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ABSTRACT 
Anti-Carbonism or Carbon Exceptionalism:  
A Discursive Project of Low-Carbon City in Shenzhen, China 
Yunjing Li 
As the role of cities in addressing climate change has been increasingly recognized over the 
past two decades, the idea of a low-carbon city becomes a dominant framework to organize urban 
governance and envision a sustainable urban future. It also becomes a development discourse in 
the less developed world to guide the ongoing urbanization process. China’s efforts toward 
building low-carbon cities have been inspiring at first and then obscured by the halt or total failure 
of famous mega-projects, leading to a conclusion that Chinese low-carbon cities compose merely 
a strategy of green branding for promoting local economy. This conclusion, however, largely 
neglects the profound implications of the decarbonization discourse for the dynamics between 
the central and local governments, which together determine the rules and resources for 
development practices. The conclusion also hinders the progressive potentials of the 
decarbonization discourse in terms of introducing new values and norms to urban governance. 
This dissertation approaches “low-carbon cities” as a part of the decarbonization discourse 
and employs a discourse-institutional analysis to investigate the relationships between discourse, 
institutional arrangement, and socio-political resources for development activities. Through an 
examination of the Shenzhen International Low-Carbon City (SILCC), the dissertation answers 
three questions: (1) How does the framework of a low-carbon city affect a specific urban 
development project? (2) What is the role of the state (local/national) in promoting low-carbon 
development? and (3) What is the influence of the decarbonization discourse on institutions and 
norms of urban governance? Evidence was gathered during 2014-2017 from three fieldtrips, 39 
interviews and the review of government documents and other archives. 
The dissertation highlights how different levels of government became entangled in 
developing a local area and how, in doing so, the proponents continuously searched for ways of 
‘positioning’ their initiative in discourses that would attract higher level government support, 
maintain local coalitions, and entice international attention and investment. In this regard, 
low-carbon cities are a state discursive project. Rather than an established material goal, a 
low-carbon city is an evolving process in which the decarbonization discourse introduces a new 
set of values, metrics and governing logics into development practices and redefines the 
legitimacy and accountability of urban development. Furthermore, the local state leverages the 
interpretive flexibility within the decarbonization discourse through strategies including carbon 
labeling, weak carbonization, and carbon exceptionalism. Consequently, the state takes a 
strategic position to reconfigure the state-society as well as the environment-economy 
relationships.  
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China’s urbanization poses one of the biggest challenges to the ongoing global project of 
climate aversion. The changing lifestyle and income growth of new urbanites, who have 
increased in number by 16 million annually since the beginning of economic reform in 1978 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1978, 2017), act as a key driver underlying the country’s 
accelerating greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions, let alone the intertwined industrialization 
processes. Since China overtook the United States in 2007 as the world’s biggest contributor to 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, its urbanization (which is expected to continue for another 
couple of decades) has become a major concern for global climate governance. To a large extent, 
how effectively Chinese cities control their CO2 emissions will determine how successfully 
climate change can be addressed. 
Climate change was not a priority for municipal governments in China until mid-2007 (Qi, 
Ma, Zhang, & Li, 2008). Since the National Leading Group on Climate Change (NLGCC) was 
established in June 2007, a variety of city-focused programs have appeared to reduce local CO2 
and other GHGs emission. They can come from either local government initiatives or central 
government mandates or international organizations’ programs. Furthermore, they can focus on 
particular industrial sectors as well as social groups. Among the diverse decarbonization 
programs, low-carbon cities, which are defined as local-scale, place-based initiatives to reduce 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases emissions through a comprehensive planning approach, are of 
 2 
particular relevance to the urbanization outcomes. Up to date, nearly half of Chinese 291 cities 
have set a goal to build a low-carbon city, and a majority of them operationalize this goal in the 
plans of new towns and other newly developed urban areas (China Society for Urban Studies, 
2011).  
The efforts toward building low-carbon cities have been ambiguous. On one side, the 
extraordinary scale and scope of this initiative in Chinese cities inspires many international 
observers.1 On the other, the cessation or total failure of some ambitious low-carbon city 
programs gives rise to the suspicion that the initiative composes merely a green branding strategy 
for promoting the local economy with no guarantee of environmental ends. Currently, it is the 
latter disposition that preoccupies scholars’ interests in the topic, leading to a prevalent opinion 
that low-carbon cities have been used as a development instrument by the local government to 
facilitate growth (Chien, 2013; Liu & Salzberg, 2012). Therefore, they can be easily 
distinguished from their counterparts in the advanced capitalist societies, where a focus is placed 
on low-carbon behaviors and participatory, consensus-oriented approaches (Rutland & Aylett, 
2008).  
It would be an oversimplification to characterize Chinese low-carbon cities as a 
commonplace development instruments. As well, for planners and others, the underlying 
                                                 
1 For example, Richard Register, the coiner of the term “eco-city”, commented that “China is in the lead in lots of 
ways. One thing that you can simply see is that China is trying to build an ecological city. You don’t see the United 
States doing that.” Retrieved from 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chinas-city-of-the-future-tianjin-rises-on-wasteland/ , December 15 
2015. 
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cynicism hinders the possibility of generating positive and progressive actions. Reading them as 
a green branding strategy overlooks their profound implications for environmental governance 
and urban politics, both of which have incorporated GHG-related indicators into performance 
evaluation as well as policy discourse. Furthermore, local government’s role as development 
machine in the East Asia’s context has been subject to a ‘new developmentalism’ driven by 
renewable energy development goals (Dent, 2012, 2014). Therefore, what development and 
development instruments mean is being redefined under the framework of climate change. 
In addition, a dichotomy between Chinese and Western experiences underestimates the 
shaping power of international forces. Climate change in China has been treated from the very 
beginning as an international issue and driven mostly by external pressure (Qi et al., 2008). In 
particular, factors such as international cooperation, policy learning, and knowledge and 
technology transfers compose prominent features of existing low-carbon cities (de Jong et al., 
2013; Wu, 2016). Furthermore, such a simplified differentiation neglects the global trend of 
‘low-carbon urbanism’ (Bulkeley, Broto, & Edwards, 2012), ‘carbonization of urban governance’ 
(Rice, 2010), or ‘the new urban politics as a politics of carbon control’ (Jonas, Gibbs, & While, 
2011).  
As carbon control becomes a new ‘master concept’ of environmental regulation (Keil, 2007), 
the urban political arena has seen new concepts and planning principles such as the post-carbon 
transition, post-carbon economies, low-carbon lifestyles, zero-carbon building, carbon-neutral 
development, carbon trading, carbon footprints and so on (Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2008). 
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Existing literature on this emerging urban agenda, especially in terms of progressive potentials 
within this process for urban development practices, has focused almost exclusively on the more 
developed countries (e.g. Gibbs & Jonas, 2000; Jonas et al., 2011; North, 2009; Dierwechter & 
Wessells, 2013; While et al., 2010). Considering the less developed world accounts for a 
majority of global carbon emissions and the percentage is still expanding, it is imperative to 
investigate the parallel processes in these areas.  
The goal of this study is to better understand the dynamics and rationales of city-scale 
climate change mitigation efforts in China through a case of a low-carbon city in Shenzhen. In 
particular, the research answers three questions: (1) How does the framework of a low-carbon 
city affect a specific urban development project? (2) What is the role of the state (local/national) 
in promoting low-carbon development? and (3) What is the influence of the decarbonization 
discourse on institutions and norms of urban governance? By drawing attention to the 
relationship between the existing growth-oriented urban institutions and the ever-increasing 
urgency to control GHGs emissions from municipal jurisdictions, the study reveals the particular 
obstacles and opportunities faced by cities as they have increasingly engaged with addressing 
climate change. The study also explores the progressive potentials within these processes in 
terms of the redefined legitimacy and accountability of urban governance.  
Being situated at the intersection of sustainability policy, urban development politics, and 
environmental discourse, this study adds to an accumulating body of literature on urban 
low-carbon transformation. In particular, the study sheds some light on two ongoing debates 
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within climate governance research. First, the longstanding debate about the state’s role in 
tackling climate change has been refueled by mixed evidence of both facilitating and obstructing 
roles the state can play. The urban response to climate change has been restrained by the 
resources and powers of local government and by conflicts between economic and environmental 
objectives (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Hodson & Marvin, 2009). Recognized as a leading state in 
both economic growth and climate policy innovation, China provides an intriguing example to 
observe the relationship between the prevailing growth-oriented urban institutions and the 
imperative to control local CO2 emissions. 
Second, there is a growing debate about to what extent the new agenda of carbon control 
will challenge or reinforce urban entrepreneurialism under the neoliberal regime (e.g. Bailey, 
2007; Hudson & Marvin, 2009; Lohmann, 2001, 2008; North, 2009; Slocum, 2004; 
Swyngedouw, 2004, 2009; While et al., 2010). As ‘carbon rationing’ in urban governance—a 
process of strategic calculation driven by the instrumental goal of cutting carbon emissions—is 
widely observed in neoliberal capitalism, new questions arise with respect to the relationship 
between the city’s dual identity as a crucial site for responding to climate change as well as for 
capital accumulation. This issue is of particular significance for East Asian developmental states, 
where the decision on reconfiguring the environment-economy relations can be tricky due to an 
implicit but vital dimension of legitimacy of the state authority. In particular, China’s ‘state 
entrepreneurialism’ which combines two seemingly contradictory paradigms including 
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neoliberalism and the developmental state provides an exceptional opportunity to examine the 
socio-economic implications of the carbon-dominated urban regime (Wu, 2016).  
To achieve the above research goal, this study uses a research design that combines aspects 
of case study (Yin, 2003) and grounded theory (Charmaz, 1996) for the purpose of theorizing the 
process of Chinese low-carbon cities. Furthermore, it employs a discourse-institutional analysis 
to highlight the rhetorical aspect of carbon-themed projects and how the de-carbonization 
discourse exerts its influence through ideological and institutional spheres. Evidence was 
gathered during 2014-2017 from three fieldtrips, 39 interviews and the review of government 
documents and other archives. In doing this, the study points to an emerging trend in which the 
regime of carbon control introduces a new set of values as well as planning policy tools into 
urban development practice, thus creating new possibilities to reshape state-society as well as 
environment-economy relations. 
The main body of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 sets the context for the 
discussions of China’s low-carbon city initiatives. Given that China’s low-carbon cities are 
linked to a wide array of issues, such as the administrative and planning system, environment, 
economy restructuring, land, and urbanization, this could be an extremely vast topic. Rather than 
a survey of all the relevant themes, this chapter succinctly lays out the fundamental driving 
forces (e.g., the central government’s mitigation target and related policies, national campaign 
for new urbanization, land-use planning scheme) with a focus on the political and institutional 
context of the low-carbon city initiatives. In particular, these initiatives are contextualized with 
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respect to Chinese climate governance, urbanization, and the urban planning system respectively. 
The combination of these three forces marks a peculiar socio-political environment for creating 
low-carbon cities.  
Starting from this background information, the general research questions are raised at the 
beginning of Chapter 2, followed by an explanation of the discourse analysis method and the 
particular analytical framework used in this study. Theory development via case study requires 
building on preexisting theory (Stake, 1995). In search of particular theory as the starting point, 
three groups of existing literature are reviewed: effect of environmental discourse in 
policymaking, the role of the state in climate governance, and urban politics of carbon control. 
The results of literature review are presented in Chapter 3. 
In the following two chapters, the Shenzhen International Low-carbon City (SILCC) as the 
single case under study is presented along three story-lines: regional cooperation, 
low-carbon-eco development, and new urbanization. These story-lines represent three 
consecutive phases of the project that were characterized by varying socio-political contexts. 
Chapter 4 and 5 focus, respectively, on the parts before and after the concept of a low-carbon 
city rose to prominence. A story is told about how different levels of government became 
entangled in developing an urban district and, eventually, SILCC and how, in doing so, the 
proponents continuously searched for ways of ‘positioning’ their initiative in discourses that 
would attract central government support, maintain local collations, and entice international 
attention and investment. 
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On the basis of these descriptive accounts, the SILCC is further discussed in Chapter 6 and 7 
along two analytical concepts of strategic alliance and strategic selectivity. It was found that the 
nature, process and outcomes of the project were fundamentally influenced by the shifting 
discourses. In particular, the discourse of carbon reduction presented a superior capability in 
promoting the project by virtue of interpretative flexibility, allowing the project to be interpreted 
in drastically different ways by different actors under different situations. To better appreciate 
this interpretative flexibility, the concept of strategic alliance is introduced to reveal how the 
framework of a low-carbon city enabled cooperation independent of the preexistence of 
consensus. Furthermore, the concept of strategic selectivity is employed to demonstrate how the 
state promoted and reshaped its priorities over the course of implementing the project. The 
findings from this analysis are summarized with policy implications discussed in the concluding 







Chapter 1: Three Major Drivers of Chinese Low-Carbon Cities 
The significance of municipal action as a means of combating climate change cannot be 
overstated. Since the city’s central role in securing global sustainable development was 
established in the 1987 Brundtland Report, the potential of the city in providing solutions to 
climate change has been vibrantly discussed within academic and policy communities (Betsill & 
Bulkeley, 2007; Bulkeley et al., 2012). A product of these discussions is the concept of 
low-carbon cities, which has inspired a number of world cities to embark on a project of 
low-carbon transformation.  
In China, a parallel process was taken up as a result of policy mobility. As a country 
containing more than 100 cities with a population greater than one million and six of the world’s 
mega-cities (with a population over 10 millions) (United Nations, 2014), China quickly attracted 
the attentions of many international organizations that engaged with the concept. In 2007, the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund supported a study in Hong Kong and the city of Guangzhou on 
developing a roadmap to a low-carbon economy for the Pearl River Delta area. Around the same 
time, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) launched a Low Carbon City Initiative in China, selecting 
Shanghai and Baoding as pilot cities to enhance energy efficiency in industry, construction, and 
transportation sectors and promote renewable energy2. Since then, low-carbon cities started 
gaining ground in China. 
                                                 





Under the dual trends of the devolution of responsibility to local government and 
accelerating pressures to limit CO2 emissions, an increasing number of Chinese cities have 
incorporated the concept of low-carbon cities into urban agenda. The recent practices, however, 
deviated from the initial pathway, which was largely shaped by international influence. Rather 
than the low-carbon retrofit of existing urban areas, the concept of low-carbon cities has 
increasingly involved the creation of new urban areas. In addition, the creation of low-carbon 
cities has been an integral part of and subject to the institutional development for climate 
governance in the country.  
To a large extent, the mix of the apparently homogeneous vision and ethical claims for a 
low-carbon urban future and the dramatically different socio-political context in China has led to 
the ambiguous interpretations of implementations on the ground. In particular, in the late 2000s, 
when the concept of low-carbon cities was introduced and related experiments started, the 
country was facing a changing global economic and political environment as well as a package 
of internally initiated reforms. This shifting socio-political landscape has largely determined why 
and how the initiative has been carried out. Therefore, a closer look into these particular contexts 
is essential to truly understand Chinese low-carbon cities.  
This chapter is divided into three sections to depict the major driving forces that have given 
shape to Chinese low-carbon cities. The first section outlines the general administrative structure 
and policy process in the environmental field, which forms the basis for the institutionalization 




schemes, policies, and programs for carbon mitigation and, in particular, the National 
Low-Carbon City/Province Pilot Program. The second section lays out the institutional landscape 
of urban development and the dynamics within China’s urbanization. It focuses on two aspects 
and trends of the urbanization process, including new town development and the new 
urbanization campaign, both of which are intimately related to the emergence of low-carbon 
cities. The third section reviews the Chinese urban planning system. Special attention is directed 
to the innovative practice of strategic planning which dominates the efforts toward low-carbon 
cities. 
1.1. Low-carbon cities as response to climate change 
In China, cities are responsible for 75% of the national energy consumption and 55% of the 
total CO2 emissions (The Climate Group, 2010). In particular, the 35 largest Chinese cities 
account for 40% of the country’s total energy consumption and carbon emissions (Dhakal, 2009). 
These numbers are expected to increase considering the continuing income growth and 
urbanization: energy consumed by Chinese cities is expected to account for 83% of the country’s 
overall consumption by 2030 (The Climate Group, 2010), with China’s primary energy 
consumption projected to increase nearly 70% from 2010 to 2035 (IEA, 2011). Under these 
trends, carbon reduction has been seen as urgent and to be addressed at the city level.  




In China, the issue of climate change entered the national agenda a decade after 
environmental protection was formalized.3 In 1990, the central government established the 
National Climate Change Coordination Group under the Environment Protection Committee to 
formulate and coordinate the policies and measures related to climate change. After being 
reorganized as the Weather Evaluation Coordination Group of the State Council in 1998, the 
Group was elevated in 2007 to the National Leading Group for Climate Change, Energy 
Conservation and Emission Reduction. In the same year, the central government issued the 
National Climate Change Action Plan, which was the first national climate change program 
(Schreurs, 2011). Since then, the issue of climate change has gained increasing priority on the 
national agenda.  
The authority of the Leading Group has moved beyond the sphere of traditional 
environmental management to an inter-departmental structure. The Leading Group consists of 
the Premier of the State Council, who is the group leader, the Vice Premier, who is the deputy 
group leader, and twenty-nine directors of the ministries and commissions who are the members 
                                                 
3 A popular view holds that environmental protection in China was formalized around the 1980s with the 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Law (on trial in 1979 and promulgated in 1989) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1982 (Skinner et al., 2003). However, some environmental regulations were 
promulgated in the 1950s and 1960s, including those concerned with water and soil conservation, safe drinking 
water, and forestry (Ross and Silk, 1987). Furthermore, the first national conference on environmental protection 
was held in 1973 following a report prepared by the delegation to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm. As the predecessor of the State Environmental Protection Bureau, a 




of the group. For daily operations, a standing office4 of the Leading Group has been set in the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The NDRC has also established a 
Department of Climate Change to take the lead in the implementation of United Nations 
Framework of Climate Change Convention and related international negotiations and 
cooperation. The NDRC, which has responsibility for overseeing and planning China’s economic 
development, has become a central actor in formulating climate change strategies and policies.  
In addition to the shifting authority, climate governance in China has presented some novel 
traits compared with traditional environmental management. These new characteristics greatly 
influence the modes of carbon management in general, and more specifically low-carbon city 
initiatives. But before looking into the novel traits, it is necessary to review some of the key 
characteristics of China’s traditional environmental management. These characteristics together 
constitute the institutional environment and political culture in which climate governance is 
embedded.  
I. While lower levels of government generally follow guidelines issued by higher ones in 
the mostly top-down system, the ability of local government to determine their own 
priorities and implement policy options selectively is developing as a result of the 
increasing financial autonomy. In the environmental sector, while a four-tier 
environmental management structure, which consists of the central agency and province-, 
city-, and county-level environmental protection bureaus (EPBs), is still in use to date, 
                                                 
4 The Office of National Leading Group for Climate Change shares the same personnel, leadership, and budget with 
the Office of National Leading Group for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction, which is also set in the 
NDRC. A particular title will be chosen and used under certain circumstances considering the political context and 
the nature of affairs the entity is engaged with. This arrangement is named “one personnel, two brands” and 




and while the central environmental agency has gained increasing power and importance5, 
the responsibility for monitoring and enforcement has been largely decentralized to 
EPBs. 
II. Double lines of authority exist where a local EPB is subject to instructions from both the 
EPB of the governmental level immediately above it and the local government at its own 
level, leading to possible conflicts of interest and tensions. In practice, the local gov-
ernment of the same level usually has the final say because it is in charge of an EPBs’ 
financial resources and personnel. 
III. Partly as a result of the previous point, a local EPB is more closely aligned with the 
development ambitions of the local government at its own level than the environmental 
concerns of national regulation, giving rise to the “local protectionism”, with local 
governments blamed for protecting their own economic interests rather than the 
environment (Alford & Shen, 1998; Jahiel, 1998; Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Sun, 1996). 
IV. The performance of local government officials is evaluated based on a set of criteria that 
emphasizes economic growth. More recently, these performance criteria have included 
certain environmental indicators to provide more incentives for local managers. The 
outcomes are, however, ambiguous. For example, better control of sulfur dioxide 
emissions from power plants followed the inclusion of reduced sulfur emissions in the 
performance criteria; but the Green GDP Accounting Research project to incorporate 
environmental degradation into traditional GDP accounting failed to take effect due to 
local resistance6.  
V. Under the culture and political atmosphere of “administrative level decides all”, certain 
state-owned enterprises that are of the same or even higher administrative levels than that 
of environmental authorities could simply violate environmental regulations in practice. 
                                                 
5 In 1973, the first national-level office, the Environmental Protection Leading Group, was set up under the State 
Council. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established under the Ministry of Urban and Rural 
Construction and Environmental Protection in 1982. In 1988 it was elevated to a stand-alone agency under the State 
Council and was renamed the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA). In 1998 its administrative status 
was further promoted from an agency at sub-ministry level to the ministry level, and it was subsequently renamed 
the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). In 2008 it was upgraded from an agency under the State 
Council to a cabinet-level ministry as a part of the State Council organ with a new name, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP).  
6 In 2005, State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and National Bureau of Statistics, jointly 
launched a “Green GDP” campaign, a project designed to evaluate the performance of local officials both according 
to their economic stewardship and according to how well they protect the environment. This campaign was designed 
to increase local governments’ responsibilities for environmental regulation. However, the campaign faded away 




Although administrative penalty measures are taken to punish such violation in some 
cases, but these measures are subject to the lack of legal support and thus readily ignored. 
VI. Consensus building within the government is central to the decision-making process, as 
implementation of any policy initiative requires the cooperation of many units at various 
levels of government (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). While implementing 
environmental policies, negotiation and bargaining are preferable to pressure from above 
or direct confrontation because implementation is easily slowed by unsupportive 
bureaucracies (Sinkule & Ortolano, 1995). 
VII. Personal networks (“guanxi”), as the informal side of influence exertion, prevail over 
formal organizational structures (Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Pye, 1992). 
VIII. Public participation in the decision-making process is limited in the existence of a weak 
civil society according to Western standards, and environmental non-government 
organizations (NGOs) have remained closely tied to the state and largely perform 
functions in line with central government policies. Realizing that working in co-operation 
with the government, rather than challenging it directly, allows them an avenue of 
influence, they have usually focused on apolitical campaigns, such as battery recycling, 
or raising environmental awareness (Schwartz, 2004; Stalley & Yang, 2006; Mol & 
Carter, 2006).  
IX. Many levels of government in China have increasingly experimented with market-based 
instruments to manage the environment. Since 2007, China has introduced a series of 
environmental economic policies spanning across the areas of finance, insurance, trade, 
and taxation (Pan, 2007). These economically based instruments were further promoted 
by the 12th Five-year Plan (2011-2015). However, some observers believe that 
command-and-control regulations are still generally more effective than those using 
economic incentives (Qi et al., 2013).  
X. The international community has played a significant role in China’s environmental 
management. The institutionalization of China’s environmental management in the late 
1970s was largely a result of its reconnection with the international community and, in 
particular, participation in the 1972 UNCHE. Before the 2000s, around 15 per cent of 
China’s total environment-related spending originates from bi- and multilateral lending 
and aid (Tremayne & De Waal, 1998). Nevertheless, foreign assistance could influence 
China’s environmental policy only on less controversial issues (Mol, 2006). Despite a 
quick learner of Western environmental policy, China has been reluctant to accept foreign 
assistance accompanied by stringent environmental conditions (Rock, 2002). 
XI. Considering the socio-economic diversity across different places, especially between the 
more affluent coastal provinces and inland provinces as well as between urban and rural 




spatial patterns of the inequality are still under debate, and conclusions largely depend on 
particular indicators used to gauge regional differentiation. For example, from a 
perspective of sources of industrial pollution, He et al. (2017) found that areas inhabited 
by ethnic minorities and western regions of China carry disproportionate environmental 
burdens. Focusing on access to pollution treatment technologies, Xia et al. (2016) 
observed an existing but narrowing gap between the Central/Western area and the Eastern 
area.  
The above characteristics together point to an odd combination of top-down 
decision-making and highly decentralized discretionary power. This mixed institutional 
landscape has been further complicated by at least four trends in response to the climate change 
agenda. First, as there has been considerable institutional capacity building to address 
environmental, climate change, and energy concerns at both the national and local levels, the 
departmental and policy fragmentation has been exacerbated by the organizational foundation of 
climate governance. Besides the newly established Department of Climate Change within the 
NDRC, many other central authorities, such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD), the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), have also set up special departments responsible 
for work relating to climate change. Implementation of a climate program always involves 
multiple agencies and thus faces an extraordinarily fragmented administrative landscape with 




This is even true in the energy sector, which accounts for an overwhelming majority of 
China’s climate strategies.7 The national level policymaking is characterized by different 
departmental positions, especially those of the MOST, MIIT, and the newly established National 
Energy Administration (NEA),8 as well as competing interests of the top-five central coal-fired 
power plants with similar or even higher political status than other central agencies. The local 
levels are characterized by parallel inter-departmental interactions and state-owned grid 
operators, the entities responsible for regional organization of electricity. Under these 
circumstances, the organization of the energy regime on which a city/region is reliant is not 
coterminous with any particular administrative territory. 
Second, the central government’s limited leverage over provincial governments and 
municipalities as a result of the economic decentralization might be counteracted by the 
emerging laws and programs. For example, the energy conservation target responsibility system 
(TRS) established in the revised 2007 Energy Conservation Law “takes the completion of energy 
conservation targets as an item to assess and evaluate the performance of the local people’s 
government and the persons in charge thereof.”9 Starting from 2011, the State Council has 
applied TRS in carbon reduction, distributing the national CO2 mitigation target among different 
                                                 
7 In 2011, State Council Document No.41 positioned the energy intensity target (16% reduction of energy intensity 
per unit GDP between 2010 and 2015, established by the State Council Document No.26 in 2011) as one of the key 
measures to achieve the CO2 target. 
8 In 2008, the central government set up an energy commission and energy bureau on the basis of National Energy 
Leading Group established in 2005. In 2013, the energy bureau was integrated with the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission to form the National Energy Administration (NEA). 




provinces, autonomous regions and provincial-level municipalities. The State Council also 
requests provincial-level governments to further allocate their targets among prefectural-level 
cities and counties. This cascading system of target setting has posed unprecedented pressures on 
lower levels of government to make the national agenda of climate change a local priority. 
Thirdly, the international community has assumed ever-increasing importance in China’s 
response to climate change. As a non-Annex I party to the Kyoto Protocol, China has been able 
to benefit from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).10 Rather than providers of technical 
and financial assistance in the traditional international cooperation on environmental 
management, the international community has played an increasingly essential role in policy 
learning and transfer. This is especially the case in the eco-city and low-carbon city initiatives,11 
which are largely a result of policy mobility and transfer of low-carbon imagineering (Wu, 2015). 
In addition to the foreign private sector and transnational organizations, early experiments with 
these concepts have been characterized by international collaboration between Chinese 
                                                 
10 The CDM was established to permit industrialized countries to obtain emission reduction credits for greenhouse 
gas reduction projects taken in developing countries. As of April 2015, China had hosted over three thousand 
CDM-registered projects with direct or indirect participation of Annex I countries. These projects focused heavily 
on renewable energy, energy saving and efficiency improvements, and the capture and destruction of greenhouse 
gases with high global warming potentials (such as methane) (UNFCCC, 2017). 
11 In October 2008, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Government of Norway, and the EU 
jointly launched a project to support Chinese provincial climate change programs and projects. At the level of 
individual cities, the UK Strategic Programme Fund has supported a development, research, and planning effort to 




government and the government of another country.12 According to some commentators, if a 
foreign government is found to cooperate with the Chinese government and is willing to engage 
in investment, policy guidance and technological advice, the highest possible status for an 
eco-city project is achieved (de Jong et al., 2013). 
Lastly, additional challenges will be posed to the existing environmental inequality between 
coastal and inland regions as climate policy is mediated through different material contexts for 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. For example, the access to cutting-edge technologies and 
knowledge are distributed unevenly across different provinces. The more affluent coastal 
provinces usually become beneficiaries of advanced production technologies without effective 
mechanism for technology spillovers for their less developed counterparts (Guan, 2013). As a 
result, China’s different regions possess disparate capabilities to pursue a climate-friendly 
development, with the least developed regions often locked in the carbon-intensive pathway.  
Taken together, these nascent trends as well as the “nested” characteristics of traditional 
environmental management feature a special socio-political context for Chinese climate 
governance. This context foreshadows as China focuses on means to reduce energy consumption 
and develop related technologies, among other measures, as its climate response. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Prominent examples include Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city (Wu, 2015), Sino-Swedish Caofeidian Eco-city 




Special characteristics of Chinese carbon mitigation 
Becoming the world’s largest emitter in 2007, China has faced ever-increasing pressure to 
cut back a sharply-rising long-term greenhouse gas emission trajectory and to establish ambitious 
greenhouse gas mitigation targets. While China has exploited its status as a transition economy 
to resist binding climate mitigation goals in international negotiations (Schreurs, 2011), it 
expressed an intention to reduce its carbon intensity (CO2 emissions per unit GDP) by 40-45% 
by 2020 compared to the 2005 level during the 2009 Copenhagen conference. This international 
commitment immediately generated great institutional apprehension. Built on its energy 
conservation endeavors since 2005,13 China started incorporating the goal of carbon reduction 
into national policymaking. 
In its 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2011-2015), China, for the first time,14 set up targets to 
reduce energy use and CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 16% and 17%, respectively, by the end 
of 2015. Furthermore, the central government has applied the Target Responsibility System 
(TRS), which was introduced in 2006 and adopted as an energy-saving policy in the 11th FYP 
                                                 
13 In 2005, the Politburo (the highest decision-making body of the Communist Party of China) announced the 
national goal of reducing energy intensity by 20% in five years. The State Council designated the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as the responsible organ to oversee the energy conservation 
objectives. Since 2006, the central government has issued many policies and programs relating to various aspects of 
energy conservation and renewable energy development (Lo, 2014). 
14 As a centerpiece of China’s planned economy system, Five-Year Plans (FYP) had incorporated elements of 
energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy expansion before the carbon emissions mitigation target. The 
10th FYP (2001-2005), for instance, made specific mention of the need to increase solar, wind, and geothermal 
energy. The plan also called for the development of large grid-connected wind, solar, thermal, and photovoltaic 
power. The 11th FYP (2006-2010) set specific targets, including 20 percent reduction in energy use per unit GDP 




(2006-2010), to the implementation of the carbon reduction target. The TRS established a 
territorialized carbon management system under which the national mitigation target is 
disaggregated to local governments. In the meanwhile, many sector-based five-year plans, such 
as those of power and building industries, have also included sector-specific carbon mitigation 
targets as part of development goals. Through these plans, implementation of the national 
mitigation target is supported by both place- and sector-based allocations. 
In addition, China has developed a wide range of environmental and energy policies and 
programs that will contribute to a reduction in the growth of its CO2 emissions. For example, the 
Ten-Thousand Enterprises Energy Conservation Low-Carbon Program15 (hereafter referred to as 
Ten-Thousand Enterprises Program) regulates energy-intensive enterprises with an annual 
consumption equal to or higher than 10,000 tons of coal equivalent. The program includes 
16,018 enterprises that collectively account for approximately 60% of the total energy 
consumption of China. It is expected to contribute approximately 37% of the total energy saving 
target set in the 12th FYP (Lo, 2015).  
Another example is the CO2 emissions trading program. In 2011, the NDRC approved five 
cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen) and the two provinces of Hubei 
and Guangdong to carry out experiments on a carbon emission trading scheme. Similarly, many 
low-carbon programs in China have assumed an experimental character and designated particular 
                                                 
15 The program was established in 2011 by the NDRC as a successor to the Thousand Enterprises Energy 




sets of localities as pilot or demonstration projects. This place-based strategy, which was 
established by the State Council in 2011,16 has given rise to many local efforts at carbon control, 
among which the initiatives of low-carbon city make an important genre.  
Before a further look into these low-carbon city initiatives, it should be clarified that Chinese 
carbon reduction is distinguished from the Western countries by three salient features. First, a 
larger fraction of the total CO2 emissions is within the government’s control through the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) system as well as the command-and-control relations between 
central and local governments. Many SOEs owned by the central government, such as China 
National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, and the top-five 
coal-fired power plants, are the country’s largest and most carbon-intensive businesses, let alone 
the numerous local SOEs engaging in power generation, petrochemical fining, steel and cement 
production.  
As for the strong political supervision and the authority over leadership appointment, the 
government is in an advantageous position to intervene in these entities’ carbon management. 
For example, the central SOEs participating in the Ten-Thousand Enterprises Program are 
directly controlled by the central government through the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission. Furthermore, the State Council officially required large-scale 
power plants to control their CO2 emissions under 550g/kw⋅h by 2020 (State Council, [2016] 61). 
                                                 
16 In 2011, State Council Document No.41 called for building of low-carbon province, cities, districts, and 




This regulatory power distinguished China’s carbon governance from the carbon control in 
democratic societies, where the bulk of the planned carbon reductions lies outside of areas where 
the government has direct control.17 
The second feature of Chinese carbon governance is the use of compulsory measures to 
control carbon emissions. For example, the government has forced the closure of thousands of 
the most energy-inefficient and highly polluting firms; some of them were shut down on short 
notice via sudden top-down decisions (Schreurs, 2011). Compulsory measures have also been 
taken to regulate ordinary people’s life. Use of automobiles was strictly limited during special 
events such as the 2008 Olympic in Beijing and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. Similar 
controls on automobile use have been further introduced to many cities to limit carbon emissions 
from everyday traffic flow. Such interventions in personal behaviors and lifestyles provide 
Chinese government higher leverage on the society’s carbon performance. 
Thirdly, Chinese carbon governance is an integral part of its official evaluation system and 
thus characterized by extra political significance. The National People’s Congress enacted the 
revised Energy Conservation Law in 2007, stating that work on energy conservation carried out 
by local government officials should be integrated into the assessment of their political 
performance along with output growth (NPC, 2007). Since 2008, governors of province-level 
                                                 
17 Taking the famously climate-engaged city of Seattle for example, the emissions produced by the city’s own 
operations (known as a city’s corporate emissions and generally from municipal buildings, fleet, street lighting and 
signaling, and methane emissions from the municipal dump and sewage processing) accounted for roughly 9% of 
the total emission in 2002. Under the circumstances, many North American cities (Toronto, Chicago and Calgary, 




governments have been required to report on their efforts to save energy and reduce pollutant 
discharge (Qi et al., 2007; Gang, 2009).  
More recently, similar requirements have been integrated into low-carbon schemes such as 
the Ten-Thousand Enterprises Program and the TRS for carbon reduction targets. Under the 
former scheme, enterprise-specific carbon reduction targets for local SOEs and private enterprises 
were negotiated with provincial and local governments, which would be punished if enterprises in 
their jurisdictions failed their reduction targets. Punishment includes the responsible officials 
being ineligible for promotion for one year and restriction on investment in new energy-intensive 
projects (Lo, 2015). This arrangement has given local government officials incentives to make 
sure that enterprises comply with carbon reduction targets. 
The TRS has presented a more complicated political landscape as the central government 
allocates the national target between provinces, but leaves decisions on further distribution of 
allowances to province-level governments. In reality, different local governments have made 
totally opposite decisions. On one side, some local governments set up lower targets in advance 
to target distribution by their respective supervisors. These self-established targets were often 
accepted and adopted in official mitigation plans at higher levels of the government. On the other, 
some local governments proposed more ambitious targets than the regional average in the hope 
that a higher target would contribute to local officials’ political achievement and promotion 




reduction represents a complex political landscape filled with cross-level dynamics and strategic 
calculations rather than a strictly top-down command-and-control tool. 
Low-carbon city initiatives 
With the significant devolution of powers to lower-level governments in the reform era, 
promoting model cities is a customary strategy of China’s central government to mobilize 
municipal governments to achieve national agendas. It is especially popular in environment 
governance due to fragmented power in the environmental field and the consequent policy 
misimplementation at local levels (Marks, 2010; Ran, 2013). Since 1990s, a package of national 
programs including model cities of environmental protection (NEPA), green cities (SFA), 
sanitary cities (MOH), garden cities (MOHURD), tourist cities (CNTA), and harmonious 
community development cities (MCA) have been implemented by multiple central agencies to 
improve urban sustainability.  
Of particular relevance to the emergence of low-carbon cities is the concept of eco-cities. In 
2003, the then SEPA initiated a program to establish eco-counties, eco-cities, and eco-regions 
nationwide for purposes of a resource conservative and environment-friendly society. In 2004, 
the then MOC upgraded its National Garden City program to the Eco-Garden City Program in 
response to the ascending political discourse of sustainable development. Compared to the 
garden city appraisal standards, eco-garden city assessments look to such additional factors as 
quantitative measures of ecological protection, standards for ecological construction and 




environment, and public satisfaction (Zhou et al., 2012). When the idea of a low-carbon city 
appeared, it was simply a combination of the notion of low-carbon development and the eco-city 
concept (Qiu, 2009). 
The city’s significant role in reducing carbon emissions was established in China in the late 
2000s though programs initiated by international organizations such as the Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund and the World Wildlife Fund. Later on, following China’s announcement of the mitigation 
target at the COP-15, city-level carbon management started receiving more attention from 
policymakers. The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and 
Development (CCICED) themed its 2010 Roundtable Meeting “City Low-Carbon Transitions 
and Green Development” to provide energy- and environment-related policy recommendations 
to the government under the emerging carbon mitigation regime. Up to date, a couple of central 
agencies have established city-based programs that are named in different ways but share a 
common objective of reducing greenhouse gases (Table 1.1).  
Program Name Priorities Promoters Scope 
Low-Carbon City/Province Pilot 
Program 
Low-carbon development plan 
making; low-carbon industry; 
collection and management of 
greenhouse gases emissions data; 
design of TRS within jurisdictions; 
low-carbon lifestyle and 
consumption (NDRC Dept. 
Climate Change [2010]1587) 
NDRC 2010: 8 cities & 
5 provinces 







Low-carbon Eco-city Pilot 
Program  
Exclusive to new developed urban 
areas and new towns; land 
conservation; proximity and 
connection to existing cities; green 
transportation; institutional 
capacity building (MOHURD 
[2011]78) 
MOHURD 2012: 8 cities 
Energy Efficiency and Emissions 
Mitigation Fiscal Policy 
Demonstrating City Pilot 
Program 
Low-carbon industry; low-carbon 
transportation system; green 
buildings and building sector’s 
energy conservation; development 
of service sector; pollutants 
control; development of renewable 




2011: 8 cities 
2013: 10 cities 
Low-carbon transportation 
system pilot program 
Energy efficiency of transportation 
system; promotion of alternative 
energy in the transportation sector; 
promotion of energy-saving and 
low-carbon technologies; 
popularizing green commuting;  
establishing management system 
for transportation-related emissions 
(MOT Dept. Policy and Regulation 
[2011]53) 
MOT 2011: 10 cities 
2012: 16 cities 
Smart city pilot program Integration of urbanization, 
industrialization and development 
of information technologies; urban 
logistics public information 
platform; institutional capacity 
building (MOHURD General 
Office [2013]5) 
MOHURD Jan. 2013: 90 
cities 
Aug. 2013: 103 
cities 
2015: 13 cities 
Sponge city pilot program Plans for flooding and extreme 
weathers; underground conduit and 




2015: 16 cities 




heat island effects; development of 
public-private partnership for 
related projects (MOF Dept. 
Economic Development 
[2014]838) 
Table 1.1: National city-based carbon reduction programs (multiple sources, complied by the author) 
Among others, the Low-Carbon City Pilot Program, which is the first central level program 
with an explicit subject of low-carbon cities, has particular political significance. As a policy 
response to the State Council’s official promise that China would cut its carbon emission 
intensity by 40% to 45% by 2020, the NDRC, which acted as the leading central agency for 
climate policy making and had responsibility for setting the national carbon emissions mitigation 
target in the five-year plans and allocating it among different provinces, launched this pilot 
program to encourage local efforts toward carbon reduction.  
The status of this program is also distinguished by the NDRC’s role as the most powerful 
Chinese bureaucracy in charge of planning and administration of Chinese economy. Under its 
vertical administration structure, the NDRC has many local branches at provincial, municipal 
and county levels, and a local DRC is responsible to the DRC at its immediate upper level as 
well as the local government of the same level. According to Chinese administrative approval 
system,18 a development project needs to be approved by the NDRC or a DRC of a particular 
                                                 
18 Under this system, many infrastructure-related urban development projects, such as satellite cities, large-scale 
urban renewal, rail transit, and renewable energy development, must be approved by the NDRC to receive grants 





level depending on its scale and size of investment. In general, admission into a NDRC program 
like the Low-Carbon City Pilot Program will give a locality extra access to central funding and 
political attention.  
Three groups of pilot projects have been established under this program in 2010, 2014 and 
2016, respectively. As a result, a total of 81 municipalities and 6 provinces have become national 
pilot low-carbon city/province. Geographically, they represent all of the 31 provincial and 
provincial-level administrative units in China. Despite the geographic diversity, these pilot 
projects have proposed similar strategies for mitigating local CO2 emissions such as industrial 
restructuring, increasing renewable energy mix, green buildings and upgrading transportation 
system.  
In addition, a focus has been consistently placed on a capital investment approach and new 
construction (green buildings, on-site power, public transit facilities, etc.) rather than an 
operating approach. These similarities across different localities situated in dramatically different 
natural and economic contexts have raised concern about the effectiveness of the Low-Carbon 
City Pilot Program and the top-down carbon policy in general (speech of Xie Zhenhua at 
National Pilot Low-Carbon Pilot City/Province Conference, December 2013). 
Aside from programs initiated at higher levels of government, cities have also found an inner 
urgency to manage local carbon emissions in the face of top-down mitigation target allocation. 




themselves as “eco-cities”,19 and a sub-group of 133 cities had established specific targets to 
develop as “low-carbon cities” (Chinese Society for Urban Studies, 2011).  
1.2. Low-carbon cities as new forms of urbanization 
Chinese urbanization has been highly dependent upon urban sprawl and energy-intensive 
pathways and thus responsible for a considerable portion of the country’s environmental 
degradation and ecological depletion. In particular, a high correlation exists between 
urbanization rate and CO2 emissions in China.20 Changing lifestyle drives the increase of energy 
use and carbon emissions.21 In many Chinese cities, the levels of per capita carbon emissions are 
now comparable or even higher than that in the developed world (Wang et al., 2012). 
It is estimated that the per capita carbon footprint of an urban resident is more than three 
times that of a person living in rural areas.22 Further evidence shows that people in newly 
developed urban areas emit more carbon dioxide per person than people in existing urban areas 
(Glaeser & Kahn, 2008). Given the rapidly rising emission levels tied to urbanization and, in 
particular, expansion of urban areas, China is under considerable pressure to tackle the dual 
challenges of urbanization and climate change. In response, many local places connect the 
                                                 
19 http://leaders.people.com.cn/n/2014/0106/c359550-24033524.html  
20 According to He’s (2010) research, there is a consistently positive correlation of 0.9731 between urbanization 
rate and CO2 emissions in China, meaning that the country’s urbanization processes were an important contributor 
to the growth in CO2 emissions. 
21 An astonishing example is with the city of Wuhan, which grew from a population of 8.01 million and 9.7 tons of 
CO2 emissions per capita (tCO2/capita) in 2005 to 8.27 million and 15.2 tCO2/capita in 2011 (Want et al., 2015). 
22 The per capita urban Chinese carbon footprint was 8 tons/year of CO2 emissions in 2009 (Feng et al., 2012), 
which was almost similar to the EU average. Every rural Chinese resident generated 2.3 tons/year of CO2 emissions 




low-carbon concept with their schemes for urbanization or urban renewal. The idea of a 
low-carbon city is thus becoming a popular framework under which urbanization is conceived 
and conducted. 
Drivers of Chinese urbanization 
The speed and scale of rural-urban transformation witnessed in China over the last three 
decades has been a result of myriad factors ranging from dismantling of agricultural collectives 
to rapid industrial development. While the process is closely related to the country’s transition to 
a market economy, it actually follows the mentality of a developmental state rather than the logic 
of global capital (Wu, 2016). Specifically, three urban-scale strategies of the developmental state 
act as key drivers of Chinese urbanization, including (1) commodification and marketization of 
land, (2) municipal financing, and (3) administrative approval system. These driving forces also 
constitute fundamental dynamics underlying Chinese low-carbon cities in newly urbanized areas. 
The first force is land commodification and the consequent real estate boom. After a long 
period during which urban construction was primarily led by the state, the land and real estate 
market was established in the early 1990s. Private developers were allowed to purchase Land 
Use Rights (LURs) from the government and gain profits from the market. Since then, urban 
China has seen the rise of all sorts of commercialized projects of real estate development such as 
central business districts (CBD), residential complexes and gated communities, industrial 
enclaves, shopping malls, and luxury hotels and tourist districts. Completed new construction 




and 2000s, respectively (China Statistics Yearbook, 2016, 2005). It is further estimated that 40% 
of the building stock by 2030 will be constructed after 2010 (Liu et al., 2010). Between 2011 and 
2015, annual completed new construction averaged over 3,841 million square-meters of floor 
area (China Statistics Yearbook, 2016). 
The fast urban property development has become one of the strongest pillars underlying 
China’s economy. Since 2009, a consistent over 6 percent of national GDP has come from 
construction sector, and the sector’s growth rate surpassed the overall economic growth until 
2014 (MOHURD, 2016). As a result, Chinese urbanization has an overwhelming focus on new 
physical construction. 
Related to this inclination is the second driving force of Chinese urbanization, which is the 
municipal finance mechanism. Since the 1994 tax reform, municipal governments have taken on 
the responsibility to provide local infrastructures and services. In the face of incompatibilities 
between tighter budget constraints and growing expenditures, especially capital expenditures 
needed for urbanization as well as industrial development, municipal governments have sought 
to generate income in the form of extra-budgetary revenues. As the land lease market was 
established under the exclusive supervision of local governments, fees from leasing LURs has 
become an increasingly crucial source of extra-budgetary revenues. At the national level, 
land-related revenue grew from less than 10% of total local budgets in 1999 to 55% in the late 
2000s, and land leasing fees accounted for as much as 80%-100% of the funds needed to finance 




share of income from land leases in the local extra-budgetary revenue was about 30% at the 
provincial level and as high as 87% at the prefecture and country levels (Lin, 2009; Tao, 2010). 
Such land-based financing in urban China is further stimulated by various kinds of local 
government financing vehicles (LGFVs), which are established, owned, and supervised by local 
governments to borrow on their behalf.23 Many LGFVs, usually under the name of urban 
development investment corporations, are given parcels of public land by the state as starting 
assets and collateral for borrowing from commercial banks. More than often, LGFVs also engage 
with land development and construction of on-site structures to capture the accrued land values 
to the greatest extent. Under this situation, local governments accumulate capital through a 
monopoly on LURs transfer on one hand and, on the other, LGFVs becoming active players in 
the real estate market. Property development, especially large-scale new construction, is 
therefore given high priority by municipal governments for fiscal purposes.  
The third driving force is the discretionary power of local governments within the Chinese 
administrative approval system. Every development project is required to obtain a series of 
approvals from the government before implementation. The centerpiece consists of “one report 
and two permits”, including a site selection report, a land use planning permit, and a building 
                                                 
23 Under Chinese Budget Law, local governments are barred from borrowing from commercial banks on their own, 
and so have turned to wholly-owned corporations to raise money for infrastructure and other projects by 
borrowing. The first LGFV was established by Shanghai municipal government in 1992. By the end of 2010, there 




permit.24 These documents, all of which are issued by local planning departments, as well as the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) issued by local EPBs constitute the fundamentals for 
developers to apply for overall project approval from the DRC system, which is a mandatory step 
to initiate a formal development project.  
In practice, local governments can, however, facilitate particular projects through 
manipulating the review and approval processes. With the economic transition speeding up since 
1991 and the establishment of the real estate market around the same period, cases abounded 
where local governments used elimination of EIA requirements to attract foreign investment in 
urban construction (Mao & Hills, 2002). In the planning field, variant or simplified review 
processes were sanctioned by local governments under formal and informal approval of key local 
politicians to secure and facilitate projects that were considered as holding great potential to 
generate local good. Ironically, the regulatory power within local governments for purposes of 
controlling and supervising development activities can function as precipitant for hasty urban 
development. 
New town development and urban expansions 
As a result of a wave of administrative boundary changes in the early 2000s, a typical Chinese 
municipality nowadays consists of a central-city built area along with several suburban 
districts/counties on the periphery, within which most of land was originally for agricultural use 
(Zhang & Wu, 2006). For a municipal government, the conversion of farmland into urban use is a 
                                                 




critical revenue generator as well as meeting growing demand for space during the urbanization 
process. The value of this revenue stream was greatly enhanced by the Constitution and several 
amendments which specify that only the state can undertake the rural-urban land use conversion. 
Municipal governments acquire rural land at low prices set by the state based on agricultural 
revenues and relocations costs, improve the land with urban infrastructure, and then sell or auction 
the LURs to developers for property development.  
Stimulated by considerable revenue from such land leases and a booming real estate market, 
local governments have been eager to expand urban areas by establishing various types of new 
towns, such as economic and technological development zones (ETDZs), science parks, bond 
areas, college towns and high education parks (Chien, 2013). More recently, this practice has been 
added by low-carbon eco-cities as a result of increasing pressures for local governments to address 
the environmental problem and climate change in particular. Commentators believe that these 
efforts mark “the third round of new town development” in contemporary China after the ETDZs 
fever in 1980s and the college town fever from the late 1990s onwards (Chien, 2013; also see Lin, 
2012; Wu, 2015). 
Widespread new town development has resulted in dramatic rural-urban land conversion over 
the past decades. In the 1990s, the scale of such conversion amounted to an average of 1,022 km2 
per year. Between 1978 and 1996, 4.2% of the country’s farmland was converted into land for 
urban construction. Given the monopoly on rural land requisition as well as LURs transfer in the 




their term of office, leading to disordered overdevelopment. The over-reliance on spatial extension 
and the consequent massive rural-urban land conversion makes a prominent feature of Chinese 
urbanization and largely explains its outrageous environmental costs. 
Driven by concerns over national food security as well as environmental degradation, the 
central government has strengthened its regulation over rural-urban land conversion since the late 
1990s. After the revision of the Land Administration Law in 1998, it set annual quotas for the total 
amount of land conversion which could not be exceeded. Later on, an influential policy of ‘1.8 
billion mu25 farmland threshold’ (shi ba yi mu hong xian) was stipulated in 2005. The policy 
requires all local governments to collectively ensure a minimum of 1.8 billion mu of farmland at 
the national level. To achieve this goal, the total ceiling amount is divided among different 
localities as farmland protection targets, which are further set as performance indicators for 
evaluating local leaders. As a result, local governments could not arbitrarily convert rural land for 
urban development. 
The strengthened land control by the central government has imposed considerable constraints 
upon new town development. In particular, limits on construction land could have been a 
significant obstacle for local governments to carry out low-carbon eco-city projects. For example, 
the well-planned Dongtan Eco-city in Shanghai, failed to be implemented due to the lack of 
available construction land as well as inter-level conflicts and political scandals within the 
government (Wu, 2015). As well, some eco-city projects, such as Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city 
                                                 




and Caofeidian Eco-City, were proposed on non-arable saltpan areas to bypass the restrictions on 
land conversion (Chien, 2013).  
While land regulation has become a serious limitation for local governments to pursue the 
sprawl-style urbanization as before, new town development did not completely stop or wither. 
Indeed, the 2000s witnessed massive development in outer suburban areas and the proliferation of 
multifunctional new towns (Shen & Wu, 2017), including those known by name of ‘low-carbon 
cities’. People and entities pursuing such a pathway do, however, need a distinctive set of 
strategies and tools for new town development under the new, strict land policies.  
In particular, some new town projects initiated by local governments skillfully apply related 
policies to promote their viability. A prominent example lies with the 2000 policy of land quotas, 
which allowed construction land quotas to be interchangeable between rural and urban areas. More 
specifically, a certain amount of rural land could be converted to construction use if an equal 
amount of construction land within the same municipal jurisdictions was reclaimed for agricultural 
use (MLR, 2000; State Council, 2004). Originally, this policy was adopted by the central 
government to facilitate the national goal of farmland preservation. Local governments could, 
however, take advantage the same policy to carry out suburban development through various 




For instance, some local governments claimed farmers’ homestead land for agricultural use 
and relocate these farmers in new mid- to high-rise residential buildings.26 The increased 
population density released additional land, which was then converted to construction use. In 
addition, some local governments obtained new construction land quotas by transforming 
unavailable land into agricultural use.27 As well, construction land in the remote countryside were 
converted into agricultural use to create new construction land in peri-urban areas where property 
value has a higher growth potential. As a result of these practices, the provision of newly increased 
construction land has remained at a high level. New town development has become more strategic, 
rather than impracticable, under the strict land policies. 
 
 
National campaign for new modes of urbanization 
Urbanization has long been an integral part of China’s planned economy. The status of 
“under-urbanization” in the pre-reform era was a result of the national strategy to promote 
industrialization while at the same time limiting its indirect costs of urbanization, and the 
“incomplete urbanization” in the early reform era was realized through the household registration 
(hukou) system (Chan, 2010). In 1998, the central government advised that urbanization be an 
                                                 
26 Rural homestead land is owned by the rural collectives with use rights assigned to rural households based on 
household size and other factors.  
27 Unavailable land refers to land that is impossible or hard to be used for everyday human activities. Examples 




important approach to addressing the “three rural issues” (san nong wen ti): agriculture, rural 
areas and farmers. The country’s 10th FYP (2001-2005), for the first time, proposed promoting 
urbanization as a key national development strategy.  
After two decades of rapid growth, on January 17th, 2012, the NBS announced that the 
country’s urbanization rate for the first time exceeded the symbolic 50% threshold during the 
previous year. The news triggered widespread debate in both academic and policy communities 
about problems associated with China’s unprecedented urbanization, such as environmental 
degradation, ecological depletion, living conditions and welfare of rural migrants, inefficient 
infrastructure, and deficiency of high-quality facilities and services. Participants in the debate 
called for improvement in these areas and a shift to a more sustainable pathway for urban 
development. 
These voices together gave rise to nation-wide policy discourse of new modes of 
urbanization that entailed innovative approaches to urban development. The discourse gained 
momentum at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in November 
2012 when the Chinese leadership singled out urbanization as the main driver of the economy in 
the coming years and introduced the new urbanization initiative. The then President Hu Jintao 
addressed in his speech: 
We should carry over Chinese style of industrialization toward a new pathway 
through advancing development of information technologies (IT), urbanization 
and agricultural modernization. We should promote integration of IT application 




coordination between urbanization and agricultural modernization, thus 
promoting coordinated development of industrialization, IT application, 
urbanization and agricultural modernization. 
By then, new urbanization became one of China’s most pressing policy issues. The first 
Central Urbanization Work Conference was held in Beijing in December 2013. The country’s 
new leadership, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, delivered speeches 
during the conference, signaling the Xi administration’s strong interest to promote this emerging 
agenda to deflect urbanization from the previous developmental trajectory. The central 
government followed this up with the launch of National New Urbanization Plan (2014-2020) in 
March 2014. The plan is the first urbanization-focused national program in China and anticipates 
that 60% of the population will live in cities by 2020, up from 54% in 2013 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2014).  
The National Urbanization Plan provides a broad framework to integrate a variety of 
interdependent national policy priorities such as migration, land, food security, environmental 
protection, technological development, industrial upgrading, and social welfare. In particular, it 
proposes institutional reforms in five main areas, namely the household registration system, land, 
fiscal and taxation, housing and environment. It designates the NDRC as the leading central 
agency for the program, thus providing the DRC system across different levels of government 
with extra power in the urban sphere. Hence, new urbanization has come to be considered as the 
“iteration of China’s national policy platform” under the latest administration and a potential 




Many follow-up measures as well as the Plan of itself will influence the building of 
low-carbon cities through many regulations with respect to land, environment, industry, and 
technology.28 Specifically, targets are set for an array of infrastructure, resource and 
environment indicators, including public transport share, percentage of on-site waste 
decontamination and wastewater treatment, share of renewable energy and green building, and 
air quality. Given that these areas compose at the same time important elements of low-carbon 
cities, the National New Urbanization Plan will further stimulate such initiatives to achieve the 
targets. However, the more stringent land management suggested by the Plan, especially in terms 
of tightened constraint on rural-urban land conversion, will pose serious challenge to projects 
planned in newly urbanized areas or involving massive new construction, which characterize a 
majority of Chinese low-carbon cities.  
Another implicit but profound impact of the new urbanization program upon low-carbon city 
initiatives is related to the reconfigured urban planning system. To facilitate implementation at 
local levels, the central government calls upon local governments to develop their own local 
                                                 
28 The central government has initiated many measures to advance the Plan. For instance, in July 2014, the State 
Council advised that rural-urban distinctions under the household registration system be scrapped; by August 2015 
over 20 provinces had issued regional measures to relax the Hukou system. In June 2015 the State council 
announced the intention to renovate dilapidated buildings of 18 million housing units in the urban areas and 10.6 
million in the rural areas during 2015 and 2017. In July 2015 the Ministry of Land Resources selected 33 regions 
nationwide as the trial locations for rural land reform. In August 2015 the State Council urged local authorities to 
upgrade the underground conduit and pipeline system to certain standards by 2020. The State Council in April 2015, 
granted the Compendium for the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Metropolitan Region and 
the plan of establishing the fourth urban agglomeration around the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. The official 
website of the National Development of Reform Commission indicates that China is going to develop more new 




urbanization plans and policies according to the framework laid out in the national plan. As a 
result, the new urbanization program has created a new planning apparatus parallel with the 
existing economic, land-use, and urban planning systems, thus challenging the existing planning 
process and institutional structure of urban development.  
1.3. Low-carbon cities as strategic planning 
The creation of low-carbon cities entails various forms and degrees of interactions with the 
functioning urban planning system. For example, new land use plans are usually prepared to 
guide low-carbon cities and sometimes contradict existing plans promulgated by the local 
government. Both the approval of new plans and the revision of existing plans need to undergo a 
review process which is supervised by local planning authorities. In addition, every single 
project containing some elements of new construction must obtain the required planning 
permissions before proceeding. Therefore, the configuration of the urban planning system 
exercises a great influence on the working mechanisms for building low-carbon cities. 
Basic components of the statutory urban planning system 
Despite a long planning tradition, an urban planning system with statutory status was not 
formalized until the country’s first law in this field, the City Planning Law, was enacted in April 
1, 1990. Under the current legal framework, development control is enforced by the local 
government through regulation of land uses at the parcel level. In particular, a two-level planning 
system is established to achieve development control (Fig). The macro-level is the urban master 




structures, general land uses, and the distribution of major infrastructures. In some larger cities, 
such as Shenzhen under this study, divisional plans (fenqu guihua) are prepared to supplement 
the master plan with more detailed guidance on urban development. A divisional plan plays a 
similar role to the master plan, but it applies to only a small part of the city, usually an urban 
district, which is the location of rapid development. 
 
Figure 1.1: Chinese statutory urban planning system 
The micro-level is composed of two types of detailed plans, including the zoning-style 
regulatory plans (kongzhixing xiangxi guihua) and the design-oriented constructive-detailed 
plans (xiujianxing xiangxi guihua). The former provides a set of quantitative indexes to control 
land use, construction density, traffic capacity, and infrastructures, and the latter provides further 









Master plans City function, population size, industrial specialization, and spatial structure of the city
Divisional plans (optional) District-scale plans with similar contents as master plans and more details
Regulatory plans
Major elements include boundaries of land 
parcels, building height and density, transport 
lines, entrance and setback from the street, 
layout of pipelines, etc.
Constructive-detailed plans 
(optional)
Architectural and landscape design (e.g. three-





horizon, the detailed plans are prepared for directing construction to be carried out in the near 
future. In many cases, detailed plans are drafted for areas facing immediate construction.  
Among the different types of plans within the statutory planning system, only master plans 
and regulatory plans are legally required and implemented, while divisional and 
constructive-detailed plans are rarely voluntarily performed. A result of this selective practice is 
that constructive-detailed plans are often proposed by individual developers of particular land 
parcels in a patchwork fashion. This gives developers considerable bargaining power to negotiate 
with the planning authorities and the official plans. They are able to define many aspects of 
urban development, such as land uses and building densities, although their proposals need to 
obtain the planning authorities’ approval to go into effect. 
When the City Planning Law was formulated, the land market had not yet emerged, and 
“developers” mainly included state work-units and other state agents who acquired land through 
administrative allocation and carried out state capital projects in accordance with the centrally 
planned economy. With the establishment of the land market, an increasing number of private 
developers started engaging with urban construction, leading to a more chaotic landscape for 
planning practice. Land leasing may proceed before the preparation of the statutory plans, 
although they should theoretically follow planning requirements according to the law. Under the 
circumstances, the current statutory planning system has fallen short of the promise to effectively 




This trend has been particularly obvious in the peri-urban and suburban areas where a 
majority of Chinese low-carbon cities are located. For a long period of time, the areas outside the 
central city were managed by a parallel rural planning system and not subject to the legal 
framework set by the City Planning Law. The planning reform initiated in the late 1990s has 
broken down the urban-rural dual planning system to promote metropolitan and regional 
development. An updated version of the 1990 City Planning Law, the Urban and Rural Planning 
Law, was enacted in 2008 to facilitate the emerging national agenda of urban-rural integration 
under the Hu administration. Under this law, urban and rural planning is unified, and a master 
plan should cover the whole municipal jurisdiction, including the central city as well as the 
peripheral suburbs. In addition, the method of regulatory plans is applied to suburban and rural 
areas to regulate new development. 
Planmaking has, however, generally been outpaced by China’s rapid urbanization. The 
approval of a master plan can take many years, by which time it is well out-of-date. In addition, 
the existing system of checks and balances is generally insufficient to ensure that master plans, 
when approved, are not arbitrarily modified by local government officials. As a result, the 
statutory planning system intended for development control has turned out to be subservient to 
the development ambitions of the local government, which have been largely reflected in the 
spatial expansion of the urban areas. 




Aside from the statutory planning system, an innovative form of ‘non-statutory plans’, or 
so-called ‘conceptual plans”, have emerged since the turn of the century. Following 
Guangzhou’s first experiment with the conceptual plan in 2000 (Lu, et al., 2010; Wang et al., 
2011; Xu et al., 2012), more than 200 large or middle-sized cities in China started preparing 
similar urban plans in the early 2000s (Chen et al., 2013). Prominent examples between 2000 and 
2003 included Nanjing, Hangzhou, Hefei, Harbin, Xiamen, Suzhou, Haikou, Shijiazhuang, and 
Quanzhou (Wu & Zhang, 2007). 
These early practices were largely a response to the expanding urban areas, within which 
many parts had been considered as ‘rural’ and thus excluded from the statutory planning system. 
While the preparation of a conventional master plan was time-consuming considering the formal 
plan-making process required by the City Planning Law, a non-statutory plan could provide an 
immediate solution to the city’s changing spatial layout. As the name ‘conceptual plan’ suggests, 
these non-statutory plans were aimed at formulating the ‘concept’ of metropolitan development 
(Wu, 2015).  
In practical applications, the conceptual plan mainly concerned the spatial structure of a 
metropolitan region and, in particular, the relationship between the central city and outer suburbs. 
Being “expansionist” and “growth-oriented” by nature, the conceptual plan often specified the 
location of ‘growth corridors’ or ‘growth poles’ to direct future urban expansions (Ibid). The 
conceptual plan also included ecological considerations by setting aside certain land as natural 




to a master plan with respect to spatial strategies (Li, 2003; Zou, 2003). The conceptual plans 
emerging in the early 2000s generally sketched a vision of polycentric metropolis for many 
traditional compact Chinese cities. 
Because the statutory planning system has not imposed any requirement on the conceptual 
plan, great flexibilities could exist within the plan-making process as well as the content. In 
contrast to the more enclosed process of plan-making in the statutory plans, planning contests 
have become a common practice to involve external, sometimes international, consultancy. As 
the organizer of such contests and subsequently the “client” of planning consultancy, the local 
government has been able to substantially influence planmaking. In many cases, the conceptual 
plan became a reflection of local leaders’ development aspirations with a slogan which 
epitomized their political statements.29 As a result, a conceptual plan might be arbitrarily 
abandoned when the local leadership changed. The undefined legal status has meant considerable 
inconsistency in the implementation of the conceptual plan. 
To a large extent, the non-statutory plans have been used opportunistically as tools to 
achieve local development goals, which have been mostly to enhance a city’s economic 
competitiveness against the new background characterized by inter-urban competition.30 
                                                 
29 For example, Hangzhou proposed to build a ‘silicon valley in the city of heaven’; Shantou Strategic Plan has an 
English slogan suggesting the development of a ‘coastal metropolitan garden city’ and a Chinese slogan as ‘the city 
of Chao Chinese; elegant and exquisite Shantou; an international, coastal, landscaping, humanity metropolis” (Wang 
& Dubbeling, 2013). 
30 The imperative that cities compete against each other is relatively new in China. In the pre-reform era, cities were 




Following a competitive mentality, these plans have often included regional analysis to position 
the subject city in the region in comparison with other cities. In addition, the local government 
has also incorporated a variety of place promotion strategies in planmaking, such as the 
invention and dissemination of slogans associated with the plans (Wu, 2015). As another name 
of ‘strategic plan’ indicates, the non-statutory plans have increasingly functioned as tactics to 
increase a city’s competitiveness.31  
The status of non-statutory plans was officially recognized by the central government 
through a series of ordinances starting from 2005.32 These ordinances together established the 
role of strategic plans as preliminary study for the master plan. Therefore, a mutual supportive 
and coordinated relationship between the statutory and non-statutory plans was developed (Wang 
                                                                                                                                                             
pursue development goals of their own. The mindset of competing against each other emerged in Chinese cities after 
the economic devolution and, in particular, the 1994 tax reform. The inter-urban competition further intensified after 
China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, as the prosperousness of cities were 
largely dependent upon participating in the global economy as well as capturing the globally mobile capital.  
31 In China, the term strategic plan has both a broad and a narrow definition. In the broad sense, strategic plan refers 
plans with strategic thinking and can be found in different geographic scales. At the national level, there are 
National Urban System Plan (2005-2020) and the main functional area plan. At the regional level, there are several 
provincial urban system plans, urban cluster coordination plans and regional development plans. In the narrow sense, 
strategic plan refers to strategic planning for cities. This dissertation focuses on the narrow definition of strategic 
plan. Besides the name of conceptual plan, urban strategic plan in China can be called by other names, such as urban 
strategic development plan (study) and urban strategic spatial development plan (study). 
32 In 2005, the MOHURD announced the Notice on the Preparation and Approval of City Master Plans (Building 
Code [2005] No. 2), suggesting that “before preparing the city master plan, a proactive strategic study should be 
organized to work on the strategic issues like the city positioning and spatial structure.” This statement was 
confirmed in the 2006 Measures for Urban Planning., which stipulates that “before preparing the city master plan, 
the responsible government should […] carry out the proactive study on issues like city positioning, development 
objectives, urban functions, and spatial arrangement and so on according to the national urban system plan and 





et al., 2011), although the latter remained outside the legal system. Being complementary to the 
statutory planning system, which carried the legacy of the planned economy and conformed to 
the national goals, strategic plans reflected the central government’s priorities rather than focus 
exclusively on a city’s competitiveness.  
One of the national priorities that has been pervasively reflected in the existing strategic 
plans has been sustainable development, which took priority over any other issue in the late 
2000s because of new situations facing China. Most prominently, the 2008 global financial crisis 
posed a significant threat to the country’s export-oriented economy, and the pressures to limit 
CO2 emissions accelerated after China became the world’s largest emitter in 2007. These new 
circumstances raised awareness among different levels of government of the importance of 
sustainable development in both economic and environmental terms. In addition, cities focused 
on the sustainability issues in the strategic plan to respond to the nascent national new 
urbanization program. Given all these facts, numerous strategic plans were drafted to address the 
sustainability issue at the local level to acquire support and recognition from the central 
government. 
In contrast to the earlier experiments with strategic planning, which focused on spatial 
strategies at the metropolitan scale, there was considerable diversity in contents and scales with 
the strategic plans for urban sustainability. Aside from comprehensive plans, separate plans were 
drafted to deal with particular issues concerning sustainable urban development, such as 




In addition, strategic plans offered guidance on spatial arrangement of particular projects and 
district development. It was from this “second round of strategic plans” and, in particular, the 
pursuit of urban sustainability that the low-carbon city planning emerged. As a result, 
low-carbon city plans have assumed a “strategic” nature, which means considerable flexibility, 
informality, and, also, a lack of legal basis. 
1.4. Summary 
Chinese low-carbon cities have been a product of confluence of factors. The most important 
among them includes the increasing pressures of carbon control and a new stage in the 
urbanization process, which is characterized by the tightening land supply for new development. 
Additional factors contributing to the emergence and proliferation of such an experiment have 
been embedded in the particular central-local government relationship, the political and 
economic logic of competitive cities, and an evolving urban planning system. To sum up, the 
initiative of low-carbon cities has been a spatial and physical response to a new transition period 





Chapter 2: Research Questions, Research Design and Analytical Framework 
2.1. Research questions and definition 
To understand the relationship between the de-carbonization discourse and the state 
entrepreneurialism in the context of China’s urbanization, this dissertation is led by three main 
questions: (1) How does the framework of a low-carbon city affect a specific urban development 
project? (2) What is the role of the state (local/national) in promoting low-carbon development? 
(3) What is the influence of the decarbonization discourse on institutions and norms of urban 
governance? In succession, these questions bring the subjects of urban low-carbon initiatives, 
state entrepreneurialism and urbanization under the spotlight one at a time, with connections to 
the others being closely traced. The first question is mostly an empirical one, and the second and 
third questions are aimed at theory generation as well as an observation of what is happening on 
the ground.  
Like elsewhere in the world, Chinese low-carbon cities can take many different forms 
ranging from downtown green transformation to industrial restructuring plans to new towns with 
innovative technologies and infrastructures. Moreover, local climate initiatives in China are 
essentially an administrative response to the central government’s call and thus subject to 
place-specific interpretation by politicians and local government officials (Qi et al., 2008). This 




diverse agendas. The diversity of Chinese low-carbon cities thus calls for a working definition 
for purpose of clarity.  
Under the context of this study, a low-carbon city is defined as a local-scale, place-based 
initiative to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gases emissions through a planning approach. 
More specifically, a low-carbon city is distinguished by four characteristics. First, it has a 
sub-municipal scale with well-defined boundaries, which means that a municipality that is 
designated as a ‘low-carbon city’ as a whole under any program or by itself, is not the subject of 
this study. Second, to understand the special context of Chinese urbanization, this study focus on 
low-carbon city initiatives in peri-urban or non-urban areas. Their counterparts in established 
neighborhoods and communities in downtown areas generally take quite different approaches 
and are excluded from this study. Thirdly, this study is interested in low-carbon cities that take a 
prominent planning approach. Manifestation includes a specifically drafted master plan and the 
involvement of professional planners. The last characteristic is an explicit mitigation target. 
Initiatives with only vaguely defined goals, such as low-carbon development, are not included.  
According to an annual survey of low-carbon eco-cities (Chinese Society for Urban Studies, 
2010-2014), a significant proportion of existing Chinese low-carbon cities fall into the scope 
defined here. In addition, some low-carbon city programs consisting of the whole municipal 
jurisdictions include one or more sub-programs that fit with the definition of low-carbon cities in 
this study. It should be also noted that some projects known by other names, such as eco-cities or 




because when the idea of a low-carbon city first appeared in China, it was simply a combination 
of the notion of low-carbon development and the eco-city concept that had been long established 
in policy discourse (Qiu, 2009). As long as a project presents all of the four characteristics as 
mentioned above, it is considered as the object of this study.  
2.2. Research design 
This study uses a case study research design (Yin, 2003). In particular, it employs an 
embedded single case method, which means a single case with subunits, to gain in-depth 
understanding of the complexity of the real world through richness and thoroughness. The study 
therefore has a qualitative, interpretive nature with particular attentions to details, context, and 
meanings.  
Single case study and grand theory 
The case method has a few inherent advantages that are of particular usefulness for 
answering the research questions raised in this study. First, as a “historical-genetic method”, the 
case method is suitable to answering questions concerning development and process, especially 
when a new stage is emerging or a transition is ongoing (Young, 1932, p.27). It usually includes 
a continuous ‘picture of past situations which furnish new meanings and new responses’ and is 
therefore helpful for exploration of the “re-” questions, such as urban restructuring, urban 
renewal, and social reform (Gee, 1950). The low-carbon city initiative is an ongoing experiment 
with the low-carbon transitions, which is “a society’s wholesale transition to a low-carbon future” 




change through shifting away from the conventional energy-intensive pathway toward a 
low-carbon one. In this light, the low-carbon city initiative is embedded in and conditioned by a 
wide array of “re-” processes, such as reconfiguration of existing institutions and social norms, 
reform of the government apparatus and related policies, economic restructuring, and 
redistribution of risks and responsibilities. The case method provides a comprehensive 
understanding of these intertwined processes with great temporal thickness. 
Second, the case study has great potential to solve questions involving complex 
interrelations or interactions. It provides information from a number of sources and over a period 
of time, thus permitting a more holistic study of complex social networks, social action, and 
social meanings (Orum et al., 1991). This study is situated at the intersection between 
sustainability policy, environmental discourse, and urban governance. More specifically, it aims 
to explore the relationships between low-carbon initiatives, local state entrepreneurialism, and 
urbanization to reveal the underlying dynamics and rationales for Chinese low-carbon cities. The 
case method is well suited to achieve this end as it describes and explains complex and entangled 
group attributes, patterns, structures or processes (Verschuren, 2003).  
Thirdly, the case study method contributes to theory generation. Compared to the “general 
linear reality” approach that searches for causality flow from big to small attributes, the case 
study method appreciates the power in “small things” of giving a glimpse of big pictures (Abbott, 
2001). Low-carbon cites are a social experiment to address climate change at the urban scale. 




element of the global response to the environmental crisis. The case study method is of particular 
use to conceptualize such experimental efforts that begin at a limited scale but are eventually 
aimed at scaling-up. Furthermore, generating theory from cases, especially a single case, is 
subject to particular prerequisites. Building theory from case studies is a further step from 
refinement of concepts through the process of falsification (Stake, 1995; Popper, 2002). 
Essentially, by building on preexisting theory, case studies extract the general from the unique. 
Identifying particular preexisting theory is therefore a critical step to theory building through 
case study. This is the main goal of literature review, which will be addressed in the next chapter.  
In addition to the above qualities that promote a holistic understanding of the world, the 
validity of this study is further supported by an embedded case design methodology (Yin, 2003). 
In particular, three sub-units of analysis are established, including a regional cooperation 
demonstration project, a low-carbon city, and an EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation pilot 
project. They represented different ways in which the SILCC was framed and appeared in 
sequence during the evolution of the project.  
As a result, examination of the SILCC assumes some characteristics of a longitudinal study 
although the temporal scale is quite limited. According to Yin (2003), the arraying of events into 
a chronology can be used as an analytic device to investigate presumed causal events as well as 
for descriptive purposes. Built on this argument, the arrangement of three embedded cases in this 
study serves as both analytical and descriptive lenses. More detailed information about the 




Case selection rationales 
For a single-case research design, case selection is of particular importance for the 
generalizability of the overall study. So it is imperative to ask to what extent the SILCC 
represents its myriad counterparts in other parts of China. In fact, the SILCC demonstrates some 
general patterns of Chinese low-carbon cities. First and foremost, it is steered by the municipal 
government of Shenzhen, within which most decision-making power over the design and 
implementation of the project lies. The government-led nature also means that local government 
financing vehicles (LGFVs) play an important role in facilitating the SILCC. This is also a 
common financing strategy in many similar projects elsewhere in China. 
Secondly, the SILCC is characterized by new construction projects and places a strong focus 
on building and transportation sectors. Furthermore, the project depends on a variety of 
technologies that reduce GHGs emissions, such as rain collection and reclaimed water systems, 
distributed generation, smart-grid, and general green building technologies. All these elements 
are familiar ingredients of Chinese low-carbon cities, exemplifying a globally prevalent 
technology-centered approach to climate change and low-carbon transitions (Hodson & Marvin, 
2011).  
Thirdly, the SILCC involves broad international cooperation with foreign governments and 
the private sector as well as international and transnational organizations. The presence of 
various international actors is also a salient feature of Chinese low-carbon cities, especially those 




government is engaged in investment, policy guidance, and technological assistance (de Jong et 
al., 2013). As a result, international cooperation has become a popular strategy among 
low-carbon eco-city initiatives. Taken together, the SILCC typifies the emerging low-carbon city 
initiatives insofar as its apparent features tell. At a deeper level, in light of the leading role of the 
local government apparatus, this single case also exemplifies a developmental state’s approach to 
urban development and transformation in East Asian countries.  
More importantly, the SILCC is becoming a role model for local-scale sustainable 
development as a result of many awards as well as its status as a demonstration project in many 
programs initiated by the national government and international organizations such as the World 
Bank and World Wildlife Fund. As a result, it can be anticipated that an increasing number of 
low-carbon city initiatives in China as well as other developing countries will adopt similar 
approaches as the SILCC. In other words, the SILCC is likely to represent a greater number of 
future low-carbon cities in these places.  
Finally, rather than typicalness, the primary reason for choosing the case of SILCC is its 
complexity in terms of the sinuous evolution involving a wide arrange of goals and statuses, 
diverse actors, and a multiplicity of strategies and tactics adopted to facilitate implementation. 
According to Yin (2009), the single-case design is justifiable when the case represents (1) a 
critical test of existing theory, (2) a unique or extreme circumstance, (3) a representative case, (4) 




three qualities, thus providing an opportunity to move from the “micro” to the “macro,” and 
connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future (Burawoy, 1998). 
Background of the case  
Although the project name SILCC includes the city name of Shenzhen, its spatial scope is 
limited to and coincides with the boundaries of Pingdi, a sub-district33 in northeast Shenzhen. 
Pingdi occupies an area of 57.6 square kilometers and is located in the bordering areas between 
Shenzhen and two adjacent cities of Dongguan and Huizhou (Fig 2.1). Home to a population of 
approximately 160,000 in 2009, the area was historically supported by a dominant secondary 
sector and, in particular, traditional manufacturing industries, including production of electric 
equipment, metal and plastics, clothing and garments, toys, and computers.  
As a result, the well-being of Pingdi is subject to a mix of less-than-satisfied economic and 
environmental performances. For example, in 2010, Pingdi had a per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) of 36,000 yuan, representing under 50% and 40% of that of Longgang and 
Shenzhen, respectively (Wang, 2014). However, its electricity consumption was 0.27kWh per 
GDP yuan, which was 3.7 times the city-wide energy intensity. Similarly, the water consumption 
                                                 
33 A sub-district, or “jiēdào”, is a form of township-level divisions in China. As opposed to a rural township known 
as a “xiang” or a “zhen”, a sub-district is typically part of a larger urban area and serves as agency of a municipal 
district government. Pingdi had been established as a “zhen” until it was transformed into a sub-district in 2003. Its 
administrative agency, the Pingdi sub-district office, functions as a level of governments under the district 





per unit of GDP was as high as 4 times the city average (Statistics of Pingdi Sub-district 
Economic and Social Development, 2010-2013; Shenzhen Statistical Yearbooks). 
 
Figure 2.1: Location of the SILCC (Source: made by author based on map provided by Shenzhen Public Art Center) 
As the predecessor of SILCC, a project of Ping-Xin-Qing Regional Cooperation 
Demonstration Project (hereafter referred to as Ping-Xin-Qing) was initiated in 2010 by the 
district government of Longgang which was the next higher level administrative unit above 
Pingdi. Longgang proposed to work with another two places of Xinxu and Qingxi, which are in 
Huizhou and Dongguan respectively, to create a cross-municipal industrial district to 
agglomerate high-tech industries. The Ping-Xin-Qing proposal quickly came to a halt in the face 
of the other two cities’ uncertain motivations. The development of Pingdi gained real momentum 
only after being rebranded as a low-carbon city. In this light, the SILCC provides an exceptional 




framework of a low-carbon city in particular affects the nature, approaches, and outcomes of 
local development in Chinese cities. 
Led by the municipal government of Shenzhen, the SILCC was launched in August 2012 on 
the basis of a conceptual plan titled Developing a Special ECO-2-ZONE (hereafter referred to as 
ECO-2-ZONE plan), which was drafted by a joint consulting group of Dutch as well as Chinese 
professionals between 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, the implementation of the SILCC was 
steered by a series of planning/design documents with focus on various different subjects and 
professional fields (Table 2.1). In particular, the master plan divided the SILCC into three 
sub-areas with separate plans of short-, medium-, and long-term timescales (Fig. 2.2). The 
implementation to date has been concentrated in the 1 km2 Pilot Zone and led by several public- 
and private-sponsored projects focusing on the improvement of the built environment and the 
introduction of high-added-value industries (Table 2.2). 
Planning documents Authors 
Master plan Urban Planning and Design Institute of Shenzhen 
Low-carbon industrial development plan Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School 
Low-carbon indicator systems, schematic 
architectural design 
Shenzhen Institute of Building Research Co., Ltd. 
Site survey Shenzhen Changkan Institute of Survey and Design 
Engineering design Shenzhen Municipal Design & Research Institute Co., Ltd. 
Economic analysis, financing planning DTZ 
Transportation planning Tongji Univerisity 
Energy planning (distributed energy sources) South China University of Technology 
Low impact development planning Low Impact Development Center (U.S.) 





Figure 2.2: Pilot Zone, Extension Zone and the whole area of the SILCC (Source: Shenzhen Public Art Center) 
Sponsorship Project 
Public  SILCC convention and exhibition center 
 Low-carbon transformation of the Hakka community 
 Existing factory buildings green retrofit 
 Innovation, research and development district 
 Road system and transportation facilities improvement 
 Dingshan River Eco-park 
Private Communication terminal devices manufacturing 
 Computer peripheral equipment manufacturing 
 High power factor electronic power manufacturing 
 Lighting devices manufacturing 
 Precision components research and development 
 LED manufacturing  
 Genetically modified anti-pest cotton plantation 
 Electronic gadget research and development 
 Intelligent electrical products research and development 
 Factory building construction and production line installation 
 Laser equipment research and development 





The SILCC has accumulated international fame as well as political profile. In May 2012, the 
SILCC was designated by the central government as the single flagship project of the newly 
established EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation. In 2014, the Chicago-based Paulson Institute 
and China Center for International Economic Exchanges jointly awarded the second annual Prize 
for Cities of the Future to the SILCC. In the same year, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) chose the SILCC as a pioneering project for its new program of Low Carbon Model 
Town and the location to launch the national campaign. In many senses, the SILCC has become 
a prominent example of China’s strives for sustainable urban development and urban low-carbon 
transitions. 
2.3. Analytical strategy 
The embedded cases  
The embedded cases include the Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation demonstration project, 
the low-carbon city project, and the flagship project of EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation. 
They represent three consecutive phases over the course of the project’s evolution revealing the 
shifting socio-political context and positioning of the same project. Behind the obviously 
differing titles, each of the embedded cases is also characterized by a distinct set of key elements, 
including planning documents and tools, leading actors, networks, political and financial 
resources, and organizational foundation.  
These embedded cases are not necessarily exclusive to one another. They overlap in terms of 




the ECO-2-ZONE plan, was initially prepared for facilitating the Ping-Xin-Qing project; and the 
low-carbon city and the EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation flagship project shared the same 
organizational structure. However, for both descriptive and analytical purposes, different 
embedded cases are treated as independent sub-units of the SILCC. 
On the basis of separate descriptive accounts, the three embedded cases are connected and 
compared with each other to identify the key drivers and shaping forces of the whole project. 
Tracing the connections between the embedded cases also reveals the relationship between urban 
low-carbon initiatives, local state entrepreneurialism, and urbanization, which is the general goal 
of this study. In particular, the embedded case of the low-carbon city is compared with the other 
two to highlight the special project context created by the emerging climate change agenda in 
comparison to conventional urban development politics. This is particularly helpful for 
answering the third research question, which concerns to what extent the governing institution of 
urban development is altered by the framework of climate change. The two-level analytical 
framework, which is composed of descriptive accounts of embedded cases and then a 
comparison to build theory, will be further elaborated in the remaining part of this section.  
A method of discourse analysis  
Rooted in the interpretive and social constructionist tradition and the “discursive turn” 
within the social sciences (Fischer & Forester, 1993), discourse analysis has been deployed by an 
accumulating body of studies as a methodology to understand the processes of environmental 




& Keil, 2004). The method of discourse analysis rests on the assumption that a discourse 
“enables those who subscribed to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into 
coherent stories or accounts” and thus “is a shared way for apprehending the world” (Dryzek, 
1997, p.8). Discourse analysis is particularly suitable for study of environmental policy as 
environmental problems are rarely predefined but subject to interpretation. For instance, under 
different discourses, oil leakage can be interpreted as a pollution issue affecting local ecosystems 
or a justice issue affecting local populations or a resource efficiency issue affecting businesses 
(Ibid). 
Discourse analysis has taken on additional relevance as the environmental conflict in recent 
years “no longer focuses on the question of whether there is an environmental crisis; it is 
essentially about its interpretation” (Hajer, 1995, p.13-14). This is even true in the case of 
climate change where the existence of a problem in the first place is contested. Accordingly, 
particular solutions, including policies and actions, must be interpreted by a particular society, 
with problems identified and given meaning through a process of claims-making (Hannigan, 
2006). This process can be understood through the lens of discourse. 
There are different approaches to discourse analysis which are based on differing definition 
of discourse (Mills, 1997; Torfing, 2005). Linguistic traditions define discourse solely as the 
units of written and spoken communication under study and focus on the content of texts and 
conversations. Other social science traditions inspired by Foucault’s theories define discourse as 




not only in policy rhetoric, but also in institutional structures, practices and events. The 
Foucauldian discourse analysis draws attention to how discourses are formed and shaped and to 
the possibility of contrasting sets of influences producing divergent discourses. Furthermore, this 
method places power relations at the center and approaches them through focusing on points of 
conflict and change. 
This particular study follows the Foucauldian interpretation of discourse. In particular, it 
builds on Hajer’s argumentative approach which defines discourse as “a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a 
particular set of practices through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 
1995, p.44). Implicitly, this definition of discourse includes materiality as an essential object of 
the analysis and interrelated with practices as well as ideas and arguments. In addition, with a 
clear recognition that the process of meaning making is dominated by a limited group of people 
who define the nature and urgency of key problems as well as conceptualize the solutions to 
these problems, the argumentative approach “focuses on the constitutive role of discourse in 
political process” and “conceives of politics as a struggle for discursive hegemony in which 
actors try to secure support for their definition of reality (Ibid, p.58-59). Therefore, the 
argumentative approach provides a way of understanding competing discourses and the 
operation of power which shape this process.  
To understand how discursive orders are established, maintained or transformed, this 




“discourse coalition” (Hajer, 1995). A “storyline” is “narratives on social reality through which 
elements from many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of 
symbolic references that suggest a common understanding” (Ibid, p.62). Storylines play an 
important role in the “clustering of knowledge, the positioning of actors, and, ultimately, in the 
creation of coalitions amongst the actors of a given domain” (Ibid, p.63). Actors constituting a 
discourse coalition may have different motivations and interests, but by referring to particular 
storylines, they can give meaning to physical and social realities as well as their practices in 
response to those realities. In Hajer’s words, “discourse-coalitions are formed if previously 
independent practices are being actively related to one another, if a common discourse is created 
in which several practices get a meaning in a common political project (Ibid, p.65).”  
As storylines play an essential role in the positioning of subjects and structures, political 
change may take place through the emergence of new storylines (Ibid, p.56). During a period of 
time, certain storylines gain prominence and dominate the ways in which people conceive certain 
phenomena, giving rise to routinized understandings. Dominant storylines are more than often 
manifested in established institutional arrangements. At particular points, new storylines may 
appear and re-order understandings, giving rise to new political claims and institutional 
structures. As such, institutional arrangements are not merely the “pre-conditions of the process 
of discourse-formation” (Ibid, p.60), but the reflections of the transitory results of discursive 
struggles. These issues of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization relevant to persistence or 




inspired this study to trace the institutional evolution during planning and early implementation 
stages of the SILCC. 
The dissertation research identified three storylines in the SILCC, including regional 
cooperation, low-carbon-eco development, and new urbanization in the three embedded cases, 
respectively. They are detected from various government documents, policy reports, proposals 
and plans, consultation materials and media coverage. While these competing narratives 
profoundly influenced the implementation of SILCC, they have not been examined so far, 
leaving the role of discourse in local efforts towards carbon reduction and climate protection 
undervalued. In particular, a key question is why and how a storyline gained so much influence 
at a particular time and in what ways it impacted the nature and practice of the SILCC. The 
answer to this question can shed light on the strategic nature of Chinese low-carbon low-carbon 
cities and the relations between climate action and historical contexts of specific places. 
Whilst a storyline dominated in a particular period, each new storyline did not necessarily 
replace the former but was layered on it as part of the accretion of discourse surrounding the 
project. For purpose of analysis, each storyline is viewed as a composition of a distinct set of 
components. These components include definition of the problem, particular solutions proposed 
in both conceptual and material terms (e.g. main strategies, plans, regulatory tools, indicators, 
etc.), responsibility claims (arguments about who has what kind of responsibility and capability), 
discourse coalitions, and institutional arrangement. Elaboration of each single storyline will be 




trajectory of the SILCC. After that, a comparison between different storylines is made to 
understand the relationship between competing narratives and the changing socio-political 
context within which the project is carried out.  
Two analytical concepts for case interpretation with a comparative perspective 
Based on the detailed descriptive accounts, the three embedded cases are compared with 
each other through comparison between different storylines. To do this, two analytical concepts, 
namely strategic alliance and strategic selectivity are introduced. Strategic alliance is a concept 
mostly used in the business and management context to distinguish a more flexible and 
contingent cooperative relationship from the contract-based and/or legally binding joint venture. 
The concept is of particular use for examining urban-scale climate governance as the governance 
has witnessed a diverse collection of actors that is not confined to conventional spheres of 
authority (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013), and as the pursuit of low-carbon transitions is “empowering 
new strategic alliances in urban politics” (Jonas et al., 2011, p.2539). The strategic alliance has a 
high overlap with a discourse coalition under the same storyline. But the former also contains 
subjects who are actively involved in the production and transformation of discourse. These 
subjects take a more instrumental view toward discourses and thus do not necessarily commit to 
particular storylines. The examination of the strategic alliances is therefore crucial for 
understanding the opportunistic practices within the low-carbon city initiatives. 
Strategic selectivity is a concept drawn from Jessop’s (1999, 2001, 2002) state theory and 




site of political action where specific strategies are pursued by specific forces with specific 
identities to advance specific interests over specific spatial and temporal horizons. Forms of state 
interventions reflect the state’s favoring of some forces, some identities, some interests, some 
spatial, and some temporal horizons more than others. Based on this presumption, environmental 
regulation will reflect the ‘strategic selectivity of the state’ as governments seek to balance 
environmental and ecological goals with other forces, pressures and demands (Jessop, 2002, 
p.31). Strategic selectivity was first used as a theoretical lens to observe urban-scale carbon 
control in While et al.’s (2010) study on the eco-state restructuring. The concept yielded a 
fruitful discussion on how governments reconcile carbon reduction with other pressures and 
demands such as economic growth and welfare.  
Taken together, these two concepts highlight the strategic nature of the SILCC and similar 
efforts toward low-carbon cities in China and potentially elsewhere as well. In practice, strategic 
selectivity and strategic alliance are inseparable because 'policy inclinations' never come before 
having certain groups in mind. In other words, strategic alliance is an inherent and integral part 
of strategic selectivity. Also, particular groups will reinforce and further their own interests after 
joining alliances through defining what counts and what does not. Their relationship is thus 
dialectical and one is inextricable from the other.  
The discussion in this chapter treats strategic alliance and strategic selectivity as two parallel 
elements to show different, but equally essential factors that shape the processes as well as 




sensitive to the discursive transitions. Strategic alliances and strategic selectivity function as 
intermediaries between discourses and the SILCC. In particular, the former works largely 
through shaping the relationship between the state and other actors, while the latter exerts its 
influence mainly through shaping the relationship between economy and ecology. 
General analytical framework 
So far, the two dimensions of the case study, including a description of the SILCC with a 
focus on the evolving trajectory and an interpretation of it with an eye to theory building, have 
been introduced. They together make up a two-level analytical framework as shown in Figure 3.3. 
The core in the framework represents the descriptive part of the study where three embedded 
cases under the SILCC are documented. They are examined through the concept of storyline, 
which is considered to be manifested by a particular set of characteristics, including definition of 
the problem, particular solutions proposed, responsibility claims, discourse coalition, and 
institutional arrangement. The three storylines together signal a shifting discourse under which 
the SILCC took shape and was constantly reshaped. 
The column marked by vertical arrows represent the comparison between the embedded 
cases through different dominating storylines. A pair of concepts, including strategic alliance 
and strategic selectivity, serve as clues to the connections and transitions between different 
storylines. The comparative study draws particular attention to how the framework of a 
low-carbon city formed a broader strategic alliance and facilitated the realization and refinement 




represent two channels through which discourse mediates and affects the SILCC project on the 
ground. The outer ring in the framework captures this process of influence and stands for the 
interpretive part of the study. 
 
Figure 2.3: Analytical framework of the study 
2.4. Data collection and analysis 
A primary benefit of a case study rests on the technique of triangulation, which entails 
different approaches to data collection and the efforts to combine their advantages. Each 
approach reveals its own aspects and parts of social reality, but the function of triangulation is 
not a mere linear accumulation (Verschuren, 2003). Triangulation permits researchers to 




more opportunities for introspection and cross-check on the basis of a variety of data sources 
(Orum et al., 1991). In this way, triangulation can improve the validity of a research.  
To take advantage of the triangulation strategy, data collection and analysis follows a 
principle of “complexity” in this study. Specifically, the principle was embodied in a threefold 
strategy including (1) multiple sources of data, (2) purposefully building connections between 
different data, and (3) an interactive manner of data collection and analysis.   
Multiple sources of data 
This study is based on both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources 
include interviews with key informants, field trips, and on-site observation of a series of public 
events related to the SILCC. First, interviews were conducted with a total of 39 respondents 
between December 2014 and May 2017. The interviewees were identified through snowball 
sampling starting from an urban planning scholar from Tsinghua University who was on the jury 
of the Paulson Institute’s 2014 Prize for Cities of the Future evaluation. The subsequent 
respondents included officials of different levels of government and public agencies, employees 
in academic and professional institutions, working staff in state- and private-owned enterprises, 
key members of local communities and organizations, and representatives of domestic and 
international NGOs. They participated in the SILCC under various circumstances and across 
different stages, which means they had knowledge of one or more of the embedded cases. A list 
of interviewees by titles can be found in Appendix A. All of the interviews were scheduled in 




during site visits. The interviews were based on a semi-structured format, which allowed 
respondents to identify the issues of importance to them within an established research frame 
(Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). The research frame was prescribed in the interview protocol (see 
Appendix B) developed in advance to guide but not dictate discussion. Based on the questions 
included in the interview protocol, the respondents were encouraged to share stories and 
anecdotes and talk freely about their views and experiences. All respondents were informed in 
advance that the information would be recorded under pseudonyms and reported anonymously. 
Second, the case study was based on many visits to different parts of the SILCC. Casual 
communications happened during these visits with spontaneous questions raised based on what 
was observed. Many of the visits followed an interview meeting and were guided by the same 
interviewees or their colleagues. This provided great opportunities to ask follow-up questions 
and to confirm and improve understanding of information put forward earlier during interview. 
The route of a site visit was generally suggested by the person who guided the tour, with 
extended stay or additional stops arranged at my request. During the site visits, notes and 
pictures were taken by permissions of the guides.  
Thirdly, I also attended the SILCC Forum 2015, 2016 and 2017 to gather information about 
the progress and evolution of the project. Various materials, including pamphlets, handouts, 
brochures, posters, and advertisements, were collected. In addition to lectures and panel 
discussions that were open to the general public, I also attended the press conferences prior to the 




vehicles, the group tour to waste recycling sites, and the orientation for calculating individual 
carbon footprint. My observations focused on both the content of these events and the actors, 
including the organizers and participants. Sometimes I started informal talks with the people I 
met on these occasions. My questions were centered around how they perceived and participated 
in the Forum and the SILCC project in general. Such informal talks sometimes led me to 
additional key informants to conduct full-length interview with and new sources of information. 
In this regard, primary data collection in this study followed a flexible and iterative style to 
capture as much details and hidden facts as the case contained. 
Aside from the primary sources as mentioned above, the case study drew on a wide range of 
secondary sources of data. Among others, prominent examples included policy and other 
government documents, addresses of politicians and government officials, public notices, official 
statistical data, media coverage, plans and other professional consulting reports, and requests for 
proposals (RFPs) used in tendering and competition. An archival study method was adopted to 
approach these materials with a temporal range starting from 2009, when the Ping-Xin-Qing 
project was initiated, to the point when data was collected.  
Building connections between data points 
To apply the technique of triangulation, data was viewed as nodes in an information network. 
The purpose of data collection and analysis was not only about identifying where these nodes 
were and what they entailed but also tracing the connections between them. These connections 




and informative connections with respect to the research questions. To put it in another way, the 
three research questions guided the search for connections between different data points.  
First, to answer the question about the operationalization of the concept of a low-carbon city, 
the examination of SILCC was organized around the relationship between its immaterial aspects 
(ideas, narratives, policies, institutional arrangement, etc.) and material aspects (plans, actors, 
financial resources, change in physical environment, etc.). Furthermore, this relationship was 
compared across different phases (embedded cases) of the project to highlight the special 
representation and reflection of the notion of a low-carbon city. In this manner, the analysis 
revealed the mechanism through which the concept was operationalized.  
Secondly, to answer the question about the role of the state, connections were purposefully 
built between state and non-state actors. Data collected from interview respondents in the public 
sector were compared with those in private and the third sectors to identify their varying 
propositions and roles in the project. Also, state actors were asked about their working relations 
with non-state actors, and vice versa.  
Thirdly, to answer the question about the the special socio-political context for low-carbon 
initiatives, data collection and analysis draw attention to the changes between different stages of 
the SILCC. For example, interview questions were asked about how a respondent’s work 
addressed a particular embedded case or negotiated between different ones, and how they 




In addition, cross-checks were conducted between primary and secondary sources of data 
and among different sub-categories of each single source. Furthermore, recognizing the SILCC 
was enabled by inter-level and cross-department cooperation within the government, connections 
were purposefully built between data from/about different levels of government and different 
agencies of a single level. 
Interactive manner of data collection and analysis 
Conducting a case study is in itself a learning process as researchers can continuously 
modify and revise preconceptions in response to feedback from research subjects (Flyvberg, 
2006). The modified preconceptions can be reflected in the refinement of research design, 
analytical framework, and strategies for data collection and analysis as well as altered 
assumptions concerning the research questions. With high appreciation of this characteristic of 
case study, an iterative process was expected at the outset of the study.   
Several major changes were made as the study advanced. The most significant change was 
the introduction of the embedded case design under a single-case study after it became clear that 
the Ping-Xin-Qing and the pilot project of EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation were two 
phases and dimensions of the SILCC rather than counterparts of the low-carbon city initiative. 
Then it was natural to ask what was behind these three different “titles” and what connections 
and dynamics exited between them. To answer this line of questions, which were closely related 





In addition, data collection and analysis were performed in an interactive manner to make 
the best use of information accumulated along the way. For example, the interview protocol as a 
key tool for data collection was constantly revised based on new information arising from 
completed interviews. In particular, a major type of question concerning decision making in the 
SILCC was made obsolete by the fact that decisions were overwhelmingly or even exclusively 
made by the municipal government of Shenzhen, which was consistently indicated by the first 
couple of interview respondents. For the rest of the interviews, these questions were replaced by 
new ones that focused on the relationship and dynamics of a respondent’s work with that of the 
municipal government. 
Interactive data collection was also reflected in the snowball sampling strategy which was 
adopted to locate potentially informative data points. When an interview respondent mentioned 
intense interactions with a new entity to carry out the SILCC, request was made for a referral 
from this entity. A handful of professional institutions and NGOs were identified in this way. In 
addition, a couple of interview respondents voluntarily introduced me to new key informants 
who subsequently participated in the interview. Despite being less visible than the most active 
and prominent actors in the SILCC, these entities and individuals actually played a critical role in 
shaping and promoting the project. The strategy of snowball sampling and interactive data 
collection in general largely contributed to the finding of the comparatively obscure information, 




The threefold strategy as discussed above prescribed a flexible and reflective method of data 
collection and analysis. In this manner, the SILCC was approached incrementally and from a 
multiplicity of perspectives. The technique of triangulation was applied for every step during this 
process rather than a once-and-for-all application after all data is present.  
2.5. Terminology, translation, and currency exchange rates 
Before moving to the main body of the case study, it is necessary to clarify a few points that 
might otherwise cause confusion. First, a couple of terms are used interchangeably with the term 
of the ‘low carbon discourse’, including discourse of carbon reduction, discourse of carbon 
mitigation, and discourse of de-carbonization. Second, all translations are by the author, and 
Pinyin is used for the transliteration of Chinese names and terms. With the exception of Chinese 
writers who published in English and presented their names in Western fashion, Chinese names 
appear in Chinese form, with surname preceding given name. For example, Li (surname), rather 
than Keqiang (the given name), begins the full name of Li Keqiang. Thirdly, quantitative 
features are expressed in units following Chinese custom with notes of conversions. Lastly, 
according to China Statistical Yearbook 2016, one U.S. dollar was worth about 6.14-6.77 





Chapter 3: Environmental Discourse, Environmental State and Low-Carbon Urbanism 
To capture the essence of Chinese low-carbon cities, this study approaches them from three 
angles: (1) as a policy discourse, (2) as a shaping force on the state’s role in advancing 
development, and (3) as a new trait of a city. In succession, these three angles reflect my 
epistemological understanding of the interpretative or social constructionist tradition (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989), the political relevance of this study, and my general research interest in the 
relations between cities and climate change. As such, this study is situated at the intersection of 
three bodies of literatures on (1) environmental discourse, (2) the state-environment relations, 
and (3) urban low-carbon politics.  
This chapter first reviews a strand of literature in environmental policy research that 
emphasizes the discursive nature of the environmental problem and thus draws attention to the 
role of discourse, frames, and rhetoric in the environmental policy process. This section also 
briefly introduces the framework of ecological modernization as the dominant environmental 
discourse in today’s policy world. The second section presents the long-lasting debate on the 
state’s role in environmental protection and, in particular, climate change aversion. Then this 
section outlines the literature on this same topic but sets it in China’s particular context to 
provide necessary background for a theoretical discussion of the case. The third section reviews 
the implications of the new environmental agenda of carbon control for governance of cities. In 




3.1. Environmental discourse under global environmental frameworks 
Discourse is so powerful in framing the world that it precedes and even determines action 
(Fischer & Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999). This is well recognized by the interpretative or social 
constructionist tradition in the social sciences, which assumes the existence of multiple, socially 
constructed realities rather than a single reality determined by immutable natural laws. Following 
this tradition, the “argumentative turn” (Fischer & Forester, 1993) has drawn increasing attention 
to the significance of language within public policy and planning. It is assumed that “language 
profoundly shapes one’s view of the world and reality, instead of being only a neutral medium 
mirroring it” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p.176). In other words, language produces meanings 
rather than expresses the world and its properties out there. 
Within the “argumentative turn”, discourse analysis, which is the study of language-in-use 
(Wetherell et al., 2001), has established itself as an important tool for understanding the nature 
and processes of policymaking. In particular, it has attracted researchers of environmental policy 
and planning because of its appreciation of the messy and complex interactions that make up the 
environmental policy process (Richardson & Sharp, 2001). The basic presumption of this 
approach to the environment is that social and cultural processes shape our perceptions of the 
environment, and discourse shapes what can and cannot be thought, delimit the range of policy 
options and thereby serve as precursors to policy outcomes (Litfin, 1994, p.37; also Keller & 




up the question of how we interpret and represent the environment through communications 
whereby knowledge is exchanged. 
Discursive approaches to environmental policy research 
Planning and environmental policy research has seen an increasing number of studies since 
the mid-1990s that draw on the social constructionist epistemology in order to analyze ‘discourse’ 
(for example, Hajer, 1995; Hannigan, 1995; Myerson & Rydin, 1996; Dyrzek, 1997; Luke, 1999; 
Desfor & Keil, 2004). These studies generally take a critical stance toward the essentialist 
ontology and a single reality governed by immutable natural laws. Specifically, discursive 
approaches to environmental policy research build on a refusal of the existence of clear-cut, 
pre-defined environmental problems. Rather, “they must be ‘constructed’ by individuals and 
organizations who define pollution or some other objective condition as worrisome and seek to 
do something about it” (Hannigan, 1995, p.2). Because a discourse “is a shared way for 
apprehending the world” (Dryzek, 1997, p.8), discourse analysis can provide understanding of 
how an issue becomes an environmental issue and how it becomes a particular type of 
environmental issue. 
The understanding of “issue definition”, which is alternatively termed as “problem definition” 
or “agenda setting”, has been pursued by policy analysts since the early 1970s (for example, 
Cobb & Elder, 1972; Downs, 1972; Eyestone, 1978; Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; 
Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). At the outset, these areas of inquiry emphasized the origins and 




formulation and the dynamics of policymaking. Then the study of issue definition matured into a 
major strand in the contemporary policy study and expanded to include inquiries about forces of 
policy change. In their 1993 book Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Baumgartner & 
Jones described the state of “punctuated equilibria,” when stable policy subsystems are disturbed, 
destroyed, and reorganized by new interpretations of issues. In this light, a commonly accepted 
definition, or understanding, of an issue is contingent upon “policy subsystem stability” during 
which time the attendant subsystem dominates policy actions and controls issue interpretations; at 
other times, events, actors, and circumstances create new interpretations that lead to the demise of 
once-prevailing issue images and subsystem arrangements (p.238). Both stability and change are 
a reflection of how institutional settings or venues are used to advance and shape images of 
policy issues.  
A similar interest in problem definition and, in particular, its relationship with institutional 
settings has been developed in environmental policy research in recognition that behind their 
factual and scientific appearance, environmental arguments are also meaningful, suggestive and 
atmospheric (Hejer & Versteeg, 2005). It matters whether the environment is problematized in 
terms of the spaceship-ness of the Earth, the greenhouse-ness of climate change, or the 
disease-ness of pollution (Myerson & Rydin, 1996, p.25). An accumulating body of literature has 
shown how different actors actively try to impose a particular frame or discourse onto an 
environmental discussion (Litfin, 1994; Myerson & Rydin, 1996; Dryzek, 1997; Luke, 1999). Of 




Discourses and Myerson & Rydin’s (1996) The Language of the Environment: A New Rhetoric, 
both of which examine aspects of the language of various types of environmentalism. 
Well-known examples also include Beder’s (1997) critique of the language of 
anti-environmentalism. These works well demonstrate that environmental issues do not present 
themselves to us in well-defined boxes with labels but rather arise from argumentation, 
contestation, and struggles about meanings and interpretations (Dryzek, 1997, p.7). Discourse 
shapes what can and cannot be thought, delimits the range of policy options and therefore serve 
as precursors to policy outcomes (Keller & Poferl, 1998; Litfin, 1994, p.37). 
Within this line of works, the institutional dimension has been emphasized by a sub-group of 
scholars and policy researchers who follow Foucault’s interpretation of discourse as being 
derived from and dependent on social practices—the complex mix of cultural norms, disciplines 
and rituals—which govern discursive formations (Hajer, 1995). This “embeddedness of language 
in practice” distinguishes Foucauldian approaches to discourse analysis from a “textually 
oriented approach”, which has roots in linguistic traditions, or approaches built on Habermas’ 
normative notion of discourse (Sharp & Richardson, 2001; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). For the 
former, discourse is understood as being manifested not only in texts and conversations, but also 
in institutional structures, practices and events. In particular, institutions are not only one type of 
outcomes of a prevailing environmental discourse but also part of the context in which the 




a major contribution that Foucauldian discourse analysts have made to illuminate the complex 
environmental policy process. 
The institutional inquiry has been further developed in the study of institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization in relation to persistence or change in environmental policy discourses 
(Hajer, 1995; Rydin, 2003). This strand of literature draws attention to how discourses are 
formed and shaped, and to the possibility of contrasting sets of influences producing divergent 
discourses. A prominent example is Hajer’s (1995) “argumentative approach” to discourse 
analysis, which highlights “the constitutive role of discourse in political process”. Through an 
examination of the acid rain controversy in Britain and the Netherlands, the author traces how 
over the mid-1980s the British Forestry Commission transformed the criteria it used to assess 
tree health in in order to obscure the urgency of acid rain. Other examples include Luke’s (1999) 
documentation of how the very broad political concern over environmental decline was 
articulated as the ‘three R’s’ of resources, recreation and risk and how this discourse 
subsequently institutionalize in university curricula for Mas in environmental studies and Litfin’s 
(1994) study on the relationships between Ozone discourse and international regimes.  
A major goal of institution-focused discourse analysis is to illuminate the power relations 
that underpin competing discourses and establish particular discourses as the commonly accepted 
understanding of the environment. This inclination reflects Foucauldian interpretation of 
discourse as multiple and competing sets of ideas and metaphors. In this conceptualization, “the 




social and physical world, and construct the individual” (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p.196). 
What is implied here is a dynamic and contingent nature of the policy world. On one side, the 
meaning of the policy principle never solidifies, but is constantly the object of political 
contestation (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). On the other, neither identities nor interests are fixed in 
discursive processes. Discourses create spaces for new identities and coalitions among them; 
moreover, discursive interaction itself “can create new meanings and new identities” (Hajer, 
1995, p.59). 
To achieve the goal of understanding power relations within discursive practices, a focus of 
Foucauldian environmental discourse analysis is placed on points of debate, conflict, controversy, 
and inconsistency in the policy process. In addition, special attention is directed to various actors 
involved in framing and finding solutions to environmental problems, who are actively 
‘positioning’ themselves and others drawing on discursive categories (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). 
So environmental discourse analysis should not be understood as a type of analysis in which 
actors do not play an important role. Indeed, “environmental policy could be conceptualized as 
being constructed on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and 
truth are contested, and the rationality of policy-making is itself exposed as a focus for conflict” 
(Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p.198).  
It is the Foucauldian style of discourse analysis that is of particular relevance to the current 
study. In general, the appeal of discursive approaches to the planning field rests partly on the 




determines action (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999). On the other part, solutions that are 
invented to deal with a purely technically defined physical problem but that are insensitive to the 
common-sense social construction of a problem are likely to become regulatory failures (Forester, 
1982, p.52-3). Therefore, discursive approaches to policy and planning are largely regarded as 
solutions to the failures of the rational planning model in directing action in the face of “wicked 
problems” (Rittel & Webber, 1973).  
The planning profession’s ultimate goal toward ‘action’ has imposed new challenge on the 
Foucauldian discursive approaches to policy inquiry. Considering Foucault’s deliberate 
avoidance of defining “what should be done” as well as the broad definition of discourse in 
which there is no single set of identifiable agents of change (Sharp & Richardson, 2001), how the 
analysis of environmental discourse can lead to effective action and then real social change has 
long been a central debate among discourse analysts. These authors suggest that Foucauldian 
discourse analysis can contribute to improvement in policy outcomes, implementation and 
broader social change through highlighting the connections between rhetoric and action. Various 
studies on environmental policy discourse have consistently identified a substantial gap between 
dominant discourses and practices in the real world (for example, Litfin, 1994; Hajer, 1995; 
Rydin, 2003). By identifying the difference between what is said and what actually happens, 
discourse analysis enables understanding about why certain types of barriers to policy 




particular relevance to practitioners exploring empowerment approaches (Sharp & Richardson, 
2001). 
One example of these empowerment approaches is collaborative planning. Seeing a policy 
discourse as “a system of meaning embodied in a strategy for action” (Healey, 1997, p.277), this 
camp of scholars suppose that discursive approaches can produce practical values in the form of 
institutional capacity building, social learning, and resolution of conflict through a better 
understanding of different perspectives (Healey, 1998). According to Dryzek (2001, p.7), 
discourse analysis provides “a useful mediation tool for environmental dispute resolution 
because it provides a systematic and substantive basis for a mediator to develop better 
understandings of each party’s position, and thus be able to engage more productively in the 
dispute negotiation process”. 
Furthermore, discourse analysis has been embraced by a group of planning scholars to 
promote reflexive style of planning (Rein & Schon, 1996; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Jensen & Richardson, 
2003). The appeal of discourse analysis to these scholars lies in the search for problems rather 
than solutions, which “blind us” to the examples of responses provided by our limited experience 
(Schon, 1993, p.156). As the author continues, discourse analysis provides a rare opportunity to 
deconstruct apparently intuitively obvious constructs and to rebuild “a full and explicit 
understanding of them”. Discourse fundamentally shapes what can and cannot be thought, 
delimit the range of policy options and thereby serve as precursors to policy outcomes (Keller & 




literature, which has demonstrated how particular discourses provide a bias both in 
conceptualizing the policy problem at hand as well as the solutions that can be conceived for 
those problems (e.g. Jensen & Richardson, 2004; Pal, 1995). Therefore, reflexive planning 
advocates call for a critical analysis of environmental discourse to challenge the status quo in 
environmental politics. 
The changing environmental problem and discourse  
Contemporary environmental politics have been increasingly organized around many 
environmental problems on a global scale, such as ozone layer depletion, loss of biodiversity and 
global warming. In contrast to traditional environmental problems that are the object of direct 
sensory perception, such as dirt and smoke, diagnosis of the new problems depends on complex 
scientific extrapolations and takes what has become known as the ‘global biosphere’ as the level 
of analysis (Hajer, 1995). Furthermore, the rightness of such diagnosis cannot be immediately 
proved because it will often take many years for these problems to materialize. Due to the 
difficult-to-measure and uncertain nature of the new environmental problems, environmental 
policymaking and implementation has become subject to continuous argumentation and 
contestation.  
Many environmental policy researchers have drawn attention to the “ever-increasing 
discursive nature of the environmental conflict” under the global framework (Ibid, p.13; also see 
Dryzek, 1997). In particular, it is widely accepted that the agenda of sustainable development, 




environmental governance. Hereby environmental problems are less tangible but are of 
increasing importance. The concept of sustainability is continually contested, with struggles 
taking place over their meaning, interpretation and implementation. In Hajer (1995, p.13-14) 
words, the environmental conflict “no longer focuses on the question of whether there is an 
environmental crisis; it is essentially about its interpretation”. 
One feature of the sustainable development agenda is that, while it has its roots in global 
concerns, it does not rest at that global level but has become an issue of regional and local levels 
also (Dyzek, 1997). The implementation does not, however, happen in a ‘cascading’ way, where 
what needs to be done at a lower level is unequivocally prescribed at the higher levels (Hajer, 1995, 
p.14). Indeed, the concept of sustainability is so broadly defined that further articulation under a 
particular context is always necessary before real action toward this goal can be taken. As a result, 
defining a problem becomes the first and foremost step to environmental policymaking, which 
involves different actors trying to impose their respective agendas.  
Not surprisingly, the actors who can play a decisive role are often experts who have superior 
access to expensive scientific instruments as well as professional knowledge. A growing body of 
literature has highlighted that the “ever-increasing discursive nature” of environmental problems 
under the global environmental framework goes hand in hand with an even prominent expert 
culture in the policy world (Beck, 1992; Hajer, 1995; Hunold & Dryzek, 2005). Hajer (1995, 
p.10) finds that understanding of the environmental problem “has ceased to be a matter of direct 




require extremely expensive supercomputers, and, consequently, it is a limited group of experts 
who define the key problems, who assess the urgency of one problem vis-à-vis other possible 
problems, and who implicitly often conceptualize the solutions to the problems they put forward”. 
Beck (1992) arrives at a similar conclusion that “the established social institutions and expert 
cultures had already taken over the environmental discourse, including the definition of 
knowledge”, but he takes a more radical standing in arguing for a counterculture—or what he 
called ‘subpolitics’—to demolish or challenge the established institutions and expertise (p.183). 
Furthermore, these authors have consistently pointed to the close connections between the 
dominant expert culture in contemporary environmental politics and the policy discourse of 
ecological modernization. The leading scholars who initiated the talk of ecological 
modernization at Free University and the Social Science Research Centre in Berlin in the late 
1970s conceptualized the environmental degradation as evidence of a fundamental omission in 
the functioning of the institutions of modern society (for example, Huber, 1982, 1985; Janicke, 
1990; Simonis, 1989). But unlike the radical environmental movements of the 1960s, the 
discourse suggests that environmental problems can be solved in harmony with the main 
institutional arrangements. Following this line of arguments, ecological modernization stands for 
“a restructuring of modern institutions to follow environmental interests, perspectives and 
rationalities” (Mol, 2006, p.30).  
As a new way of conceiving environmental problems and their possible solutions, ecological 




1982; 1985). While several European scholars later drew particular attention to the potential of 
market forces, which allowed the attachment of some environmental values to the economic 
imperative (Hajer, 1993; Mol 1999; Hunold & Dryzek, 2005), the preoccupation with the 
technological optimism continually played as a major pillar underpinning the proposed 
environment-economy concord. The illustration of the slogan ‘pollution prevention pays’, which 
crystalized the idea that environmental initiatives can make capitalist production more efficient 
and consequently profitable, makes a good example. As it goes, lower pollution indicates more 
efficient materials use; it is cheaper to redesign technologies to produce less pollution than to 
clean up pollution after the fact (Hunold & Dryzek, 2005, p.83). It is even argued that ecological 
modernization in its basic form is mostly a technological fix enacted through the market domain 
(Christoff, 2005). As a result, environmental politics are dominated by efficiency and 
technological solutions through a technocratic and corporatist style of policymaking under the 
discourse of ecological modernization (Schlosberg & Rinfret, 2008).  
In the 1990s, the technocratic character became the focus of criticism of the ecological 
modernization discourse in particular and contemporary environmental politics in general. On 
one side, a series of empirical studies have discovered that, despite the wide acceptance of the 
ecological modernization principles, major environmental initiatives are defeated or dismissed 
whenever they are perceived to harm economic growth (Christoff, 1996; Schlosberg, 2005; 
Elling, 2008). These empirical findings have been further connected to the intensifying 




situation promised by ecological modernization is realistic in economics that are increasingly 
competitive and driven by shareholder value (Christoff, 2005). Considering the persistently 
subordinate position of environment initiatives to economic imperatives, some scholars call for a 
“stronger” form of ecological modernization that involves more fundamental transformation of 
the political economy rather than technological fix in the basic or “weak” form (Christoff, 1996, 
2005). Specifically, this transformation largely depends on the formation of a critical public 
sphere to challenge or supplement the dominant expert culture and technocratic character of 
contemporary environmental policymaking (Beck, 1992; Hajer, 1995; Mol & Spaargaren, 2000; 
Hunold & Dryzek, 2005).  
On the other, around the same time of the criticism of the mainstream environmental 
discourse, environmental problems on a global scale started to become a dominant issue on 
international political agenda. The increasingly discursive nature of the new environmental 
problems, which is highlighted earlier in this section, has raised additional concerns about the 
overwhelming, if not exclusive, authority of experts to define the key environmental problems 
and to conceptualize the solutions to the problems they put forward. Ironically, the expansion of 
participatory, informational, and other procedural arrangements or the creation of new pluralistic 
institutions under the global environmental framework (i.e., governmental advisory councils, 
local Agenda 21 processes, round tables, or other forms of consensus-oriented bodies) has 
encouraged the emergence of highly specialized organizations in science and society. As a result, 




communication, and interest groups must deploy expertise to prove the scientific characteristic of 
the evidence in order to achieve influence (Blowers, 1997). Moreover, the disqualification does 
not only affect the lay man who depends on sensory perception and everyday experience. Indeed, 
“specialist natural scientists, politicians, philosophers, or social scientists, all experience how 
their stocks of knowledge and normative theories about proper procedural rules of reaching 
social agreements are devalued too” (Hajer, 1995, p.10).  
It was in this intellectual context that discourse analysis took on new relevance and have 
been applied in the study of sustainable development, climate change and, more recently, 
resilience policies (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Among the many different approaches to discourse 
analysis, the one inspired by Foucault’s interpretation of knowledge, power, and language is of 
particular use to reveal the power imbalance within environmental policy processes. A main goal 
of Foucauldian discourse analysis is to unearth perspectives that are not often expressed 
explicitly, thus unmasking the rationalization processes within which environmental problems 
are defined and solutions are conceptualized. By rejecting “taken-for-granted” knowledge, this 
approach to environmental policy would contribute to a “critical green public sphere”, which has 
been prohibited by the unitary expert culture dominating the ecological modernization practices 
(Beck, 1992). 
3.2. The state and new environmental crisis 
Central to the legitimacy of environmental planning is the idea that it is a state action 




activities. While environmental quality has traditionally been perceived as a common or public 
good which cannot readily be provided via the market, the presumption of state responsibility 
has only existed since around the 1980s, when the scope and scale of state environmental 
regulation was systematically extended into many aspects of society and governance in 
industrialized countries (Mol, 2002; Meadowcroft, 2005; Keil, 2007). Most Western countries 
established the environment as an independent field of public policy for the first time following 
the 1972 Stockholm UN conference on environment in response to the notion of ‘environmental 
problematique’, which was raised in the conference report Limits to Growth (Hajer, 1995). 
The effectiveness of the state to ensure environmental quality was not, however, accepted 
without resistance. Indeed, in the first days of the institutionalized state environmental regulation, 
the involved countries, most of which were affiliated with the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), started to question the adequacy and quality of state 
responses to environmental problems (Rosenbaum, 1973). Action to address actual and potential 
environmental problems has been subject to pressures for and against different forms and levels 
of intervention from firms, workers, trades unions, property owners, civic groups, social 
movements, and different branches of the state (Low & Gleeson, 2001).  
Under this context, state environmental regulation has always impinged upon social and 
spatial interests (While et al., 2010) and represented the incapability of satisfying 
more-than-often contradictory demands for environmental regulation by different social groups 




holding this view generally focused on cities in industrialized countries, where environmental 
protection was usually placed in a subservient position to industrial interests and urban 
development interests. For example, Weale (1992, p.17-18) attributed the problem of 
“implementation deficit”, or “a substantial gap between what legislation and high-level executive 
decisions declare will be achieved and what is actually achieved at street level in terms of 
attainment of environmental standards”, to the state’s inefficiency in reconciling environmental 
and ecological protection with wider economic and social demands.  
This line of arguments has been joined by discussion on the relationship between nature and 
neoliberalism and, in particular, talk of neoliberalising nature” (Castree, 2008a, 2008b) or “the 
neoliberalization of nature” (Heynen & Robbins, 2005; Burke & Heynen, 2014). This talk has 
pointed to the “competition state” under the neoliberal regime, where the state’s primary tasks 
are to attract increasingly mobile capital and to make its economic activities more competitive 
globally (Cerny, 1997). As a result, environmental functions and responsibilities developed by 
many states have been derailed. 
Another group of scholars have focused on the nature of environmental problems and 
attributed the efficacy of state environmental regulation to the intrinsic complexities within them. 
Dryzek (1997, p.80) stated that environmental problems were often “displaced” rather than 
“solved” because of “a large number and variety of elements and interactions” within them. For 
example, a pollutant discharged into a water course may be eliminated by collecting it as a toxic 




pollutant at the expense of increasing another, “problem displacement” could also occur when 
the environmental problem in a particular area was solved by transferring the problem to another 
area. Meadowcroft (2005, p.17) argued that state environmental policy at any given temporal and 
spatial context was at best “a patchwork of partially overlapping and sometimes contradictory 
laws, administrative rules, and programmes”.  
Furthermore, the type and nature of knowledge that can be acquired by the state to inform 
environmental policymaking have concerned some scholars. An accumulating body of research 
has revealed the breadth and value of local or situated knowledges in the environmental field 
(Corburn, 2003; Fischer, 2000; Heiman, 1997; Tesh, 1999; Wynne, 1996), leading to a suspicion 
that state environmental knowledge, as promulgated by public authorities, has neglected 
competing views of nature (Robbins, 2000; Williams & Matheny, 1995). 
Driven by these concerns, many researchers from environmental politics, state theory, policy 
sciences and public administration have embarked on a project to redefine the role of the state in 
environmental protection. More recently, as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 
especially carbon emissions, has become the new ‘master concept’ of environmental regulation 
in an attempt to avert climate change (Keil, 2007), the question of how to position the state in 
global environmental governance takes on new urgency. Considering the state’s deep 
intervention in the spheres of production and consumption, both of which have decisive 
influences on final carbon emissions, the imperative for the state to manage the carbon flows 




From environmental regulation to environmental governance: The changing role of the 
state 
Since the 1980s, most industrialized countries have engaged in a discussion of “state failures” 
in the environmental field (Jänicke, 1990, first published in Germany in 1986 as Staatsversagen). 
A central presumption is that the state does not have the capacity to achieve many of its policy 
objectives (Stone, 1989). Successful environmental protection, therefore, requires the 
involvement of actors outside the sphere of the state both in policy formulation but also 
implementation. In his influential book, Jänicke (1990) discussed the shifts of environmental 
tasks to parastatals, public-private partnerships, or even private companies as a result of the 
evolving state-polluter relations from adversarial to more consensual or negotiated ones. The 
author illuminated the growing role of the state as arbiter and facilitator between different 
interests instated of the state as the primary protector of common interests. Rather than a simple 
dichotomy of centralized state-regulation versus privatization-deregulation, Jänicke’s analysis 
emphasized new modes of environmental governance. 
The concept of environmental governance has become a leading framework to 
re-conceptualize the role of the state in environmental protection and improvement. The term 
governance implies a focus on systems of governing, or "authoritatively allocating resources and 
exercising control and co-ordination" (Rhodes, 1996, p.653), in which state actors are not 
necessarily the only or most significant participants. Rather than seeing government and 




governing, in which state and non-state actors play a variety of roles. More inclusive government 
in the form of governance is legitimated on the basis of improved policy delivery (Rydin & 
Pennington, 2000). But it is also legitimated in democratic terms, that is, the right of parties to be 
involved in decisions that will affect their lives. In Rydin’s (2003, p.5) words, “governance is 
about participation and empowerment as much as delivery and effectiveness.” 
In practice, environmental policy makers have shifted their attention from a state-led, 
command-and-control form of environmental management to include economic and market 
mechanisms, actors and dynamics (Economy, 2004). Some familiar products of this shift have 
included, for example, more responsibilities and tasks for private actors, public-private 
arrangements in provision of environmental goods, economic valuation techniques, a stronger 
reliance on environmental taxes and the privatization of utility companies. All of these new 
approaches and policy instruments reflect the general goal of reconciling environmental and 
ecological protection with wider economic and social demands on a state, which is facing 
increasing pressures from global economic competition as well as rapid technological change 
(Barry & Eckersley, 2005). 
Environmental governance easily finds a place within the discourse of ecological 
modernization, which has dominated environmental discussions in industrialized countries since 
1980s. Seeing environmental degradation as evidence of a fundamental omission in the workings 
of the institutions of modern society, ecological modernization stands for the shifting relations 




institutions to follow environmental interests, perspectives and rationalities” (Mol, 2006, p.30). 
At the beginning, ecological modernization theorists minimized the state and emphasized the 
critical and determinist role of technological innovation in advancing the “ecological switchover” 
(Huber, 1982; 1985). As this proposition was criticized for overemphasizing the industrial and 
technological aspects and neglecting the social context within which they occur, a more balanced 
perspective on the role of state and market forces in the process of ecological modernization has 
been developed by several European scholars since the late 1980s (Hajer, 1993; Mol 1999). 
In particular, an enabling and contextually steering role of the state in ecological 
modernization has been accentuated (Barry & Eckersley, 2005; Blowers, 1997; Mol, 1995). 
According to Blowers (1997), the “enabling state”, defined as an institutional response that will 
secure the efficient functioning of the market economy within a framework of state regulation, 
will deliver ecological modernization through corporatist relationships between government and 
industry. Rather than direct regulation, the ultimate goal of the “enabling state” is social 
“self-regulation” via either economic mechanisms and dynamics or the public sphere of citizen 
groups, environmental NGOs and consumer organizations (Mol, 1995, p.46). Dryzek and 
colleagues (2003) state that an ecological modernization approach combines well with a 
reformist state strategy. More specifically, ecological modernization theorists have argued for a 
shift “from curative and reactive to preventive, from exclusive to participatory policy making, 
from centralized to decentralized wherever possible and from domineering, overregulated 




environmentally sound practices and behavior on the part of producers and consumers” (Buttel, 
2000, p.61). 
The significant role of the state has also been recognized in various concepts, such as the 
‘environmental state’ (Mol & Buttel, 2002), the ‘ecological state’ (Meadowcroft, 2005), and the 
‘green state’ (Eckersley, 2004). These concepts are related to different socio-political contexts 
and historical trajectories. For example, the potential emergence of an ‘ecological state’ is 
discussed within the context of the development of the welfare state (Meadowcroft, 2005). 
Nevertheless, they share a fundamental presumption that the state remains the preeminent 
institution with the capacity and authority to secure environmental protection (Barry & Eckersley, 
2005). 
In contrast to these positive readings of the potential of the state, the emerging agenda of 
sustainable development established in the 1992 Rio Declaration has posed serious challenges to 
the authority of the state in environmental governance. Dryzek (1997, p.131) stated that the 
discourse of sustainable development has been essentially “a discourse of international society” 
under which the appeals to coordinated international action and grassroots participation have 
suggested shifting powers away from the nation-state to both higher (transnational) and lower 
(local) levels of political organization. Being a discourse of and for global civil society, 





Transnational environmental governance took on extra urgency as the environmental 
problem went global in the early 1990s. Not only the manner in which state-centered 
environmental protection had been operated, but the scale prescribed by state-bounded 
environmental governance was called into question. Specifically, the management of global 
environmental problems, such as ozone layer depletion and loss of biodiversity, whose origins 
and impacts stretch over all state boundaries, requires the formation of international institutions 
(Paterson, 2001). In addition, the increasingly globalized economy and the emergence of various 
supra-national and global political and economic institutions and mechanisms, such as the World 
Trade Organization, had diminished state sovereignty and further reduced the capacity of 
nation-states to intervene in those economic activities with profound environmental implications 
(Wapner, 1996).  
These discussions have been echoed by a broader discussion of globalization. Several 
commentators suggest that the state has been reconfigured and rearticulated across spatial scales 
creating new 'geographies of governance' (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999, p.505). These new 
geographies have been variously described as a ‘new medievalism’ (Anderson, 1996) signifying 
the presence of overlapping and competing authorities at different scales or ‘glocalization’ 
(Swyngedouw, 2000) denoting the global-local simultaneity of economic restructuring. State 
theorist Jessop (2002) conceptualized these new trends as the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, a 
process where the functions of the state were redistributed upwards, to international and 




non-state actors. As such, the growing intellectual preoccupation with globalization or the 
‘retreat of the state’ has reinforced the idea that the nation-state is losing control in the field of 
environmental protection (Christoff, 2005; Mol & Buttel, 2002).   
Some scholars have cautioned against this reading of international regime and claimed that 
nation-states compose the basic units around which the international regime is organized. 
Eckersley (2005) pointed out that the state stands at the intersection between domestic, 
international, and global pressures and thus acts as the most significant nodes in a complex 
network of governance against the background of globalization. Furthermore, the ways in which 
states perceive their interests and sovereignty are fundamentally reshaped as cognitive and 
normative aspects of environmental issues are built and communicated through the international 
regime (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Litfin, 1994: Newell, 2000; Paterson, 1996; Payne, 2001). 
Therefore, the function of the state rests not only in their constitutions but also by the 
constellation of shared norms and practices arising from multilateral engagements (Barry & 
Eckersley, 2005). In this light, the conventional conceptualization of states as separate, static 
entities responsible for environmental quality within respective boundaries has become 
insufficient. 
The state in climate change 
If the 1990s can be seen as the era when the notion of sustainable development dominated 
the discourses and practices of state environmental regulation, the post-2000 years have been 




greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, the goal of radically reducing carbon emissions has 
become a major focus of environmental policy and activism and even replaced “sustainable 
development” as the dominant discourse underlying new modes of environmental regulation and 
governance (While et al., 2010; Keil, 2007).  
The new regime has sparked a new wave of discussions on the relations between the state 
and environmental protection. One important direction these discussions have taken is to analyze 
the “network” forms of environmental governance. An increasing body of literature has 
identified the involvement of a wide array of state and non-state actors in a joint effort to combat 
the climate change (Bäckstrand, 2008; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; Conca, 2005; Dingwerth, 2008; 
Lipschutz, 1997; Wapner, 1996). Bulkeley & Schroeder (2012) claimed that the boundaries 
between the state and the non-state have been blurred by an ongoing reconfiguration of the state. 
In this context, activities toward addressing climate change are “created, constructed, regulated 
and contested between, across and among scales, and through hybrid governing arrangements 
which operate in network terms” (Bulkeley, 2005, p.876). 
Up to date, Bulkeley and Betsill’s (2003, 2005, 2013) analyses of ‘multilevel governance’ 
has represented one of the most comprehensive efforts to explore the changing role of the state in 
the increasingly networked governance of climate change. With a focus on the urban settings, 
they described the emergence of subnational actors in climate regulation and diverse 
opportunities that networks can provide, such as access to resources, knowledge and exhibiting 




different levels of government” (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013, p.144). Action on climate change 
occurs within and between international, national, regional, and local scales of authority. 
Multilevel governance is forged “in the very process of governing climate change” (Ibid, p.144).  
This dynamic account of the state fits well with Jessop’s (1999) theory of state strategic 
selectivity. Jessop (1999, p.11) argued that state power came from “a continuing interaction 
between the structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities of the state as an institutional ensemble 
and the changing balance of forces operating within, and at a distance from, the state and perhaps, 
also trying to transform it”. Inside the state, Carlsson and Sandström (2008), in discussing new 
governing modes of the commons, demonstrated that there were different ‘faces’ of the state that 
make important actors within the networks in various policy processes, indicating diverse and 
contingent positions within the state. Such dynamic accounts of the state stand in sharp contrast 
to the traditional view of the nation-state as encompassing a relatively unitary position. 
Some authors have argued that the state reinvents and reconstructs itself in response to new 
environmental crises (Okereke et al., 2009). Specifically, as the goal of CO2 reduction has 
become an overriding concern, various policy approaches including public investment, subsidies, 
regulation, inducements and sanctions have been updated to facilitate low-carbon transitions (for 
a national-level policy review, see Broekhoff et al., 2018). While and colleagues (2010, p.80) 
conceptualize the repositioning of the state under the CO2 reduction regime as a process of 
“eco-state restructuring” (ESR), which stands for “the reorganization of state powers, capacities, 




than a normative account of sustainability like the idealized ‘eco state’ or ecological 
modernization (Meadowcraft, 2005), ESR does not prescribe a specific form of state intervention 
but focuses on the evolving process. In particular, ESR draws attention to conflicts and power 
struggles around the state in environmental governance. 
A presumption underlying ESR is that the paradigm of CO2 reduction has produced “a 
distinctive political economy that both opens up, and necessitates an extension of state 
intervention in the spheres of production and consumption” (While et al, 2010, p.82). 
International carbon governance is based around a system of national territorial accounting in 
which a global limit for emissions is divided out between countries, with national governments 
left to determine the best way of working towards their targets (Ibid). In this context, the state is 
to take a more active and directed role in regulating the environmental inputs and outputs 
through a new regulatory logic of ‘carbon control’. This paradigm of carbon control is organized 
by a set of clear and somewhat instrumental goals: to reduce carbon dioxide in the upper 
atmosphere to a certain level as quickly and efficiently as possible. Such goals distinguished the 
new paradigm from the earlier one of sustainable development, which has been characterized by 
great flexibility and ambiguity.  
An increasing number of empirical studies have demonstrated the functioning of the new 
paradigm. For instance, in a study of carbon accounting used in national carbon sink, carbon 
credit and personal carbon budget, Lövbrand & Stripple (2011) state that stocks and flows of 




economic rationality, such as government regulation, market exchanges and self-governance by 
responsible individual subjects. As a new form of governmental rationality, carbon accounting 
and policy tools alike introduce new objects of governance as well as new values.  
Besides the ESR scholars, the changing role of the state under the climate change agenda has 
also been a popular topic among scholars, who focus on the relations between climate 
governance and infrastructure transitions (Hudson & Marvin, 2010; Bulkeley et al., 2012, 2014). 
They generally see the conventional resource-intensive pathway of development as locked in the 
material persistence of infrastructures and call for reconfiguration of the current infrastructure 
networks to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels. They do not reject the growing reliance on 
different forms of “partnership” between public and private actors in the provision of new forms 
of low-carbon infrastructure. But the state is situated in a special position to encourage 
macroeconomic restructuring away from resource- and energy-intensive sectors (von Malmborg 
& Strachan, 2005).  
For example, by generating and upholding property rights, the state plays a pivotal role in 
shaping the approaches to investment, production, consumption and reproduction relating to the 
low-carbon infrastructure (Broekhoff et al., 2018). Furthermore, the state is a main driving force 
for the development and scaling-up of environmentally friendly technologies through providing 
‘lead markets’ in which technology-based innovations can demonstrate their feasibility (Jänicke 




to develop legal frameworks, financial instruments and technical capabilities to implement 
concerted and large-scale low-carbon transitions. 
As well, the state’s potential to facilitate infrastructure transitions is also relevant for social 
infrastructure. In documenting the increasing salience of “community resilience” in climate 
action planning, some scholars have drawn attention to the special role of the state in enabling 
and facilitating grassroots, collective activities towards climate adaptation as well as 
“self-regulating actors” (Rutland & Aylett, 2008; Saavedra & Budd, 2009). The institutional 
contexts within which those networks operate, both national and local, play a decisive role in 
shaping the ability of networks to achieve desired ends (Granberg & Elander, 2007; Lankao, 
2007). Furthermore, state actors organize, mediate, and coordinate between citizen groups, 
environmental NGOs and consumer organizations, all of which play significant roles in 
promoting low-carbon social infrastructure as well as more ecologically responsible behaviors 
(Barry & Eckersley, 2005).  
These findings echo a broad observation on the relations between the state and the civil 
society in climate governance. Instead of the “hollowing out of the state”, the increasingly active 
civil sphere indicates “a different means of getting governing done—through private authority 
and different parts of the state” (Okereke et al., 2009, p.68). As Sending & Neumann (2006) 
argue, “the ascendance of nonstate actors in shaping and carrying out global governance 
functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to nonstate actors, or a matter of 




in governmentality” where civil society is rendered both an object and the subject of governing 
(Okereke et al., 2009). According to Hunold and Dryzek (2005), environmentalists have a better 
chance of achieving their goals if they form strategic alliances with the state and conceptualize 
their initiatives as part of the state’s imperatives instead of in tension with those imperatives. All 
of these evidences point to the enabling power of the state in the increasingly networked climate 
governance.  
The decisive role the state is also highlighted by scholars who focus on justice issues in 
climate governance. It is argued that at the heart of climate governance is a question of 
distributional politics as resource allocation linked to climate policy is always uneven 
(Swyngedouw, 2009; While et al., 2010; Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013). Glaeser (2009) stated 
that the state could choose particular communities and make them low-carbon and resilient 
communities by directing resources to them rather than their counterparts. Similar processes can 
occur across different levels of government. For example, a nation-state can invest in regional 
infrastructures, such as inter-city rail and power transmission networks, as well as implement 
pilot programs in certain places. The local state can deliver various forms of service and resource 
such as access to public transportation, waste collection, and clean energy to facilitate 
low-carbon transitions in particular neighborhoods (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006). It can also 
prioritize particular urban areas through special zoning ordinances or other planning policy tools. 
As the primary source of (re)distributional powers, the state fundamentally shapes the outcomes 




Overall, it has been increasingly recognized that the role of the state, especially the national 
state, in climate governance has been understated in the face of the emergence of new 
authoritative actors beyond the state and new “network”, “partnership”, and “hybrid” modes of 
governance (Bulkeley, 2005; Conca, 2005; Hudson & Marvin, 2010). This inclination leads to 
the ignorance of the regulatory context of production, exchange and consumption, which 
fundamentally shapes the circumstances under which those actors and networks operate and their 
chance to achieve desired ends. Furthermore, the pessimistic view of the ecological potential of 
states may even become “an excuse for political resignation to the idea of a weakened and 
ineffectual state” and neglect of the enabling and steering potential within the state (Barry & 
Eckersley, 2005, p. x).  
The role of the state in Chinese environmental governance 
Less affluent countries have been neglected in the ongoing project of reinventing the state in 
new environmental governance. The renewed interest in re-focusing on the state and the 
exploration of ‘green,’ ‘environmental,’ or ‘ecological’ state have overwhelmingly focused on 
societies with advanced democracies and industrialized or post-industrial economies. Less 
developed countries have been conceptualized in two contradictory ways. On one side, they are 
simply described as actors who take fundamentally different position and strategies in global 
climate governance than their counterparts in the developed world (Parks & Roberts, 2010). 
Under the title of ‘G-77 and China’, national governments of these countries have been 




economic development priorities (Allan & Dauvergne, 2013). On the other side, it is assumed 
that environmental management in developing countries are deeply influenced by a global civil 
society, global environmental governance, and environmental management systems operated by 
transnational corporations (Mol, 2006). 
The distinctive Chinese political economy makes the state’s role in its environmental 
governance even more ambiguous. While a few theoretical lenses, such as ecological 
modernization and multilevel environmental governance, have been applied to China’s evolving 
environmental regulation (e.g. Mol, 2006; Schreurs, 2017; Schwartz, 2004; Zhang et al., 2007; 
Zhou, 2015), their explanatory powers fall short of illuminating the complex landscape of 
Chinese environmental problem. Nevertheless, these observations consistently point to the 
persistently overarching role of the state, especially the national state, in shaping the 
socio-political context in which market-based instruments and non-state actors perform (Mol & 
Carter, 2006; Schwartz, 2004; Stalley & Yang 2006). The functioning of the market mechanism 
and the civil society is contingent upon the state-market and state-society relationships in 
accordance with particular national priorities. Furthermore, administrative methods and 
command-and-control regulation are often more effective than economic incentives in 
environmental decisions (Qi et al., 2013). 
These findings relate to the thesis of authoritarian environmentalism (Beeson, 2010). Beeson 
(2010) defines authoritarian environmentalism as (1) a non-participatory policymaking process 




neoliberal and democratic styles of environmental policy processes (Andrew & Cortese, 2013). 
Although effectiveness as well as legitimacy of authoritarian environmentalism is still under 
debate (Gilley, 2012; Shearman & Smith, 2007; Winslow, 2005), it provides a useful framework 
to understand measures that take effect in China but would be hard to implement elsewhere. For 
example, hundreds of heavily polluting firms are shut down on short notice during mega-events 
as a result of sudden top-down decisions. Authoritarian environmentalism challenges the 
conventional wisdom that authoritarian states tend to do poorly at environmental protection 
(Shapiro, 2001; Economy, 2004). Beeson (2010) even claims that environmental 
authoritarianism may be necessary if China and other countries in Southeast Asia are to deal with 
the environmental challenges they face. 
Whilst authoritarian environmentalism captures some key characteristics of China’s 
environmental governance including a powerful party-state that dominates a non-participatory 
policy process, a retrained environmental civil society, and a regulatory regime based mainly on 
command-and-control instruments (Deng, 2010; Schwartz, 2004), it can hardly explain the 
prevailing weak implementation of environmental policy and environmental failures. Pure 
authoritarian environmentalism never exists and a mixture of different environmental governance 
models can be found in China (Gilley, 2012; Lo, 2015; Schreurs, 2011). According to Schreurs 
(2011), China’s model of authoritarianism is one that is increasingly accepting the need to 
address pollution problems and to act on climate change but only to the extent that doing so does 




Lo (2015) cautions that simply regarding China’s environmental governance as authoritarian 
ignores some important features of the country’s politics. Specifically, decentralization of 
policymaking and implementation has created considerable space for local governments to align 
with local interests rather than the central government (Chung, 2000; Li, 2010; Lieberthal, 1992). 
Compared to environmental reforms of Western countries, where decentralization and greater 
flexibility have produced some environmental policies that are better adapted to the local 
physical and socio-economic situations, decentralization in China appears to have little to 
contribute to the environment. Specifically, conflicting political and financial incentives reward 
misimplementation of environmental policy, leading to the fragmentation of authoritarian power 
(Marks, 2010; Ran, 2013).  
For many observers of China’s environmental governance, local governments’ 
growth-oriented mindset has been the main driver of the country’s environmental degradation 
since economic reform in 1978 (Skinner et al., 2003; Economy, 2004). In particular, the 
prevalent export-oriented economy has stimulated local governments to develop a strategy of 
“racing-to-the-bottom” in environmental regulation to compete for foreign investment (Mao & 
Hills, 2002). In the nascent field of climate change governance, ‘Local governments neither feel 
pressure to act on climate change from the public nor do they have to deal with international 
pressures’ (Qi et al., 2008, pp.393-4). 
The role of the local state is, however, more complicated than lowering environmental 




been increasingly incorporated into the local official evaluation and promotion system, and as a 
growing number of special purpose subsidies and grants have been offered by the central 
government to promote environmental development, local governments’ decisions on balancing 
economy and environment can be difficult (Qi et al., 2008). In addition, many other political 
decisions at the central level impact local environmental governance unexpectedly. For example, 
a high turnover of leading cadres at the local level and the resultant short horizons of local 
officials encourage them to prioritize short-term economic outcomes over long-term 
environmental goals (Eaton & Kostka, 2014). Therefore, the nature of environmental governance 
depends not only on national policy but also on local politics and central-local relations. As 
argued by Gilley (2012, p.291), China’s climate change policy is centered on the regulatory and 
coercive powers of the central state and on the developmental and political incentives of local 
governments. 
Regarding the role of the local state, some observations of China’s general urban governance 
can also apply to the sub-field of environmental governance. Focusing on urban planning 
practices, Wu (2016) argues that two apparently contradictory paradigms including the 
neoliberalism and the developmental state fit together well in Chinese cities. Wu (2016, p.339) 
further refers to this urban regime as “state entrepreneurialism” to signify a combination of 
“entrepreneurialism and the operation of state apparatus.” This theory sheds much light on the 
local state’s role in environmental governance. In particular, it well explains the absurd 




arrangements such as privatization of utility companies, public-private partnerships and market 
pricing schemes, on one side, and the coercive measures such as sudden shut down of polluting 
factories on the other.  
Focusing on the constant growth-oriented rationales underlying urban planning, 
conventional understanding of state entrepreneurialism largely ignores the changing 
development agenda in the early twenty-first century. Most remarkably, the East Asian 
developmental state has witnessed the emergence of a ‘new developmentalism’, which is defined 
as “revitalised and refocused forms of state capacity aimed at realizing the transformative 
economic objectives associated with sustainable development” (Dent, 2018, p.1192). While 
industrial development still serves as the principal pathway that developmental states follow, this 
is no longer exclusively about the traditional heavy industries but more about new, ‘green’ 
industries. The developmental state has been also redefined by the priority given to 
decarbonizing the production processes, as the required technological innovation fits well with 
its goals of continued economic growth and technological advancement (Wong, 2012). Under 
these emerging trends, an updated theory of state entrepreneurialism is required to understand the 
new role of the state in China’s climate governance.  
To sum up, the long-lasting debate over the effectiveness and limits of the state in protecting 
the environment has been reinvigorated under the global framework of climate change. The 
presumption is that a new, dynamic view is needed to understand the state’s role in climate 




Western democratic and industrialized societies but would be of extraordinary importance in 
developing countries like China where any transformative project has to begin inside the state 
(Pei, 2006, p.35). Currently, studies on the relationship between the state and the environment in 
China point to an ambiguous role of the state ranging from an extremely powerful environmental 
state in authoritarian environmentalism to ineffective or even rebellious local developmental 
states. Under the context, a renewed discussion on this topic is of particular political as well as 
academic relevance.  
3.3. Cities and the regime of carbon control 
While the role of the state in climate governance is still under debate, a consensus does exist 
that cities are crucial actors, sites and mechanism to address the global challenge of climate 
change (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; Bulkeley et al., 2010). Bulkeley and Kern (2006) have 
identified four ways to govern climate change in the urban settings, including governing a 
government’s own activities, governing by direct service provision, governing by authority and 
sanction, and governing through persuasion and enabling. These authors also discussed 
specifically the use of local planning as an effective measure to address climate change. They 
found that “local authorities do not systematically exploit the opportunities which they have in 
relation to planning and regulating land use for climate protection” (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006, 
p.2247). 
Since then, a growing body of work has drawn attentions to the relations between local 




2008; Wheeler, 2008; Wilson & Brown, 2008). Although this work has lent strong theoretical 
support for the potential of linking planning to local climate governance, specific illustrations of 
local practices occurring in the subnational climate programs have been scarce. Furthermore, the 
existing study has focused almost exclusively on policy action and seen local efforts of planning 
for climate change as manifest in the formulation of relevant programs such as emission 
inventory, mitigation targets and action plans, while the formulation of these programs is no 
guarantee that subsequent climate action planning will be substantive or effective. 
Urban governance of carbon 
As the goal of radically reducing carbon emissions took on new urgency in the early years of 
the twenty-first century (While et al., 2010, p.76), an increasing interest in the management of 
urban-scale carbon flows has been shared among many scholars who focus on various innovative 
policy tools such as carbon inventory and accounting (Rice, 2010), carbon trading and offsetting 
schemes (Bailey, 2007; Hoornweg, Sugar, & Trejos, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2012) and 
individual/household/corporation carbon footprint management (Rutland & Aylett, 2008; 
Saavedra & Budd, 2009; Lövbrand & Stripple; 2011). These studies together make it evident that 
carbon control is becoming the “overriding concern at the heart of sustainable development” 
(Bulkeley, 2006, p.206). Furthermore, as carbon control becomes a new ‘master concept’ of 
environmental regulation (Keil, 2007), the urban political arena is characterized by new concepts 




lifestyles, zero-carbon building, carbon-neutral development, carbon trading, carbon footprints 
and so on (Newman et al., 2008). 
As carbon has become “a governable aspect of the environment” in the urban settings, it is 
speculated that the new political imperative of reducing local carbon emissions will have 
profound implications for politics and practices of urban developemnt (Rice, 2010, p.932). 
Through case study of Seattle’s GHGs mitigation practices, Rice (Ibid, p.929) suggest that a key 
mechanism for making climate governable in a city is “the carbonization of urban governance, 
where a relationship between the production of GHG emissions and specific urban activities is 
established through the use of GHG inventories and emissions monitoring.” By use of carbon 
footprint and other concepts alike, nearly all aspects of urban governance, from providing 
transportation options to supplying services and utilities, become “geographically defined and 
quantitatively tallied in terms of carbon (or more generally, GHG) emissions and reduction 
potential” (Ibid, p.933).  
Furthermore, measurements related to carbon emissions and reduction may turn into 
indicators of performance of political officials, legitimacy of administrative organs, 
attractiveness of a place, or even the overall well-being of a society. In this context, local 
governments face an increasing imperative to proactively manage flows of carbon and invest in 
low-carbon social and physical infrastructures within municipal boundaries. The result of these 
activities is the emergence of a ‘low-carbon urbanism’: “a variety of forms of low carbon 




climate change objectives and their long-term economic development” (Bulkeley et al., 2012, 
p.548). As such, cities have been conceptualized as “arenas within which new forms of low 
carbon economy can be developed” (Ibid, p.549).  
It is now widely recognized that the low-carbon urbanism is not just about or for the climate 
but close aligned with the concerns of urban growth and resource security (Hodson & Marvin, 
2009, 2010; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013). Hodson and Marvin (2010) have used the term of 
‘strategic urbanism’ and ‘secure urbanism and resilient infrastructure’ to denote an inclination 
that climate change becomes integral to the pursuit of wider urban agendas. Similarly, Rice 
(2010, p.) argues for “climatization of the urban environment” where ‘climate’ is used as a 
conceptual resource for urban policy and governance. Bulkeley and Betsill (2013) have also 
reported a trend under which responding to climate change has in some cities become both a 
more strategic concern and a more mainstream economic issue. The fusion of climate change 
responses and economic development raises fundamental issues about what might be constituted 
as ‘urban’ environmental governance (Ibid, p.141).  
The blurring boundaries between climate protection and economic development are 
particularly apparent in the sub-field of carbon governance. The quantifiable and measurable 
characters make carbon outputs attachable to specific economic and social activities in particular 
places (Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013). Carbon governance depends on the creation of new 
infrastructures and technologies to guide the transition to a low-carbon living. It also depends on 




these incentives into real action. Furthermore, emerging carbon accounting and trading schemes 
enable the joint pursuit of carbon emission reductions and economic profit.  
While et al. (2010, p.82-3) has argued that “although presented as a response to 
socio-ecological crisis, low-carbon restructuring is perhaps more accurately read as a 
political-economic fix enacted through the domain of state environmental regulation”, giving rise 
to “a low-carbon polity predicated on carbon-control.” For these authors, the new polity involves 
a paradigm shift as carbon control implies fundamental change in the “objects, objectives, modes 
of calculation and outcomes of all forms of environmental regulation.” As well, in contrast to the 
flexibility and ambiguity of sustainable development, a low-carbon polity is focused around a set 
of clear and somewhat instrumental goals: to reduce the concentration of greenhouse gases, and 
especially carbon dioxide, in the upper atmosphere to a required level as quickly and efficiently 
as possible (Ibid, p.83). 
A growing body of works have discussed the long-term effects of this low-carbon regime. 
For example, scholars of political geography argue that carbon budgets could lead to experiments 
in the reterritorialisation of governance at the city-regional scale around carbon 
interdependencies linked to energy supply, infrastructure, or the pooling of carbon credits (Jonas 
& Ward, 2007; Krueger & Savage, 2007). Scholars of competitive cities state that the capability 
of overcoming ecological constraints through appropriately managing carbon flows become “a 
new dimension of cities’ competitive positioning” (Hudson & Marvin, 2009, p.207; Jonas et al., 




economic activities would be relocated. It is generally argued that the combination of a growing 
concern over carbon control and the prevalent territorial accounting logic has given rise to new 
calculative base for urban management (While et al., 2010).  
Progressive potentials within low-carbon urban regime 
The nature of the climate change problem is under debate. On one side, Swyngedouw (2007, 
2009) has argued that climate change is a postpolitical environmental problem which rejects 
ideological divisions and forecloses the articulation of alternative trajectories of future urban 
environmental possibilities. Under this ‘postpolitical environmental consensus’, “there is no 
contestation over the givens of the situation, over the partition of the sensible; there is only 
debate over the technologies of management, the arrangements of policing and the configuration 
of those who already have a stake, whose voices already recognized as legitimate” (Swyngedouw, 
2009, p.610).  
On the other side, North (2009) has directly opposed Swyngedouw’s (2007) opinion, 
arguing that responses to climate change are deeply political. In particular, focusing on small and 
local scales may cause diverse political outcomes, ranging from more integrated forms of 
regional development to a breakdown of society into warring localized tribes. Up to date, the 
postpolitical reading of climate change has been widely challenged by critical political ecologists 
and critical urban scholars (e.g. Beck, 2010; Jonas et al., 2011; North, 2009). Specifically, the 




regulation as well as general climate justice issues (e.g. While et al., 2010; Rice, 2010; Lohmann 
2001, 2008, 2012). 
Of particular relevance is an ongoing debate over whether existing carbon reduction 
strategies in cities contribute to progressive goals of social justice and distributional equity (e.g. 
Gibbs & Jonas, 2000; Jonas et al., 2011; North, 2009; Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013). A 
widespread observation goes that using quantitative estimates of carbon emissions and reduction 
potential to measure economic performance and other aspects of urban development has become 
prominent feature of urban governance. These carbon control strategies “arguably represent a 
harder edge to state environmental regulation via non-negotiable target setting in contrast with the 
fairly weak implementation of sustainability principles” (While et al., 2010, p.77). For example, 
Slocum (2004, p.777) has argued that carbon reduction strategies create ‘subaltern and competing 
discourses’ that are not easily co-opted within, or reducible to, mainstream neoliberal market 
solutions. 
Nevertheless, a more popular opinion is that the current carbon control strategies are less than 
progressive in terms of extension of market environmentalism and, in particular, commodification 
and financialization of carbon (Bailey 2007; Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; Lohmann, 2012). Taking 
carbon offset as an example, Bumpus and Liverman (2008) argue that carbon management 
represents capital-accumulation strategies that devolve governance over the atmosphere to 
supranational and nonstate actors and to the market. Eco-Marxist Lohmann’s (2012) theoretical 




molecules are used as apolitical objects. By doing this, climate change is disembedded from the 
history of fossil fuel use and re-embedded in the movement of molecules emitted by ‘bounded’ 
nation states and corporations. For scholars under this camp, the emerging ‘carbon economy’ not 
just reinforces existing social and spatial inequalities but even produces new sources of 
suppression and inequity (Bailey & Wilson, 2009; Lohmann 2001, 2008).  
More balanced and optimistic assessments of the progressive potential within carbon 
reduction strategies have been offered by a group of new urban politics (NUP) scholars (e.g. 
Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013; Jonas et al., 2011; While et al., 2010). These authors focus on the 
implications of the carbon control agenda on the dominant entrepreneurialism urban regime and 
argue for a double-edged effect of the agenda. Using accounting of carbon emissions as indicators 
of urban economic performance and overall well-being of cities aligns with the political 
calculation under the neoliberal interurban competition context (Jonas et al., 2011). In this sense, 
carbon control reinforces prevailing norms. 
In the meanwhile, carbon control alters the basis of strategic calculation and thus opens up 
“alternative socio-economic possibilities for localities and regions locked into the narrow growth 
pathways of the neoliberal competition state” (While et al., p.87). Specifically, the progressive 
potential can be delivered through non-growth, de-growth and low consumption as presented in 
social movements like the Transition Town Movement (North, 2009), alternative and 
post-carbon growth strategies (Krueger & Gibbs, 2008), or “empowering new strategic alliances 




While et al. (2010, p.85) speculate that setting a price for carbon emissions “imply some form of 
redistribution of resources from wealthier high-carbon users to poorer groups.”  
Additionally, it is expected that the agenda of carbon control could generate new relations 
and conflicts between different interest groups as well as different social goals in cities. Policies 
such as private and state subsidies for household energy conservation or investments in 
low-carbon infrastructure (e.g. light rail, renewable energy supply, carbon sink) needed to be 
negotiated with or potentially traded-off against other forms of public goods (e.g. job creation, 
affordable housing, schools) or inward investment strategies (Jonas et al., 2011; Silver, 2017; 
While et al., 2010). Such hard decisions are to be made between urban growth coalitions, 
taxpayers, environmentalists and other social groups who are driven by varying degrees of 
concerns over climate change.  
A direction this discussion has taken focuses on the linkage between carbon reduction 
strategies and governing legitimacy in cities. Deloitte (2008, p.7) illustrates how carbon 
reduction is deployed in Manchester and many other localities to legitimate certain kinds of 
urban interventions over others. More fundamentally, Jonas et al. (2011, p.2545) claim that 
carbon reduction measures “could be legitimated by the cost savings they represent for capital in 
the form of incoming businesses and consumers”, thus reinforcing the general political 
legitimacy under the entrepreneurialism urban regime by standing out in the interurban 




include the capabilities of managing jurisdictional carbon emissions to resist the negative effects 
of climate change. 
The discussion is, however, largely premised on the competitive sub-national governance in 
western nations, while existing literature points to remarkable relationship between environment 
and governing legitimacy in other parts of the world such as China and developmental states 
alike. In China, the main cause of environmental degradation is rapid economic growth that is 
being driven by the need to lift hundreds of thousands of people from poverty, but also – it is 
argued (Liu 2007; Pei 2006) – by the link between growth and the legitimacy of the party state. 
At local levels, as Beach (2001, p. 25) comments: “By increasing incomes, ensuring low 
unemployment rates, and maintaining stability, local government officials gain legitimacy of the 
citizens. ... In light of these benefits of economic growth, it is understandable to see why local 
government officials do not prioritize costly environmental protection investments.” In this light, 
the decision on reconfiguring the relations between economic growth and carbon management is 
more complicated considering a dimension of legitimacy of local state authority. 
3.4. Summary  
This chapter reviews existing work on three topics including (1) the global environmental 
discourse, (2) the state-environment relations under climate change and (3) urban politics of 
carbon control. While environmental discourse, the state, and management of carbon flow at the 
urban scale are all interrelated and have profound implications for the global climate governance, 




ground have been rarely examined. In particular, current studies on respective issues consistently 
focus primarily on a ‘First World political ecology’ (McCarthy 2005), largely neglecting the less 
developed and affluent countries which present particular impact on and vulnerability to a 
changing climate.  
Admittedly, environmental management in developing countries are deeply influenced by a 
global civil society, global environmental governance, and environmental management systems 
operated by transnational corporations. But Mol (2001) has warned against the convenient 
conclusion that globalization will result automatically in homogenization of environmental 
governance. It is not only globalization dynamics and processes, but also specific local 
conditions, national priorities, domestic historical trajectories, state-market relations and power 
balances, among other things, that will determine environmental governance and reform 
practices and institutions. Furthermore, discussion on the emerging urban regime of carbon 
control, especially in terms of progressive potentials within this process for urban development 
practices, has largely missed a context where local authorities tend to prioritize economic growth 
above stringent enforcement of environmental regulations, and accountability mechanisms are 





Chapter 4: Pre-‘carbon’ Development of Pingdi and Predecessor of SILCC 
4.1. Historical context of SILCC 
The SILCC coincides with the boundaries of Pingdi, which is a sub-area of Longgang in 
northeastern Shenzhen. When Longgang turned from a county to an urban district in 1993, the 
township of Pingdi became one of its eleven sub-districts. In 2005, Longgang reached a 100% 
urbanization rate as a result of Shenzhen’s household registration system reform. Back then, a 
group of over 500 local residents still engaged in agricultural production, yielding a total output 
of 937.34 million yuan (Longgang Statistical Yearbook, 2005). As an urban district of a first-tier 
city, Longgang, however, presented many characteristics which were usually found on the urban 
fringe, such as a patchwork style agricultural and industrial land uses, influx of migrants, and 
insufficient infrastructures and social services (Interviewee 18, personal communication, July 20, 
2015). 
Before 2010, Longgang was excluded from the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone34 (SSEZ) 
(Fig. 4.1). The administrative dichotomy between guannei (literarily “within the border) and 
guanwai (literarily “beyond the border”), which was embodied by an iron fence running 136km 
around the four inner districts, prohibited Longgang from enjoying as much the central 
                                                 
34 The SSEZ was established by the State Council in May 1980 as the first special economic zone in China. It 
originally consisted of four districts, including Luohu, Futian, Nanshan, and Yantian, leaving the other areas within 
the Shenzhen jurisdictions as Bao’an county. In 1993, Bao’an county was divided into Bao’an and Longgang, both 
of which were established as the fifth and sixth urban districts in the Shenzhen municipality. But they were still not 




government’s political support and preferential policies as the SSEZ. In particular, since 
Shenzhen started a process of economic restructuring toward a strong tertiary sector in 1990s, the 
transformation has concentrated in the four inner districts due to the SSEZ’s preferential policies 
for inward investment as well as locational advantages in terms of proximity to Hong Kong. 
 
Figure 4.1: The Shenzhen Municipality, old SSEZ, and urban districts (Source: Ng and Tang, 2004) 
As a result, Longgng district, especially the remote areas like Pingdi, was largely 
marginalized in this process. As of 2009, the tertiary sector contributed approximately 32% of 
Longgang’s GDP, compared to a proportion of 60% in the then SSEZ 
(Longgang/Luohu/Futian/Yantian/Nanshan Statistics Yearbook, 2016). Longgang’s economy 
was led by a dominant secondary sector. Specifically, it was dependent upon various traditional 
manufacturing industries, such as electronics and communications equipment, garments, toys, 




environment, resulting in combined poor economic performance and environmental outcome 
(Interviewee 18, personal communication, July 20, 2015). 
In the meanwhile, Longgang was subject to the inter-city relations due to its geographic 
location. The Pearl River Delta35 area was notorious for the rivalry among its cities (Interviewee 
34, personal communication, May 18, 2017). As all of the cities were driven by inward investment 
and export-oriented industrial development, they competed with each other to attract businesses 
and investment. The competition was particularly fierce between cities in close proximity, such as 
Shenzhen and the two cities of Dongguang and Huizhou.36 As the single district in Shenzhen that 
bordered both of these cities, Longgang had long been faced with pressures to attract and sustain 
businesses in its jurisdictions rather than the neighboring cities (Interviewee 12, personal 
communication, June 24, 2015). 
A new development prospect emerged when the municipal government established the goal 
of ‘integrative development’ to direct new development toward the guanwai areas. This goal was 
driven by the concern over the depleting developable land in the city center as a result of rapid 
development and urbanization since the establishment of the SSEZ in 1980 (Interviewee 21, 
personal communication, July 29, 2015). To achieve this goal, the municipal government 
                                                 
35 Pearl River Delta refers to the collective of nine prefecture-level cities in the province of Guangdong, including 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Foshan, Huizhou, Jiangmen and Zhaoqing, and two special 
administrative regions of Hongkong and Macau. 
36 Dongguan is the fourth largest export cities in China after Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Suzhou and a major 
manufacturing hub for electronics and communication equipment. Huizhou has also engaged in this particular sector 




proposed to expand the SSEZ to include the two guanwai districts of Bao’an and Longgang. In a 
city planner’s eyes,  
Due to the administrative dichotomy between guannei and guanwai in history, these two 
districts used to be less attractive to businesses and developers. As a result, a great 
amount of land was left vacant. This land availability meant great development potential 
for Shenzhen, as it was running out of developable land after three decades’ rapid 
development (Interviewee 21, personal communication, July 29, 2015).   
To exploit these land resources, the city adjusted the structures of land uses in its new 
Shenzhen Municipality Land Use Plan (2006-2020). According to the plan, the guanwai areas 
presented most of the new construction land, which would transform from land for agricultural 
or ‘other’ uses (Table 4.1).37  
Area 
2005 2010 Change 
Construction 
Land   
Construction 
Land   
Construction 
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Futian  5,774 4,230 5,219 4,941 -555 711 
Luohu  3,999 2,748 3,711 3,087 -288 339 
Nanshan  9,323 7,432 10,871 9,467 1,548 2,035 




Bao'an 28,690 24,863 35,297 29,136 6,607 4,273 
Longgang 22,817 18,752 25,762 22,519 2,945 3,767 
Guangming* 5,746 5,128 7,019 6,343 1,273 1,215 
                                                 
37 Land in Shenzhen was divided into agricultural use, construction use, and ‘other’ uses. As the single category that 
was developable, construction land was further divided into three sub-categories including urban construction land, 
transportation and water engineering construction land, and construction land for other uses (e.g. tourism, special 
use, salt pans, etc.). Land for agricultural use could be turned into construction land to meet the development 




Pingshan** 5,575 4,433 6,989 6,275 1,414 1,842 
 
Table 4.1: Shenzhen municipality construction land by district, 2006-2020 (Source: Shenzhen UPLRC) 
*Guangming was separated from Bao’an in 2007  
**Pingshan was separated from Longgang in 2009 and became an administrative urban district in 2016 
Since Shenzhen’s proposal for an expanded SSEZ was approved by the State Council, 
Longgang was driven by a goal to catch up with the city center. It was further inspired by the 
new Shenzhen City Master Plan (2010-2020)38, which laid out an ‘east development corridor’ 
that connected Longgang to the Central Business District (CBD) and Hong Kong. Under this 
new context, Longgang initiated many ambitious programs. For example, the district government 
announced in 2010 to phase out five thousand existing manufactures, which were running 
informally, highly polluted or of safety threats, in the next five years (Longgang Economy 
Promotion Bureau, 2011). By the end of 2013, a total of 5,002 manufactures were removed in 
less than three years, vacating a total floor area of 5.7x106m2 in industrial space (Longgang 
Economy Promotion Bureau, 2014). In the meanwhile, Longgang took the lead in the 2011 
Shenzhen Summer Universiade and developed the Universiade Center39 with a public 
investment of 4.5 trillion yuan. 
These activities stimulated the area’s real estate market, the prosperity of which was ‘the 
most important indicator’ of a place’s development achievement (Interviewee 3, personal 
                                                 
38 Since the establishment of Shenzhen SEZ, three generations of master plan have been officially approved in 
1986, 1996, and 2010, although many other versions have been drafted. 
39 The Center was located in the central area of Longgang and composed of a 60,000-seat main stadium, a 




communication, June , 2015). An influx of private developers launched numerous residential 
projects across Longgang as well as in the areas surrounding the Universide Center. In 2010, 
transaction volume of market housing in Longgang amounted to 1,938,200m2, representing 
nearly half of the city-wide amount. Furthermore, the average transaction value rose from below 
60% of the city in 2003 to 80% in 2013. As of 2013, nearly 40% of the city’s real estate 
investment ended up in Longgang (Fig. 4.2). In this light, Longgang became ‘an emerging 
magnet for capital investment and a new growth pole of Shenzhen’ (Interviewee 2, personal 
communication, June 3, 2015). 
 
Figure 4.2: Real Estate Development in Longgang District, 1998-2013 (Source: Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 
2014). 
Longgang also repositioned itself as an integral part of the SSEZ through catching up the 
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environmental development and received a number of national and international awards.40 
Moreover, as the first national pilot city under the MOHURD’s low-carbon eco-cities program, it 
set up an agenda of energy conservation and focused on clean production, waste recycling and 
green building development. Specifically, its green building development, which was 
exemplified by a green portfolio of 208 properties with over 21x106m2 floor space, was 
considered as the country’s best practice (Interviewee 10, personal communication, June 19, 
2015). Shenzhen also implemented a legally binding Methods to Promote Green Building since 
2013 to ensure that all new buildings for public use would meet green building standards. More 
recent environmental development also included the Shenzhen Medium- and Long-Term 
Low-Carbon Development Plan (2011-2020), which was the first city-level climate action plan 
in China. In the Plan, Shenzhen promised to reduce its CO2 emissions by unit of GDP by 21% by 
2015 compared to the 2010 level. This target was higher than the 19.5% Guangdong 
province-wide mitigation target set by the central government (the State Council, [2011] 41).  
The district government of Longgang aspired to attach itself to the city’s climate agenda, 
especially the new status as a national low-carbon pilot city as well as a national carbon 
cap-and-trade pilot city (Interviewee 19, personal communication, July 22, 2015). Therefore, 
Longgang referred to the concept of low-carbon development and applied it in an ongoing 
development project in Pingdi, which later became the SILCC. Furthermore, the notion was 
                                                 
40 These awards include UNEP “Global 500 Roll of Honor for Environmental Achievement 2002”, UN Center for 
Human Settlement “Habitat Scroll of Honor Award”, IFPRA “International Garden City”, “National Sanitary City”, 




linked to many of its priorities, including the phase-out of traditional manufacturing industries 
and management of the natural resources (Interview 26, personal communication, September 14, 
2017). It was within this context of a transforming Longgang that the project of the SILCC 
started taking shape. 
4.2. The spatial planning foundation  
Shenzhen’s planning system is organized around a hierarchy of plans that focus on five 
different geographic scales (Table 4.2). Theoretically, every single plot of land in the city should 
be covered by these five types of plans. The smaller the scale of a plan is, the more specific and 
detailed prescriptions it will impose. A development project should be simultaneously subject to 
a set of five plans to collectively realize the city’s development goals. In particular, a project 
should conform to the statutory plan to obtain the required government approvals, including the 
site selection report, the land use planning permit, and the building permit. As the single 
legislative component of the planning system, the statutory plan plays a central role in regulating 
individual developers’ activities to achieve an orderly pattern of development.  
 
Table 4.2: The hierarchy of plans in Shenzhen urban planning system (Source: Regulations on City Planning of the 




In reality, a complete set of the five plans seldom preexists a project due to the rapid 
progress of urban development. In particular, the statutory plan is often drafted when or even 
after a specific development project is proposed. This situation is particularly prevalent outside 
the old SSEZ. Since the statutory plan was institutionalized in 1998 through the Regulation on 
City Planning of the Shenzhen Municipality, the plan-making has prioritized the inner districts, 
which have witnessed the most rapid development. After the first group of eleven statutory plans 
focusing on the city center were enacted in 1999, over two hundred statutory plans were drafted 
in the following decade with 161 of them approved by the city (Du, 2010). These approved plans 
together cover only 62% of the whole jurisdiction, leaving many areas in lack of an existing 
legislative plan. 
Pingdi was one of those areas that were historically free from any legislative plans. By 2009, 
the most detailed plan covering this area was the Longgang Central Cluster District Plan 
(2005-2020). Being something between a district master plan and a statutory plan, this document 
laid out a general idea on the socio-economic and spatial development of three communities in 
Longgang, including Pingdi and another two adjacent sub-districts. It also outlined the land uses 
in these areas (Fig. 4.3). Without land subdivision or other land use indicators, such as 
development density and building height, the Longgang Central Cluster District Plan had very 
limited regulatory power to guide Pingdi’s development (Interviewee 21, personal 





Figure 4.3: Longgang Central Cluster District Plan (2005-2020) (Source: UPLRC) 
In December 2008, the city government launched a planning campaign and announced that 
statutory plans would be prepared in two years to cover the complete municipal jurisdictions of 
Shenzhen. 41  Around 2010, Pingdi witnessed its first wave of statutory plans for four sub-areas, 
including Gaoqiao (LG203-04), Pingxi (LG203-01), Pingdizhongxin (LG203-02) and Pingdong 
(LG203-03). They together covered an area of 16.6km2, or 31.2% of Pingdi’s jurisdictions (Fig. 
4.4). These plans provided specific requirements, which were led by land use code and the 
floor-area-ratio (FAR), that a local project like the SILCC was to follow.  
                                                 
41 By 2011 August 30th, the combination of approved plans (170) and plans being drafted (83) accounted for 






Figure 4.4: The regulatory plans in effect in Pingdi (Source: Shenzhen UPLRC, compiled by the author) 
At the same time, local development has also been influenced by spatial planning on the 
regional scale. In particular, the Pearl River Delta Area Reform and Development Plan 
(2008-2020), which was drafted by the central government as a manifestation of its regional 
integration campaign42, proposed reinforcing cross-boundary cooperation between three 
Guangdong cities, including Shenzhen, Dongguan and Huizhou. Subsequently, a specific term of 
                                                 
42 The central government initiated a nation-wide campaign for regional integration and development in 2005. By 
2012, a total of fifty-three regional plans had been drafted by central-level agencies as a new “national strategy” (Liu 
et al., 2013), and the Pearl River Delta Area Reform and Development Plan (2008-2020) was an important piece 




‘Shen-Guan-Hui integration’ (‘Shen’ stands for Shenzhen, ‘Guan’ stands for Dongguan, and 
‘Hui’ stands for Huizhou) was created in policy discourse to envision the collaborative 
production on the east bank of the Pearl River (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 15, 
2015). 
In response to the central government and the provincial government’s call, the three cities 
implemented the idea of ‘Shen-Guan-Hui integration’ in a wide range of policy making, 
including industrial development, spatial planning, environmental protection, and infrastructure 
construction. At a conference attended by the Deputy Chair of the Department of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development of Guangdong Province, Deputy Mayors and planning department 
representatives from the three cities signed an agreement for cooperative planning (Interviewee 
31, personal communication, June 17, 2016). They also proposed to together draft four regional 
plans on topics of town clusters, infrastructure networks, border area development, and a shared 
urban digital information system to promote integrative regional development. These policies 
and proposals laid a foundation for later activities aimed at strengthening the connections 
between the three cities.  
As the single district that borders both Dongguan and Huizhou, Longgang was put in a 
strategic position to promote the ‘Shen-Guan-Hui integration’ agenda. On December 4th, 2009, 
Longgang district government held an expert meeting to discuss the implementation of The Pearl 
River Delta Reform and Development Plan (2008-2020). A major topic raised in this meeting 




couple of locations of the prospective demonstration project, including Longgang and Pingshan 
in Shenzhen, Fenggang Township in Dongguan, and Dayangwan Area and Huiyang District in 
Huizhou (Interviewee 19, personal communication, July 22, 2015). Although the meeting did not 
lead to a conclusion, it greatly inspired the local officials in Pingdi to take advantage of its 
geographic location and to attach its development to the policy discourse of ‘Shen-Guan-Hui 
integration’ (Interview 11, personal communication, June 23, 2015). 
4.3. Storyline I: Regional cooperation 
The name of Ping-Xin-Qing Regional Cooperation Demonstration Area (hereafter referred 
to as Ping-Xin-Qing) was first publicized in June 2010 at a press conference after the first 
meeting of Shenzhen’s Fifth People’s Congress. The then Chief of Longgang District, Zhang Bei, 
announced that a project was underway to promote the Shen-Guan-Hui integration. Two 
bordering townships of Qingxi and Xinxu were chosen from Dongguan and Huizhou, 
respectively, to join Pingdi to carry out this project. The tripartite alliance formed by these three 
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Figure 4.5: Formation of Ping-Xin-Qing tripartite cooperation (Source: made by author) 
In spite of their geographic adjacencies, these three places were characterized by disparate 
economic performance (Table 4.3). For example, per capital GDP in Qingxi was almost double 
of that in Pingdi in 2009. As the project proceeded, the gap in economic performance turned out 
to be a major shaping force and eventually an obstacle to the Ping-Xin-Qing project (Interviewee 
11, personal communication, June 23, 2015). But when Zhang announced the project, he stated 
that local governments in Xinxu and Qingxi had expressed strong interests in jointly carrying out 
the project.  








Pingdi 57.6 160,000 2,888 18,050 453 
Xinxu  158.4 120,000 3,351 27,925 216 
Qingxi  143.38 380,000 13,633 35,876 1,219 




Table 4.3: Economic performance of Pingdi, Xinxu, and Qingxi, 2009 (Source: Planning Study on Shen-Guan-Hui 
(Ping-Xin-Qing) Industrial Cooperation Demonstration Area) 
As soon as the three places were identified, the Party School of Longgang District 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (hereafter referred to as Longgang Party School for 
short) was commissioned by the Longgang BDR to draft a plan on Ping-Xin-Qing regional 
cooperation in January 2010. After a period of six months, the Planning Study on 
Shen-Guan-Hui (Ping-Xin-Qing) Industrial Cooperation Demonstration Area was finalized, 
becoming the first official plan for the Ping-Xin-Qing area. According to the plan, the 
Demonstration Area covered an area of 96.1 km2 and was composed of Gaoqiao Industrial Park 
in Pingdi and six villages43 in the other two places (Fig.4.6). Of this area, only 55 km2 of land 
was available for construction, and this land was unevenly distributed among the three places, 
including 10 km2 in Pingdi, 5km2 in Qingxi, and 40 km2 in Xinxu. The building of the 
Demonstration Area was planned to start with redevelopment of the Gaoqiao Industrial Park, 
which was currently occupied by a group of small- and medium-size manufacturers of electronic 
components. According to the plan, the whole Demonstration Area was expected to yield a GDP 
of 150 trillion yuan and tax revenues of 15 trillion yuan in 2020.  
                                                 
43 The six villages include Nankeng, Hongwei, Hongtian, Yuechang, and Dongfeng in Xinxu township in Huizhou 





Figure 4.6: Location of Ping-Xin-Qing Regional Cooperation Demonstration Area (Source: Planning Study on 
Shen-Guan-Hui (Ping-Xin-Qing) Industrial Cooperation Demonstration Area) 
As these fiscal targets as well as the priority given to Gaoqiao indicated, while framed under 
the political agenda of regional integration, the Ping-Xin-Qing plan gave a considerable priority 
to industrial transformation and economic development. In particular, the plan proposed two 
other goals besides regional integration, including clustering of emerging low-carbon industries 
and agglomeration of professional services and R&D supportive to high-tech industries. 
Specifically, low-carbon industries were defined as several industrial types, including electronic 
commerce, new energies, biopharmaceutical, and general high-techs. This narrow sense of 
low-carbon development, which meant particular industries with an exclusive focus on GDP 




storyline dominated. Such a simplification, however, was consistent with the popular 
interpretation of low-carbon development among the local government in China in the early 
years (Interviewee 33, personal communication, May 9, 2017).  
With the ultimate goal of fueling economic growth, the key problem within the storyline of 
regional cooperation was defined as an economic one caused by the prevalence of low-end 
industries. Furthermore, the problem was attributed to several geographic reasons. It was argued 
that the three places’ economic performances lagged behind their home cities as a result of 
‘geographic marginalization’ (Longgang Party School, 2010). Pingdi’s economic development 
had also been restricted by its historic exclusion from the SSEZ and less attractiveness to high 
value-added industries (Longgang Economy Promotion Bureau, 2011). While integrated into the 
SSEZ, its redevelopment was constrained by the limited industrial land. When Ping-Xin-Qing 
was proposed, there was a total of 42.45 km2 land available for construction in Pingdi, and only 
21 km2 of it could be used for industrial purposes (UPLRC, 2010).  
In contrast to Pingdi, Xinxu had plenty of land resources available for new development. It 
was, however, a less desired destination to business establishments and real estate investments 
because of its geographic location (Interviewee 8, personal communication, June 18, 2015). 
Located deeper inland and further from Hongkong and Guangzhou, the Huizhou city had been 
the least developed among the three cities in the Ping-Xin-Qing plan in terms of industrialization 




Qingxi was also faced a different situation than Pingdi. As a township directly under the 
supervision of Dongguan city, which was an important manufacturing base in the Pearl River 
Delta area, Qingxi had seen the clustering of manufactures since 2000. But Qingxi had not 
fulfilled its full potential, especially in terms of its ecological value. The township was 
characterized by vast woodland as well as fourteen reservoirs with a total water area of 5.3 km2 
(Dongguang Statistics Yearbook, 2011). The extraordinary landscape was not, however, 
transformed into additional economic payback (Interviewee 13, personal communication, July 1, 
2015). In this light, the Ping-Xin-Qing plan suggested a coordinated and integrative 
development: 
Three places can take advantage of each other’s distinctive resources, including 
attractiveness to business of Pingdi, good ecological environment of Qingxi, and 
abundant developable land in Xinxu. This can be achieved through breakdown of 
administrative isolation between the three municipalities. Cross-boundary cooperation 
can provide an opportunity of mutual benefit through resource sharing (Longgang Party 
School, 2010). 
The plan further proposed two possible cooperative schemes, namely joint venture and 
entrusted management, and both of them gave the Longgang government more say in making 
decisions. For example, under each of the two scenarios, a commission board would have been 
established to take charge of the planning, development, land management, investment and 
business invitation, and daily operations of the Demonstration Area, and the Longgang 
government would have nominated a majority or the totality of the board. Partly due to the 




acknowledged by the other two parties. More or less, this particular plan was drafted by 
Longgang’s independently, although it suggested at the end that Longgang should communicate 
with Qingxi and Xinxu to build consensus (Interviewee 31, personal communication, June 17, 
2016).  
As the initiator of the Ping-Xin-Qing plan, Longgang could not wait to carry out the plan 
mainly for two reasons (Interviewee 12, personal communication, June 24, 2015): 
First, as the last piece of land in Shenzhen and a new integrative part of the SEZ, 
Longgang has become an ideal destination for investors that sought to establish 
businesses in the Shenzhen SEZ. The current Secretary of Longgang District Party 
Committee and municipal Standing Committee Member, Zunyu Jiang, expressed on 
many occasions that a number of publicly listed companies inquired him about land 
availability in the area. As limited land had loomed as a barrier for accommodating new 
businesses, the Ping-Xin-Qing program would alleviate the problem by ‘borrowing’ land 
in Xinxu and Qingxi. 
The second reason was Gaoqiao Industrial Park.44 By 2008, there were nine enterprises, 
most of which engaged in the production of computer components, LED lighting and 
other electronic devices. Except for Shennan Circuits Company Ltd. and Shenzhen 
Grandsun Electronics Company Ltd., the other seven enterprises were running with low 
profit margins. Compared to an expected annual output of 4 trillion yuan, current 
businesses in Gaoqiao were far from doing well. The local government was eager to fix 
this problem of undervalued land, especially after land value started increasing around 
2010. 
Actually, even the two exceptional were generating only moderate outcomes. In 2009, 
Shennan and Grandsun produced a total output of 1.2 trillion yuan and contributed 80 million 
yuan in tax revenues to Longgang (Interviewee 20, personal communication, July 28, 2015; 
                                                 
44 The original name of Gaoqiao Industrial was Xinsheng-Gaoqiao Industrial Park. After first proposed in 




Interviewee 22, personal communication, July 31, 2015). These numbers could be argued as 
inferior compared to enterprises in other parts of Longgang, let alone those in the city center.  
Relocation of the existing enterprises would have been prohibitively expensive and as high 
as 2.3 trillion yuan per square kilometer (Interviewee 32, personal communication, September 14, 
2017). To mitigate this barrier, Longgang decided to turn to higher-level governments for 
financial as well as political support. Despite a common strategy used by Chinese local 
governments for carrying out large projects, Longgang solicited support from administrative 
entities at higher levels in a sophisticated way by harnessing the idea of regional cooperation.  
After the central government released The Pearl River Delta Area Reform and Development 
Plan (2008-2020), the political project of Shen-Guan-Hui integration quickly rose to the top of 
Shenzhen as well as Guangdong’s agenda. It was anticipated that framing a local project 
accordingly would attract political attention and recognition from higher levels of the 
government: 
Conceptualizing the redevelopment of the Gaoqiao Industrial Park as a pilot project for 
Shen-Guan-Hui integration was strategic. The framework could help the project to attract 
Shenzhen and even Guangdong’s political attentions, which would potentially bring in 
policy and financial supports. With these resources, Gaoqiao would obtain a higher 
political status and a better quality of development (Interviewee 4, personal 
communication, June 9, 2015). 
The framing strategy turned out to be a great success. After the release of the Planning Study 
on Shen-Guan-Hui (Ping-Xin-Qing) Industrial Cooperation Demonstration Area, many key 




Huang Huahua and provincial Party Secretary Wang Yang, publicly expressed support for the 
plan. Furthermore, Governor Huang asked the three cities of Shenzhen, Dongguan and Huizhou 
to conduct feasibility studies to further develop the proposal. According to a leading author of 
the plan,  
The Ping-Xin-Qing plan accomplished a ‘triple jump’ from district- to municipal- and 
provincial-level in the single year of 2010. More specifically, it took only thirty-five days 
to have municipal- and provincial-level acknowledgement in place after the release of the 
plan (Interviewee 11, personal communication, June 23, 2015). 
Many officials in Xinxu and Huizhou city also publicly expressed their support for the 
proposed project. For example, in a public hearing, the municipal Party Secretary Huang Yebin 
stated that Huizhou will make every effort to promote the project of Ping-Xin-Qing Industrial 
Cooperation Demonstration Area (Interviewee 8, personal communication, June 18, 2015). As 
explained by this local official,  
Xinxu had long been interested in cooperating with Shenzhen. In its 2007 Master Plan, 
Xinxu proposed to build an industrial park at its southern point bordering Pingdi to 
attract businesses which depended on the existing companies in Longgang and Shenzhen. 
Reading the Ping-Xin-Qing project as an opportunity to share Shenzhen’s resources, 
city-level Committee of the Communist Party of China once suggested listing this 
particular project in the city’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) as a top priority. 
News on the Pin-Xin-Qing project quickly had a public influence in Xinxu. In the five 
villages that were located within the project boundaries, speculative development was carried out 




25, personal communication, August 11, 2015). A real estate market reporter working at a local 
media told a story: 
I met a villager who was trying to finish the construction of a new building. He said that 
he needs to finish the building before the government started land reclamation so that he 
could ask for compensation not only for the land but also for the on-site structures. He 
seemed pretty sure about the compensation even though he knew that this building was 
illegal in the absence of a building permit. It seemed like being illegal and ineligible for 
compensation in theory would not be an issue. He told me he would get the 
compensation for on-site structures as long as there was a finished building (Interviewee 
25, personal communication, August 11, 2015).  
The speculative development activities gave rise to a building boom in Xinxu. According to 
the same reporter, nearly two hundred properties had been newly built or under construction by 
March 2011. Most of these buildings were located along the main roads and three or more stories 
high.  
Compared to Xinxu, Huizhou, the reaction in Qingxi, Dongguan was minimal. The local 
government kept a silence until provincial officials showed support for the project publicly. As 
observed by the planning team for the Ping-Xin-Qing project,  
We anticipated that Dongguan was less interested in cross-boundary cooperation. Its 
reluctance was not surprising to us, as Qingxi was experiencing rapid development and 
foreseeing a continuing growth. Then why they bother to share its land with other parties? 
In a word, Qingxi and Dongguan had no incentives for cooperation……Therefore, we 
included only a single village of Tiechang in Qingxi in the Ping-Xin-Qing plan to keep 
their resistance at a minimum level. This village had great symbolic value, as 
Ping-Xin-Qing makes sense as long as Qingxi is involved (Interviewee 11, personal 




To secure further support from Qingxi, planners of Ping-Xin-Qing embarked upon strategic 
advocacy. Noticing that Dongguan’s economy was significantly slowed down by the 2008 global 
financial crisis due to its heavy reliance on foreign investments, the planning team tried to sell its 
idea by accentuating the comparative advantage of domestic capital, especially that from 
Shenzhen.  
Despite apparent attractiveness, those overseas investments are highly volatile and 
possible to withdraw anytime. Shenzhen’s capital brings with it intellectual properties 
and self-owned brands. Therefore, Qingxi and Dongguan should welcome Shenzhen’s 
investments as enthusiastically as it once did with investments from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan……Eventually, they realized that the proposed project provided them an 
opportunity for positive change. By becoming owners of intellectual properties and 
brands, local factories could change from processors dependent on foreign companies to 
independent business establishments. Qingxi and Dongguan could shift upward from the 
bottom of the industrial chain (Interviewee 11, personal communication, June 23, 2015). 
Alongside the project planners’ advocacy, the pressures from the provincial government 
played a direct role in changing Qingxi and Dongguan’s attitude. In particular, after both the 
Governor and the Party secretary of Guangdong showed support for the Ping-Xin-Qing project in 
public, the municipal government of Dongguan felt it was necessary to respond to the call of its 
supervisors. To show its commitment to the project as well as the provincial government, 
Dongguan requested to redraw the boundaries of the Demonstration Area to include two other 
villages of Jiuxiang and Dapu in Qingxi. As a result, the Demonstration Area grew from 96.1 




By then, a discourse coalition surrounding ‘regional cooperation’ started to take shape. The 
coalition was mainly composed of government officials from Pingdi, Qingxi, and Xinxu, and 
every level of governments above each of these sub-district/townships up to Guangdong 
province. By the time of the fifth consortium meeting between Shenzhen, Dongguan, and 
Huizhou governments on April 18, 2011, ‘Ping-Xin-Qing’ had apparently become a normative 
term among policy discussion as well as various official documents, such as Shen-Guan-Hui 
Leadership Consortium Cooperation Scheme (Trial), Shen-Guan-Hui Industrial Development 
Cooperation Agreement, Shen-Guan-Hui Information Cooperation Framework Agreement, 
Supplementary Agreement III on Promoting Shen-Guan-Hui Transportation Integration. To a 
large extent, Ping-Xin-Qing was treated as a synonymous to Shen-Guan-Hui integration.  
The three municipal governments also signed a cooperation agreement specifically relating 
to the Ping-Xin-Qing project. Under the agreement, a coordinative working group would be set 
up by the three cities to perform joint planning, and the planning work was expected to finish in 
one year. This agreement was seen as “a milestone of the Ping-Xin-Qing project, signaling that 
Ping-Xin-Qing started moving from an idea in policy and academic discussion toward a real 
project in government operation” (Interviewee 11, personal communication, June 23, 2015). Due 
to the high media coverage of the consortium meeting, the regional cooperation storyline as well 
as the Ping-Xin-Qing project was further recognized by the public.  
The proposed cross-boundary cooperation would not happen easily. According to a 




successful cross-city project was the establishment of cooperative mechanisms, especially a 
benefit-sharing mechanism that was accepted by all the parties (Interviewee 29, personal 
communication, December 16, 2015). Although project proponents in Longgang initially 
claimed that Ping-Xin-Qing would be accomplished through removal of existing land, tax, 
financial and social barriers caused by administrative fragmentation. These barriers were never 
eliminated. Furthermore, effective cooperative mechanisms were never seen (Interviewee 24, 
personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
Each city had its own agenda and made individual calculation to maximize its own benefit. 
Shenzhen’s number one priority was the redevelopment of Gaoqiao Industrial Park. This was not 
only because the expected output value of Gaoqiao would considerably contribute to the area’s 
GDP and tax revenues, but because without a concrete project, Ping-Xin-Qing would become 
very vague. Only by implementing a pilot project like Gaoqiao, the Ping-Xin-Qing cooperation 
program can make real progress.  
In the absence of established cooperative mechanisms, the other two cities could hardly 
predict how they were going to benefit from the redeveloped Gaoqiao Industrial Park, which was 
located completely within Shenzhen’s borders (Interviewee 31, personal communication, June 17, 
2015). This uncertainty largely curbed their enthusiasm for this particular project and the overall 
Ping-Xin-Qing program. Furthermore, these two cities had conflicting goals. While Huizhou 




Dongguan’s baseline was to keep its existing businesses within its boundaries. In the view of the 
leading author of Ping-Xin-Qing,  
Dongguan’s reluctance to carry out Ping-Xin-Qing came from the concern that some 
existing factories within its borders would move to Huizhou for cheaper land…… 
Dongguan’s concern was typical among cities in the Pearl River delta area. As opposed 
to the Yangtze River delta, municipal governments in the Pearl River delta area lack a 
sense of cooperation. The long entrenched division between different cities is caused by 
competition for foreign direct investments (FDI). As their similar industrial structures 
render the competition a zero-sum game, a city usually chooses not to cooperate with its 
peers to avoid losing investment or business to other localities. A metaphor for this 
situation goes like ‘no regional cooperation, no road extension, no water discharge’ 
(Interviewee 11, personal communication, June 23, 2015) 
In addition to missing consensus between different cities, consensus was also absent within a 
single city. In Shenzhen, some municipal officials questioned the validity of sharing the city’s 
extremely limited land resources with Dongguan and Huizhou. There were also municipal 
officials questioning the plan of an industrial district exclusively for high-tech industries. They 
claimed that many other industrial parks in Shenzhen had similar plans and some of them were 
better conditioned than Pingdi to pursue such a pathway (Interviewee 23, personal 
communication, August 4, 2015). 
This criticism revealed the inconsistent agenda between Longgang district and the city of 
Shenzhen. While both of them hoped to eliminate low-end industries and to develop high 
value-added industries, the municipal government also wanted its suburban districts like 
Longgang to serve as new locations for businesses that had to relocate from the inner city. These 




availability or prices. To avoid the risk of losing these GDP and tax generators to other cities 
with more affordable land, the municipal government would like to see a more moderate 
industrial development plan in Pingdi. To put another way, a Ping-Xin-Qing Demonstration Area 
exclusively for industries in new energy, biomedical, and electronic commerce sectors, as 
proposed by Longgang, would shut out many relocating businesses and heighten the possibility 
of their escape from Shenzhen (Interviewee 12, personal communication, June 24, 2015). 
Miscommunication between different levels of government also happened in Dongguan. An 
official in Qingxi explained the local government’s limited capability in implementing the 
Ping-Xin-Qing project: 
The municipal government had kept silent about Ping-Xin-Qing for a while, and our 
township government had only a very limited authority over the implementation of the 
program as the program had ascended to the municipal-level. Without clear orders from 
municipal leaders, we do not dare to make decisions on our own (Interviewee 13, 
personal communication, July 1, 2015).  
Driven by discrete or conflicting goals, actors adhering to a same storyline of regional 
cooperation interpreted the storyline in rather different ways. Indeed, ambiguities about what 
“cooperation” meant and how it should be realized hung over the storyline of regional 
cooperation even in its heyday. In the absence of mechanisms to promote cooperation or 
negotiation, consensus was rarely reached, and no action plan was ever made. As key members 




Cooperation Area started fading out in the latter half of 2011 and has been rarely mentioned in 




Chapter 5: Post-‘carbon’ Development Trajectory of SILCC 
5.1. Storyline II: Low-carbon-eco-development 
As the Ping-Xin-Qing project and the discourse coalition surrounding regional cooperation 
stagnated, project proponents started promoting the same project with a different framing. The 
new framing strategy originated from a meeting between Shenzhen municipal government and a 
Dutch delegation in June 2010. The president of Delft University of Technology, Dirk Jan van 
den Berg, accompanied by the Netherlands Consulate-General in Guangzhou and the Counsellor 
for Science and Innovation from the Netherlands Embassy in Beijing, paid an official visit to 
Shenzhen. The Dutch delegation proposed government-to-government cooperation with 
Shenzhen on sustainable urban development. In particular, the Dutch delegation suggested the 
possibility of building a new town in Shenzhen to provide new locations of advanced educational 
institutions from around the world (Interviewee 35, personal communication, August 17, 2017). 
Following up the visit, the Shenzhen and Longgang governments invited a couple of 
domestic and Dutch institutions to jointly draft a master plan for Pingdi.45 As a result, a 
Sino-Dutch consulting group of over 20 professionals was formed, and they were told that two 
proposals drafted by local planning institutes had been rejected for “not being visionary and 
                                                 
45 The participating institutions included Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School 
(Shenzhen-branch of a top university in China), Delft University of Technology, Next Generation Infrastructures 
Foundation (NGI, closely affiliated with Delft University of Technology), the Dynamic City Foundation (a 
Dutch-owned research and design institute focused on the rapid transformations of Asia's urban landscape), TNO 





innovative enough, paying insufficient attention to the social context and for disregarding the 
interconnectedness of Pingdi with neighboring areas” (de Jong et al., 2013, p.103). The group 
knew well from the beginning that they need to provide “a product that could match Longgang’s 
high expectations” (Ibid, p.103). 
The comments on the two earlier proposals indicated that project proponents hoped to use 
the Sino-Dutch consulting group to promote the nascent Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation 
program. When the consulting group was called in, Longgang just announced the Ping-Xin-Qing 
project, and the district Party School’s planning work for Ping-Xin-Qing had almost been 
completed. It was hoped that an alternative plan drafted by outsiders might supplement the 
original Planning Study on Shen-Guan-Hui (Ping-Xin-Qing) Industrial Cooperation 
Demonstration Area, which was not conducted by professional planners, with innovative 
planning concepts. 
In the next nine months, the consulting group conducted a geographical, economic, 
ecological, and infrastructure analysis based on quite limited available data and finalized a 
150-page report titled Developing a Special ECO-2-ZONE at the Intersection of Three Cities: 
How Ping-Qing-Xin Can Become a World-Class Innovation Hub (hereafter referred to as 
Developing a Special ECO-2-ZONE). The plan was “based on developing the city around next 
generation infrastructures and a clean, green environment that will support and attract innovative, 
knowledge-intensive and high value-added firms and employees (Developing a Special 




As the guiding ideology of the plan, ECO-2-ZONE stood for “a blender of ECOlogy and 
ECOnomy” (Ibid, p.3) and had twofold meaning. First, it was an abstract concept denoting a 
harmonious relationship between industrial and ecological development. More specifically, it 
was a strategy “to utilize the natural and green qualities of the (Ping-Qing-Xin) region to 
enhance its economic value rather than to sacrifice them for further industrialization” (de Jong et 
al., 2013, p.104). Second, the ECO-2-ZONE was also a concrete geographic concept. It was the 
name of a bordering area composed of Pingdi and many adjacent places, including the downtown 
of Longgang District, Xinxu township in Huizhou city, and Qingxi and Fenggang townships in 
Dongguan city. 
While the plan targeted an expansive land area compared to the original plan for 
Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation, it proposed to “focus on better space rather than more space 
for development” (Ibid, p.104). The better space would come out of an industrial transformation 
from manufacturing to knowledge sectors and the consequent change in demographic profiles. 
According to the consulting group, “it is through attracting young cosmopolitan scientists and 
professionals from China and around the world to a freshly emerging green city in the Special 
Economic Zone that such a laboratory could be filled with appropriate people” (Ibid, p.104). 
Officially submitted in March 2011, Developing a Special ECO-2-ZONE obtained the 
municipal government as well as the Standing Committee of Shenzhen’s supports almost 
immediately. In fact, many city officials had been well-informed of the plan prior to the final 




Sino-Dutch consulting group reported their working progress and presented many different drafts 
of the plan (Interviewee 7, personal communication, June 18, 2015). Local officials in Longgang 
used these workshops as a platform to solicit recognition and support of key officials within the 
municipal government. From earlier experience with Ping-Xin-Qing, the project proponents in 
Longgang had well understood that the municipal government’s full support was essential to a 
success of their project (Interviewee 19, personal communication, July 22, 2015).   
As the plan was periodically adjusted in accordance with city officials’ comments, the final 
report turned out to be consistent with the city’s agenda, among which climate action ranked 
particularly high. Being selected by the NDRC as one of the eight localities under its 
Low-Carbon City/Province Pilot Program, Shenzhen was searching for new policies, programs 
and concrete projects to correspond to this national initiative. The ECO-2-ZONE plan seemed to 
have great potential to contribute to the task because it included various proposals that would 
reduce carbon emissions, such as renewable energies, waste regeneration and development of 
clean industries.  
Additionally, participation of the Dutch government and international actors from both 
private and social sectors exemplified the international cooperation involved in the project. 
Developing a Special ECO-2-ZONE was widely reported in front-page articles of leading local 




authors of the document were also covered in government documents as well as public media.46 
As international cooperation was generally seen as a contributor to a low-carbon city’s political 
profile and success (Interviewee 33, personal communication, May 9, 2017), the engagement of 
Dutch actors thus became a project feature that could be capitalized. 
To take advantage of this feature, the project proponents organized the Third International 
Conference on Next Generation Infrastructure Systems for Eco-cities in December 2010. During 
the Conference, a meeting was arranged between Netherlands Consulate-General in Guangzhou 
and vice-mayor of Shenzhen, Tang Jie, to discuss the possibility of government-to-government 
cooperation on an eco-knowledge city project proposed by the ECO-2-ZONE consulting group. 
This meeting was generally read as both vice-mayor and the municipal government’s 
endorsement for the project.  
More political commitment from the municipal government was shown later as the mayor of 
Shenzhen, Qin Xu, renamed the project as Sino-Dutch (Euro) Low-Carbon City. The city 
government further integrated this particular project into its overall political agenda of carbon 
mitigation by designating the project as one of the three pilot projects of Low-Carbon Urban 
Districts in the Shenzhen Medium- and Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Plan (2011-2020). 
Renaming the project title to include ‘low-carbon city’ was a strategic move of the municipal 
                                                 
46 For example, municipal government official website introduced the participation of Delft University of 





government to promote the emerging urban agenda to build a national pilot low-carbon city 
(Interviewee 4, personal communication, June 9, 2015).  
As Pingdi’s project was increasingly alligned with a broader urban agenda, the initiators of 
the project including local governments in Longgang and Pingdi were largely left in a position to 
implement the city’s decisions. The city-level government and officials started playing a 
dominant role in shaping and promoting the project. In particular, vice-mayor Tang acted as an 
open advocate for this project. He recruited support from the associate director of the NDRC, 
Xie Zhenhua, and head of climate division, Su Wei. At the same time, Tang sought deeper 
collaboration with the Dutch national government to further raise the project’s political profile. 
According to the local government’s conventional wisdom, an international-level project would 
be helpful for attracting the central government’s attention. Following Tang’s visit to the 
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (MEAI) and the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment (MIE) in September 2011, the Dutch Vice Premier sent an 
official letter to the Chinese Minister of Science and Technology (MST) to recommend the 
project and propose an expert seminar with representatives from both countries to discuss the 




The proposed seminar took place during December 11-13, 2011. Key officials from 
Shenzhen and Longgang welcomed a Dutch delegation47 headed by the former 
Secretary-General of the MIE. The two groups signed a document that included 19 general ideas 
about further cooperation in the Sino-Dutch Shenzhen Low Carbon City. This document, “albeit 
still somewhat generic, …… can be considered the first official Sino-Dutch Shenzhen Low 
Carbon City collaboration document” and thus established the project’s status as an 
international-level one (de Jong et al., 2013, pp.107). As the NDRC sent a representative to 
attend the seminar, Shenzhen believed that they had secured the support from the central 
government (Interviewee 16, personal communication, July 14, 2015).  
Shortly after the Sino-Dutch expert seminar, Tang and key officials from Shenzhen 
Development and Reform Commission (DRC) visited the NDRC’s climate division to report on 
the project’s progress. Head of climate devision, Su Wei, suggested renaming the project as 
Shenzhen International Low-Carbon City (SILCC) to indicate broader international cooperation. 
Su also commented that the project should function as a demonstration of China’s commitment 
to tackling climate change in the international community (Interviewee 27, personal 
communication, September 29, 2015).  
                                                 
47 The delegation included a number of civil servants from Dutch ministries and from the cities of Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, and Eindhoven. Delft University of Technology academics and representatives from some influential 




Since the adoption of the new title, the project obtained increasing political commitment at 
various levels of the government. For example, some NDRC officials visited the project site a 
couple of times in early 2012. At the local level, both the Mayor and Longgang District Chief 
officially prioritized the SILCC in public speeches and the Report on the Work of the 
Government48. In the 2012 Report on the Work of the Government, Mayor of Shenzhen stated 
that the SILCC was an approach to the city’s overall ecological and low-carbon development, 
and Longgang District Chief referred to the project as an integrative component of urban renewal 
and environmental protection in the area. In a period of time, SILCC became a frequent term in 
public officials’ speeches and media coverage in Shenzhen.  
Despite an emerging discourse coalition surrounding the SILCC, no one knew what the 
project would exactly be like or how it would be accomplished. The ECO-2-ZONE plan was 
only a strategic vision and too abstract to put into operation. More importantly, like the plan for 
Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation, the proposal of ECO-2-ZONE was a ‘conceptual plan’ by 
nature and lacked statutory powers (Interviewee 4, personal communication, June 9, 2015). In 
other words, there was no implementation mechanism to realize the imaginative scene outlined 
by the plan.  
                                                 
48 The Report on the Work of the Government is one of the most important government documents that is released 
annually by each of the different levels of government in China. The Report is delivered by the top leader of a 
government at the annual People’s Congress and released to the public. The Report is generally composed of three 
parts, including a review of the government’s work in the previous year, a plan for the government’s work of the 




Under this situation, project advocates felt an urgent need for some operational plans to 
implement the low-carbon eco-city idea. In early 2012, a group of academic and research 
institutions and consulting firms were commissioned to translate the strategic vision of 
ECO-2-ZONE into more concrete plans. Subsequently, the Urban Planning and Design Institute 
of Shenzhen (UPDIS), which was a state-owned institute previously under the supervision of 
Shenzhen Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission (UPLRC), led and coordinated the 
drafting a package of plans with focus on different sectors as well as themes (Table 2.1). 
Among the various plan makers, the Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate 
School was the only entity that had been involved in the drafting of the original strategic plan. To 
keep consistency with the original ideas, a second Sino-Dutch expert meeting was held in June to 
elicit feedback. The meeting also served to ensure the Dutch commitment to the SILCC, which 
was highly desired by Shenzhen to keep the status of the project as an international one. By then, 
Shenzhen had learned that the Dutch government would not make financial investment in the 
project. It then focused on securing Dutch administrative, expert, and professional contributions. 
The most significant change in the new plans was the project boundaries. Compared to the 
original strategic vision, all of the villages in Dongguan and Huizhou cities were excluded. The 
reconfigured SILCC coincided with the boundaries of Pingdi with a total area of 53 km2. The 
redrawn boundaries put an end to the regional cooperation storyline and the discourse coalition 
surrounding it. From then on, the terms of Ping-Xin-Qing and regional cooperation started fading 




Since the operational plans were sponsored by Shenzhen municipal government, it can be 
argued that the exclusion of Dongguan and Huizhou was anticipated. An official from Longgang 
said: 
A SILCC bounded within Pingdi was more convenient to carry out, as the city could take 
full responsibility and act alone rather than wait for Dongguan and Huizhou’s concerted 
action. . . Rather than spend time and efforts on coordinating with the other two cities, it 
is better for Shenzhen to take matters into its own hand first by setting the project’s 
confines within the administrative boundaries of the municipality (Interviewee 4, 
personal communication, June 9, 2015). 
To further facilitate the project, the UPDIS drafted a three-phase development plan to 
prioritize the redevelopment of Gaoqiao Industrial Park and its adjacent areas. The first phase 
involved a 1km2 Pilot Zone characterized by 17 kick-off projects. This phase had a five-year 
timescale and was expected to start within a year since the release of the plan. The second phase 
of development, which occupied the 5km2 Extension Zone, and the whole project area were 
planned with longer timescales and more general environmental and economic development 
goals.  
A senior planner from the UPDIS argued that the three-phase arrangement was aimed at 
expediting the project by concentrating currently limited resources on the Pilot Zone 
(Interviewee 4, personal communication, June 9, 2015). Furthermore, to precipitate the Pilot 
Zone, the Leadership Group chose its boundaries strategically to avoid possible obstacles to land 
assemblage. In operation, the Zone was characterized by a concentration of government-held 




(Table 5.1). By this means, money and time that would have been incurred by relocation and 
compensation was saved. It was expected that the success of the Pilot Zone would trigger larger 
flows of inward investment to development activities in the Extension Zone and the Whole Area. 
Land ownership Land use rights & status Area (ha.) Percentage 
State-owned 
Not transferred 67.46 67.15 
Transferred w/ structures 18.23 18.15 
Transferred w/o structures 7.48 7.45 
Collective-owned  
Compensation for reclamation of rural land 0.89 0.89 
Non-reclamation rural land 6.4 6.37 
Total   100.46 100 
Table 5.1: Land ownership of the Pilot Zone (Source: The SILCC Pilot Zone Planning Research, 2013) 
As expected, the Pilot Zone was launched quickly in less than half a year. On August 21, 
2012, seventeen kick-off projects (Table 5), including six producing public goods and eleven for 
manufacturing upgrade, were officially initiated at the Pilot Zone Launching Ceremony by Wang 
Rong, the Secretary of Shenzhen City Party Committee and Guangdong Province Standing 
Committee Member. “These kick-off projects represented a milestone,” said a Pingdi official, 
“from then on, the SILCC gained momentum with visible change almost every day” (Interviewee 
26, August 12, 2015). Most prominently, the Convention and Exhibition Center, a complex 
composed of three mid-rise buildings with a total floor area of 25,000 square meters, was built 
from the scratch within a period of less than three months.49 
                                                 
49 The construction of SILCC Convention and Exhibition Center lasted from December 28, 2012 to March 8, 2013, 





Figure 5.1: The SILCC Convention and Exhibition Center. (Adapted from an image in the Downloads of the 2015 
Competition of Alternatives for Low Carbon City (ALCC). Retrieved from 
http://www.szdesigncenter.org/?p=38932&lang=en#/ Copyright 2015 by Shenzhen Center for Public Art) 
As the plans were prepared, Shenzhen felt a need for an organizational foundation and a 
financing mechanism to flesh out the plan (Interviewee 23, August 4, 2015). Later on, a 
three-tier structure named “1+2+N” was established (Figure 5.2). On the highest tier, the “1” 
referred to the SILCC leadership group within the municipal government of Shenzhen. In the 
middle, the “2” referred to the SILCC Office within Longgang District Government and the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Construction and Development Corporation (SSEZCDC). 
While the former two were newly created taskforces dedicated to the SILCC, the SSEZCDC was 
established in 2011 as a local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to promote regional 





Figure 5.2: The organizational structure for the SILCC (Source: made by author) 
At the bottom, the “N” indicated the municipal government’s wish to engage a wide range of 
non-public actors who would provide financial or technical assistance to the SILCC. 
Commenting on this “1+2+N” system, Vice-mayor Tang, the head of the leadership group and 
the most important project advocate in the government, stated that the SILCC should be 
“government-led and enterprise-run” in order to “let the market decide” (Southern Daily, 
6/17/2013). 
The leadership group was established in July 2012 as the decision-making body to organize 
and coordinate the implementation of the SILCC. Headed by Vice-Mayor Tang, it was composed 
of representatives from the Longgang District government as well as various municipal 
government departments, including the DRC, the Finance Commission, the UPLRC, the 
Technology and Innovation Commission (TIC), the Economy, Trade and Information 
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Commission (ETIC), the Housing and Construction Bureau (HCB), and the Water Affairs 
Bureau (WAB). The ability to drive the decision-making process was, however, unevenly 
distributed across different departments (Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 
2015).  
In particular, two powerful departments of DRC and UPLRC competed to impose their 
development ideologies on the project with authorities over administrative approval and land 
transaction, respectively. Based on personal experience working closely with the leadership 
group on the SILCC, a staff from SSEZCDC commented:  
The DRC played an absolutely dominant role as it was the department in charge of 
affairs relating to climate change. Actually, the leadership group located its office in the 
DRC for daily operation. In addition, the UPLRC, the department responsible for land 
planning, also had a major voice as the project was expected to include large-scale land 
reclaiming and rezoning. Most of the other departments had far less power to influence 
the project and acted only passively because they had no control over money as the DRC 
or over land as the UPLRC (Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 2015).  
The interests of these two dominating agencies were not, however, always consistent. At 
some point, their interests might be totally conflicting with each other. For example, the power of 
DRC largely came from the fact that the agency occasionally offered favorable land leases to 
attract actors they wished to align. But favorable land leases might cause the UPLRC additional 
political risks as well as loss of part of the land revenues. In this context, the Leadership Group 




To execute the leadership group’s orders, a taskforce was established within the Longgang 
District government under the name of SILCC Office. Despite the initiator of the project, neither 
the district government nor the local government in Pingdi was given much access to 
decision-making since the establishment of SILCC (Interviewee 26, personal communication, 
August 12, 2015). The primary task of Pingdi was to negotiate with existing tenants whose 
properties would be expropriated for the project (Interviewee 18, personal communication, July 
20, 2015). It can be argued that the local government acted as an intermediary between the city 
and the local residents and businesses.  
The SSEZCDC was created in 2011 with the purpose of promoting regional development, 
which was one of the municipal government’s top priorities at the time. The municipal 
government chose SSEZCDC to sponsor the SILCC because the project was located on the urban 
fringe and originally framed as a move toward regional integration. In addition, as a newly 
established agency, “the SSEZCDC had not accumulated as much power as the other two 
city-level LGFVs and was therefore more compliant with the municipal government’s 
requirements,” said a staff from the SSEZCDC. According to this staff,  
At the beginning, the SILCC project was not attractive to investors. It was too far away 
from the city center, and there were still lots of uncertainties regarding the project’s 
future. Shenzhen Investment Holding and Shenzhen Metro Group50 were having their 
hands full with projects with more predictable returns and thus reluctant to take on the 
SILCC. Actually, the municipal government created the SSEZCDC in the hope that a 
                                                 
50 These two city-level LGFVs had a much longer history than the SSEZCDC. Shenzhen Investment Holding Co., 




nascent agency would be more tractable and willing to undertake less attractive projects 
in the outlaying areas (Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
The SSEZCDC’s foremost task in the SILCC was to carry out primary land development 
which was the first step to new development in China’s context. During this process, a ‘primary’ 
developer endorsed by the government removed exiting buildings and tenants and installed 
essential infrastructure such as access to electricity, water and cable, sewage and gas pipelines, 
and road networks. In the practitioners’ jargon, primary development turned land from ‘raw’ into 
‘improved’, ready-for-construction developable site.  
Usually, a ‘primary’ developer returned the ‘improved’ land to the government for a 
pre-defined development fee, and the government later leased the land to a ‘secondary’ 
developer to carry out real estate development. In the SILCC case, however, an innovative 
mechanism named ‘enclosed land operation’ was proposed: 
The leadership group promised that the SSEZCDC could share the subsequent land 
revenues with the city instead of being paid a fixed development fee. This proposal 
would benefit both the SSEZCDC and the city. On one hand, in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, the city government was interested in avoiding direct expenditure 
in the face of a slowdown in economic growth. On the other, as land revenues would be 
huge, the city government believed that this arrangement would enhance the SSEZCDC’s 
commitment to the project (Interviewee 23, personal communication, August 4, 2015).  
Inspired by this innovative institutional arrangement, the SSEZCDC invested nearly three 
trillion yuan in six kick-off projects that were aimed at improving the public environment (Table 
5.2). This almost equaled the total investment in all the other eleven kick-off projects that were 




Project Name Investment  (million yuan) 
SILCC convention and exhibition center 188.86 
Low-carbon transformation of the Hakka community 80.00 
Existing factory buildings green reformation 461.43 
Innovation, research and development district 2,029.99 
Roads and infrastructure construction 34.74 
Dingshan River Eco-park 150.00 
  
Total 2,945.02 
Table 5.2: SSEZCDC-sponsored kick-off projects in the Pilot Zone (Source: 
http://www.lg.gov.cn/lgzx/dtpdstbg/201511/b55da496904a4d27a861ef499b1ecdc0.shtml)  
With such investment, SSEZCDC acquired more power to influence the project 
implementation. Actually, SSEZCDC substantially controlled the advancing speed of the whole 
project by manipulating the progress of land development (Interviewee 32, personal 
communication, September 14, 2017). It thus took a superior position than the SILCC Office, 
although the two of them were equally ranked under the ‘1+2+N’ organizational structure. When 
the Pilot Zone started, Longgang government and the SSEZCDC signed an agreement on the 
allocation of future benefits and revenues from the development of SILCC.51 The agreement, 
which was a confidential document, only vaguely outlined a general benefit-sharing mechanism 
without specific or implementation methods (Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 
2015). Under the circumstances, both of the parties started feeling uncertain about the returns in 
future. 
                                                 
51 In the Pilot Zone Launching Ceremony held in August 2012, the Longgang district government signed with the 
SSEZCDC a document titled “Agreement on cooperative land development in the International Low-Carbon City 




To claim a secure share of possible land revenues, the Longgang district government 
proposed a mechanism of ‘city-district co-sponsorship’ (市区共建). Specifically, a joint venture 
was proposed to be established between the SSEZCDC and Longgang City Construction 
Investment Co. Ltd. (LGCI) which was one of the district-level LGFVs52. The district 
government further asked for a share of sixty percent with zero monetary input, and this 
seemingly unreasonable request was based on a logic that the land development would involve 
substantial land reclamation and relocation of existing property occupants, which required a lot 
of negotiation with property owners, tenants and related stakeholders. Longgang’s fiscal shortage 
due to the local government’s massive investment in the 2011 Shenzhen Summer Universiade53 
also restrained its financial contribution to the SILCC (Interviewee 23, personal communication, 
August 4, 2015). As the interviewee continued,  
The Longgang government argued that they were the only actors who had the authority 
and capability to accomplish this task. Therefore, they believed that their cooperation 
was indispensable and matched the proposed 60% share of the joint venture. 
                                                 
52 The LGCI was founded in 2010 by the district government of Longgang as a local government financing vehicle. 
It is a state-owned-enterprise and an organ directly under the Longgang government. Since 2015, the LGCI has 
extended its function beyond a financing platform toward real estate development and property management. It has 
focused on infrastructure development and other mega-projects in Longgang.  
53The 26th Summer Universiade was hosted in Shenzhen in 2011. To host the event, a new Shenzhen Universiade 
Center featuring a 60,000-seat main stadium, a 18,000-seat arena, a 3,000-seat natatorium, a 0.05-square-kilometer 
park and other facilities was established in the Longgang District through an investment of 4.5 trillion yuan. In 
addition, the Longgang District Government made an average annual investment of 12 trillion yuan between 2007 




The term of ‘city-district co-sponsorship’ was broadly seen in government documents as 
well as public discourse. There was not, however, any evidence showing such a joint venture was 
ever created. For a long time after the launching of the Pilot Zone, Longgang acted as an 
executing branch of the SILCC leadership group rather than a decision maker or an independent 
stakeholder. What the SILCC Office and local government in Pingdi did was primarily mainly 
mediating between the city and the locals and negotiating with existing tenants for relocation and 
land reclamations. 
As the SILCC entered the implementation stage, the storyline of low-carbon-eco 
development became increasingly concrete. Compared to the earlier storyline of regional 
cooperation, it generally conveyed a complex relational problem beyond pure economic terms 
and concerned the relationship between economy and environment. Pingdi’s problem was 
reframed to focus on the environmental impact of its production activities. Therefore, previous 
descriptions such as “Shenzhen’s least developed area” and “an economically backward area” 
were replaced with new rhetoric of “a carbon-intensive district” to conceptualize Pingdi’s 
development problem.  
In addition, the disadvantageous geographic factors, which made the main cause of problem 
within the storyline of regional cooperation, were disregarded. A new set of indicators, such as 
electricity, water, and carbon emissions per unit of GDP, were employed to emphasize the scale 
of the environmental problem and to attribute it to the existing economic structures. Many 




ecological well-being, and the SILCC program provided an opportunity to rectify this distorted 
economy-environment relationship and to achieve balanced development. 
The proposed solutions hinged upon the assumption that the economy-environment 
relationship could be manipulated and economic development could be reconciled with 
ecological preservation. This proposition was first introduced by the Sino-Dutch consulting 
group through the concept of ECO-2-ZONE: 
This integrated concept for regional spatial development is based on the generic 
assumption that ecological preservation and development can only occur credibly and 
effectively if a realistic conception of economic foundations and trends in the area are an 
integral part of the spatial development plan. In order to achieve this, and more 
specifically to utilize the natural and green qualities of the region to enhance its 
economic value rather than to sacrifice them for further industrialization, the authors 
proposed to focus on quality rather than quantity or volume in economic development, on 
better space rather than more space for development, and on industrial transformation 
from manufacturing to knowledge sectors (de Jong et al., 2013, pp.104).  
This reciprocal economy-environment relationship was at the heart of the ECO-2-ZONE 
proposal and remained a key principle to steer planning and early implementation of the SILCC. 
Even after the ECO-2-ZONE plan and its Dutch authors started playing a less significant role, 
many components of the project, such as a local carbon trading platform, embodied this idea 
about the relationship between economic development and ecological preservation. To a large 
extent, this economy-environment connection became the ideology underlying Shenzhen’s 
low-carbon transformation as well as this particular low-carbon city project (Interviewee 27, 




According to an official at the NDRC, local governments took on the mission of carbon 
emissions management for multiple reasons, and economic goals played an essential role in 
shaping the ways in which local officials conceived of the low-carbon city (Interviewee 33, 
personal communication, May 9, 2017). As economic outcomes were read as an important 
indicator for assessing a low-carbon city’s success, they were frequently referred to in the public. 
When Li Ganming, Deputy Secretary-General of Shenzhen City Government and Deputy Chair 
of the SILCC Leadership Group, introduced the project’s achievements at the press conference in 
advance of the 2015 SILCC Forum, he put forward a long list of numbers led by GDP outcomes: 
The area’s GDP has grown from 4.28 trillion yuan in 2011 to 8.52 trillion yuan in 2014 
with an annual growth rate of 26%. The gross industrial output value has increased from 
11.5 trillion yuan in 2011 to 23.4 trillion yuan in 2014 with an annual growth rate of 27%. 
The capital investment has increased from 1.91 trillion yuan in 2011 to 4.25 trillion yuan 
in 2014 with an annual growth rate of 31%. During the same period, the carbon has 
significantly decreased, and carbon emissions per unit GDP has reduced by 22% from 
2011 to 2014 (June 11, 2015, Press Conference Room, People’s Government of 
Shenzhen Municipality). 
The sequence of different indicators was not surprising considering that industrial 
development and investment attraction were generally considered as the driving forces as well as 
proof of Chinese economic boom. In particular, GDP has been the most important criterion for 
the central government to evaluate a local place’s performance in the top-down administrative 
system. Adding carbon calculation to the traditional matrix has distinguished the SILCC from an 
ordinary urban development project as the new indicator challenged the economy-environment 




“leap-forward development” to compliment the SILCC’s achievement in terms of both economic 
and ecological development.  
Beyond the proposed ‘1+2+N’ structure, the storyline of low-carbon-eco-development 
helped the SILCC secure the support of the central government. Carbon reduction became an 
increasingly important national agenda after the country’s mitigation commitment made during 
the 2009 Copenhagen Conference. The officials in Shenzhen strategically chose a project name 
including ‘low-carbon city’ with the purpose of attracting the central government’s political 
attention, as they knew well China’s interest in showing the world it was cutting back on 
greenhouse gases (Interviewee 35, personal communication, August 17, 2017).  
In particular, project proponents had extremely strong incentives to win the NDRC’s support 
because it was not only the central agency responsible for climate-related affairs but also ‘the 
most powerful department within the central government’ with authority over administrative 
approval for all development projects (Interviewee 23, personal communication, August 4, 2015). 
The NDRC’s support was first shown in its officials’ visits to the SILCC in early 2012. 
Subsequently, it started playing a more prominent role in promoting the project. For example, it 
led the annual SILCC Forum since 2013, making it one of the most magnificent international 
events in Shenzhen: 
Thanks to the NDRC’s support, the Forum has assumed a high political profile and 
functioned as the most powerful catalyst for the development of SILCC, resulting in new 
investment, political commitment, policy preferences, and greater visibility in the 




countries, and these attendants included government officials, journalists, scholars, 
architects, planners, businessman, scientists, and experts and professionals in various 
clean technologies (Interviewee 2, personal communication, June 3, 2015).  
With increasing political commitment from the NDRC, the SILCC became a project driven 
by the joint effort of the central and municipal government. This might be the most significant 
change brought about by shifting narrative from regional-cooperation toward low-carbon-eco 
development. When the storyline-line of regional-cooperation prevailed, the project was 
primarily steered by the local government of Longgang, and it was at the district-level that key 
decisions were made. The plan of the Ping-Xin-Qing Regional Cooperation Demonstration Area 
was drafted by Longgang Party School, an institute that was directly under the supervision of 
Longgang Party Committee. In this sense, the plan was largely a brainchild of key officials in the 
district government. Although this plan was never realized, project advocates in Longgang 
government had no competitors in composing a vision for the area’s future.  
As Longgang started losing control over the project to higher levels of the government, it 
became desperate to derive immediate land and tax revenues from the project. Before the 
operational plans were completed, Longgang leased ten plots of land in the to-be Pilot Zone and 
nearby areas between 2010 and 2012 (Fig. 5.3). The tenants were mainly manufactures of 
various electronic devices such as circuits, mobile communication equipment and lighting 
equipment. According to an author of the ECO-2-ZONE plan,   
The Longgang district government had grown increasingly impatient with the delays by 




be involved. It decided to take matters in its own hand by contacting project developers 
and allocating various parts of Pingdi to different spatial functions without waiting to see 
what further planning requirements the Shenzhen government would come up with or 
looking out for generous Dutch investors, high-tech companies, or universities which did 
not seem eager to come over (de Jong et al., 2013, p.108). 
 
Figure 5.3: Land leased by Longgang to private developers between 2010-2012 in Gaoqiao area (Source: Shenzhen 
Center for Design) 
These leased land bothered the later plan makers. For example, some of these tenants ran a 
business that failed to comply with the new requirements on the SILCC’s industrial development 
(Interviewee 7, personal communication, June 18, 2016). Furthermore, a spatial planner who 
participated in the drafting of the SILCC land-use plans complained:  
Leasing land in advance of a complete plan is a problem. When we did land use planning 
for the area, we compromised on the land with existing tenants. As three parcels of land 
in the Pilot Zone had been just leased and the structures on them were newly built, it was 
impossible to tear them down or make fundamental changes. Therefore, newly developed 




treat them as a given fact and could do nothing about them. Our plan for the whole area 
is very future-oriented, and the gap between the existing land uses and the vision of the 
SILCC would be a significant issue. This happened because Longgang was racing with 
the municipal government for quick cash in the form of land revenues (Interviewee 4, 
personal communication, June 9, 2015). 
A staff at the SSEZCDC brought up the topic of inconsistent motivations behind Longgang 
and Shenzhen to undertake the project: 
Longgang and Shenzhen have been driven by different aspirations. Longgang is most 
interested in leveraging its land resources and attracting inward investment as quickly as 
possible. This has been the predominant approach to economic boom in Shenzhen’s inner 
city since the establishment of Special Economic Zone. Longgang had long been eager to 
pursue such a development strategy while it was excluded from the SEZ, and now its 
opportunity has come. But Shenzhen aims for something different. The SILCC is only 
one of many projects in its portfolio. Other projects, such as Qianhai Modern Service 
Industry Zone and Guangming New District, are of greater scale and have more concrete 
plans for industrial development. With regard to land revenues and inward investment, 
these projects pay back more readily than the SILCC. What the municipal government 
sees in the SILCC is an experimental field to try out the low-carbon concept. It is 
expected that SILCC may offer a new model of urban development (Interviewee 23, 
personal communication, August 4, 2015).  
The experimental nature of the SILCC can be largely seen from the evolving definitions of 
‘low-carbon industries’ in its industrial development plan (multiple versions of SILCC industry 
admittance guidelines, SILCC official website). At the beginning, low-carbon industries were 
defined as six broad sectors including new energy, health, environmental protection, low-carbon 
services, high-end manufacturing and aerospace industries. As the project proceeded, a detailed 






Energy saving and 
environmental protection 
industry 
Advanced technology of environment protection 
Energy saving industry 
Resource recycling 




Life health industry 
Health management 
Health medical equipment 
Health and recreation 
High-end equipment 
manufacturing industry 
Numerical control smart equipment 
Artificial intelligence device 
Intelligent sensor 
Intelligent integrated power changing equipment 
Low-carbon service industry 
Energy saving and environmental protection service 
Low-carbon financing 
Green innovation industry 
Aerospace industry 
Aerospace material 
Aerospace ecology and environment control 
Aerospace science and technology popularization 
Table 5.3: SILCC industry admittance guidelines (Source: SILCC official website, Last Retrieved on April 19, 2018 
from http://en.ilcc.com.cn/Business/Default.aspx)  
Besides the pre-defined industry admittance criteria, the choice of tenants also depended on 
the leadership group, or, some key officials’ preferences (Interviewee 24, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015). Priority was given to a group of research institutions with 
close connections to the municipal government. For example, three entities including Space 
Technology Center South (STCS), Sino-U.S. Low-Carbon Building and Community Innovation 
Experimental Center and Shenzhen Institute of Building Research (IBR) were among the first 
occupants since the establishment of the SILCC. The municipal government of Shenzhen was a 




(Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 2015). Furthermore, the Sino-U.S. 
Low-Carbon Building and Community Innovation Experimental Center was co-founded by the 
IBR and the U.S. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. It is clear that the city wanted to fill 
the SILCC with established and trusted players.  
General actors from the private sector must go through a complicated admission process to 
located in the SILCC. This added much difficulty to the work of the SSEZCDC: 
We’re also responsible for attracting business establishments to the SILCC (besides 
making investments). This work has been frustrating. There were lots of enterprises 
showing an interest in moving to the SILCC. Sometimes we met 4-5 groups of inquiring 
businessmen during a single day. But authority over admission has stayed with the 
leadership group, and the approval process is extremely time-consuming. Usually we told 
our applicants that final decision is dependent on the city’s approval process and 
unpredictable in terms of time. Many of them went away eventually because they could 
not bear an unpredictable time frame (Interviewee 23, personal communication, August 4, 
2015).  
Despite the frustration for SSEZCDC, a SILCC project team member mentioned the 
significance of a dominant role played by the city-level government and her mixed feelings about 
this situation: 
As the operator of the SILCC (Pilot Zone), we would like to see prestigious and reliable 
players locating in the area. Usually, players of this kind can be only reached via the 
municipal government’s network. For example, the STCS was co-founded by the 
municipal government and Astronaut Center of China, the latter of which is directly 
under People’s Liberation Army General Armaments Department. It is almost impossible 
for the SSEZCDC to go directly to an organization of so high an administrative rank, 
because we are only a city-level entity. Nevertheless, as we take loans to fund the SILCC 




We have so far invested over three billion yuan in the SILCC and got nothing. Although 
we are a SOE primarily responsible for realizing the (municipal) government’s goals, our 
activities are at the same time supervised by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). The SILCC has led us into an awkward situation: 
a large amount of money being invested with no payback. We find it difficult to explain 
to the SASAC (Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 2015).  
To some extent, this mixed feeling reflected the fragmented political landscape at higher 
levels of the government. For SASAC, the primary goal was security and appreciation of 
state-owned properties. So it was risk-averse by nature (Interviewee 39, personal communication, 
December 1, 2017). Shenzhen DRC was a local branch of the NDRC. To prove its accountability 
and capability to its supervisors, it needed to align with the NDRC’s agenda to promote the 
SILCC. The DRC officials therefore wanted to “get something done” as soon as possible to build 
up their political record. The UPLRC, which was another key player in the leadership group, 
aimed at maximizing the land values. It therefore insisted on open auction for every piece of the 
land in the SILCC, a process that would call both the ‘enclosed land operation’ and the DRC’s 
favorable land leases into question. 
The UPLRC’s insistence on open auction prevented the “enclosed land operation” from 
happening on the ground. According to this interviewee: 
We have not obtained a single parcel so far…… Since President Xi’s Anti-Corruption 
Campaign, government officials have become extremely cautious, and this is especially 
true in the area of land transactions…… It makes sense that the municipal officials 
choose to avoid free land allocation, although they promised to give us ten parcels of 
land for free when they persuaded us to fund the SILCC…… Actually, we are not totally 
against open auction. But it is unfair to treat us as an equivalent of other auction parties. 




project. We should be given some priority in the auction (Interviewee 24, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015).   
Due to the suspension of the ‘enclosed land operation’, the SSEZCDC purposefully slowed 
the progress of primary development (Interviewee 32, personal communication, September 14, 
2017). 
In contrast to the SSEZCDC, there were beneficiaries of favorable land leases who became 
the first group of new tenants in the SILCC. Many of them were established D&R organizations 
in green industries or providers of green services. They not only located their new businesses in 
the SILCC but also engaged with the project implementation. One prominent example was the 
IBR, which provided consultancy in green building design and conducted carbon inventory in the 
SILCC. It later took on some management responsibilities and became the operator of the 
Convention and Exhibition Center. Nor surprisingly, these beneficiaries generally read the 
municipal government’s leading role as an advantage of the project. In an IBR manager’s words: 
The city is in a better position (than the district) to carry out a low-carbon development 
project considering its political resources and financial abilities. In addition, the city has 
a final say in land affairs as well as the authority to grant franchises, so it is able to 
choose particular tenants. As well, I am suspicious about the district’s incentives for 
carbon reduction, as it does not have an administratively bound mitigation target 
(Interviewee 2, personal communication, June 3, 2015). 
As these beneficiaries became steadfast adherents of the project, the discourse coalition 
surrounding low-carbon-eco-development was further expanded. Some of these newcomers 




Weistek, a 3D-printing company, established a partnership with the SSEZCDC and China 
Association for Promotion of Science, Technology and Finance (CSTF), a nation-wide social 
organization dedicated to integration of technology and finance industries, to jointly run a 
3D-printing incubator in the SILCC. Many government documents described these 
establishments as ‘strategically emerging industries’ to emphasize their strategic roles in the 
SILCC as well as industrial values (Annual Report of SILCC, 2014).  
So far, it is clear that land is one of the most important elements in the politics of the SILCC. 
While primary land development was a common goal of all levels and branches of government 
with an eye to land revenues, an agreement upon how this process should take place was never 
easily reached. Factors such as who undertook the development and under what financial and 
time arrangements might fundamentally influence future distribution of land revenues. In this 
context, different government bodies had their respective ideas on how land development should 
be carried out. To a large extent, land could explain the inconsistent propositions between 
different levels of government and between different departments/agencies of a single level.  
Additionally, land was a major driving force underlying individual decisions of many private 
actors. Implementation of the SILCC was hindered by local residents whose land was to be 
expropriated according to the SILCC plan. In particular, redevelopment of Pingxi Area in the 
Extension Zone slowed down due to strong resistance of existing tenants (Interviewee 18, 
personal communication, July 21, 2015). Dispute with property owners always haunted the 




from local residents added considerable uncertainties to the project implementation, the 
leadership group decided that more time might be needed for the realization of the SILCC and 
even the accomplishment of the Pilot Zone. Correspondingly, they slowed the time frame of the 
project. The Pilot Zone, which was originally scheduled to finish in five years in the 2012 
three-phase development plan, was rescheduled to be completed by 2020 (Interviewee 26, 
personal communication, September 14, 2017). 
Ironically, the tenants who impeded the project implementation were not simply opposing 
the SILCC as a concept or a tangible project. Indeed, many of them expressed satisfaction with 
changes brought by the SILCC. According to a native resident of the Hakka community in the 
Pilot Zone: 
This place used to be the poorest area in Shenzhen, and we felt a little shamed to invite 
outside relatives or friends to come here. But now it has turned to be famous because of 
the appearance of the low-carbon city. Also, we have better roads, more beautiful 
landscape and many new buildings, and the housing prices have significantly risen…… 
Now it’s a pleasure to invite families and friends to visit us here (Interviewee 37, 
personal communication, September 18, 2017).  
Rather, local residents did not take concerted action largely because less-than-satisfied 
levels of monetary compensation proposed to them, especially considering the escalating 
land values:  
The low-carbon city now becomes well-known and therefore government can sell the 
land at very high prices. The relocation compensations they offered to us were minimum 
compared with their possible revenues from reselling the land to new developers 




The local residents therefore faced a dilemma: on the one hand, without the project, they 
could not have better economic and living conditions, but if the project went ahead, the 
compensation for their relocation was insufficient for a truly better life in the same or nearby 
areas. Under the circumstances, local residents generally expressed their support for the project 
during public events such as the SILCC Forum and journalist interviews on one side; and on the 
other, they refused to follow the government’s relocation schedule in the hope that the 
government might offer greater compensation as the property value in the area further increased. 
This led to a seemingly ridiculous situation: some members of the discourse coalition 
surrounding the storyline of low-carbon-eco-development turned out to be obstacles to the 
advancement of the SILCC.  
The hindering effect of local residents contributed to a general pessimistic reading of the 
public’s role in a low-carbon city in particular and climate action in general. As argued by a 
spatial planner of the SILCC: 
We did not engage local residents in the preparation of the plan. Instead, my team 
conducted a succession of fieldwork and interviewed the chairs of nine residents’ 
committees in Pingdi.54 Back then a low-carbon city was still a new concept and totally 
strange to local residents. With poor understanding of this concept, they were incapable 
                                                 
54 There are nine residents’ committees in the sub-district of Pingdi, including Pingdi, Pingxi, Zhongxin, Liulian, 
Pingdong, Nianfeng, Sifangbu, Yixin and Gaoqiao. The residents’ committee is the organizational entity of the state 
at the lowest level in urban China. According to the Chinese constitution, it is a form of “self-governing organizations 
of the masses” and enjoys a high degree of autonomy. It is, however, highly dependent on higher authorities 






of actively participating in the planning processes (Interviewee 4, personal 
communication, June 9, 2015).  
Similarly, a manager at the IBR commented on local residents’ lack of climate awareness: 
They generally lack incentives to engage in the undertaking of carbon mitigation. In 
general, they are indifferent if the place they live in is low-carbon or not, as they don’t 
believe they would benefit from a lower level of carbon emissions. They are definitely 
concerned about the environmental quality. But they fail to recognize the close 
relationship between carbon emissions and the environmental performance (Interviewee 
2, personal communication, June 3, 2015).  
Compared to the earlier storyline of regional cooperation, the storyline of 
low-carbon-eco-development and, in particular, the framework of a low-carbon city was 
particularly effective in terms of attracting political attention and commitment from higher levels 
of the government. However, the framing and narrative of a low-carbon city contributed little to 
address the problems rising from primary land development, which was a vital step to realize the 
SILCC plan and a real goal of the local project proponents. This time an emerging nation-wide 
policy discourse of “new urbanization” was called in. Shortly after the storyline of 
low-carbon-eco development was developed, it was intertwined with this new narrative on new 
urbanization. 
5.2. Storyline III: New urbanization 
When the SILCC was officially initiated in August 2012, a nation-wide discussion on 
urbanization problems had prevailed in the public discourse for a while. The discussion 




Communist Party of China in November 2012. As the Xi-Li Administration began in 2013, this 
national initiative was further established during the first Central Urbanization Work Conference 
in December 2013 and a new National New Urbanization Plan (2014-2020).  
The SILCC implementers quickly realized the possible connections between their project 
and this emerging policy discourse.  
Pingdi is illustrative of many of Chinese urbanization problems such as environmental 
degradation, inadequate infrastructure and facilities and limited access to public services. 
These problems have severely restrained the area’s living standard…… Despite a 
one-hundred-percent urbanization in Shenzhen, here (Pingdi) and the urban center are 
like two worlds. The urbanization rate is superficial and meaning little for the outlaying 
areas (Interviewee 18, personal communication, July 20, 2015).  
As the leadership group and other designers of the SILCC invoked the national agenda for 
new urbanization, the argument for the project started shifting. Pingdi was described as a 
miniature of the dark side of Shenzhen’s urbanization. In addition to specific problems such as 
lack of infrastructure systems and public services, Pingdi also suffered from poorly managed 
urban sprawl and prevalent leapfrog development (Yang & Feng, 2014). 
Due to the growth pressures in the urban center, the farmland was hastily turned into 
development sites and occupied by a mix of poorly built factories and worker dormitories. 
In the absence of a systemic selection process that factors in environmental and other 
impact, the businesses locating in Pingdi have negatively affected the area’s environment 
(Interview X Pingdi, personal communication, July 20, 2015). 
In this light, what Pingdi faced was generally ‘a planning problem’, and therefore it needed 




As such, planning became a leading theme within the storyline of new urbanization. Compared 
to the storyline of low-carbon-eco-development, the new storyline was characterized by a more 
explicit focus on the land issue. The SILCC Office announced the application of preferential land 
policy and policy innovation to promote SILCC in their annual work report/plan (SILCC Office, 
2016). The district-level agency responsible for land reclamation and auction also placed the 
SILCC project among its top priorities in the annual work report/plan (Longgang Land 
Reclamation Center, 2016, 2017). Furthermore, the two storylines were linked together by 
establishing close connections between environmental performance and land use patterns. 
The new problem definition led to a solution of fixing the ‘misused’ land through 
redevelopment. Operationally, the solution encompassed a reconfigured composition of different 
land uses. For example, the SILCC Pilot Zone Planning Research55 proposed a 166% increase 
of industrial land alongside significant changes across all the other land use categories (Table 
5.4). In particular, a M0 sub-category of industrial land was established to be used exclusively 
for emerging industries. Furthermore, two new categories including commercial /mixed use and 
institution/public/facilities/utilities uses were proposed for the area. A commercial overlay was 
also added to half of the land parcels in the Pilot Zone to provide flexibilities (SILCC Pilot Zone 
Planning Research, 2013). 
                                                 
55 The Pilot Zone Planning Research was drafted by the UPDIS and approved by the UPLRC in January 2013. As 
the first official spatial plan in the SILCC, the Pilot Zone Planning Report had a statutory status and was an 




Land use category Present (ha.) 
Percentage 
(%) Planned (ha.) Percentage Change (%) 
Residential 6.60 6.8 3.21 3.20 -51.36 
Industrial 15.96 16.45 42.54 42.35 166.54 
Roads/Open space 12.70 13.09 22.08 21.98 73.86 
Green area 3.51 3.62 13.12 13.06 273.79 
Water area 8.50 8.76 9.64 9.60 13.41 
Non-constructive  47.94 49.42 0.00 0.00 -100.00 
Commercial/Mixed use 0.00 0.00 1.86 1.85 NA 
Institution/Public 
facilities/Utilities 
0.00 0.00 8.01 7.97 NA 
      
Total 97.01 100.00 100.46 100.00 3.56 
Table 5.4: Present and planned land uses in the Pilot Zone (Source: Pilot Zone Planning Research, 2013) 
In addition, the document proposed a much higher floor-area ratio (FAR) for most of the 
land parcels than the existing statutory plan to promote compact development (Fig. 5.4). 
According to a writer of the document, the SILCC exemplified new modes of urbanization with 
four key features including ‘intensive’, ‘smart’, ‘green’ and ‘low-carbon’ (Interviewee 4, 





Figure 5.4: Amendments with floor-area-ratio to the statutory plan of Gaoqiao area. Reprinted from SILCC Pilot 
Zone Planning Research (Draft), 2011 
By then, the storyline of new urbanization was combined with the earlier one of 
low-carbon-eco-development to dominate the narrative on the project. The convergence of the 
two storylines was made evident by the highly visible SILCC Forum, which used a theme 
containing some elements of both of the storylines (Table 5.5). In many government documents, 
it was stated that, on one hand, Pingdi would accomplish low-carbon transitions through new 
modes of urbanization (e.g. Longgang SILCC Office, 2016), and on the other, new urbanization 
was to be realized through the creation of a low-carbon city (e.g. Yang & Feng, 2014). As such, 
the two ideas of low-carbon cities and new urbanization became synonyms under the SILCC’s 




Event Time Theme 
1st SILCC Forum 6/17, 2013 Low-Carbon Development—Exploring New Urbanization 
 2nd SILCC Forum 6/10-11, 2014 Low-Carbon Development—Urbanization of High Quality 
3rd SILCC Forum 6/17-18, 2015 Green and Low-Carbon Transitions of Cities 
4th SILCC Forum 6/16-17, 2016 Green and Innovation—New Momentum of Urban 
Transitions and Development 
5th SILCC Forum  9/7-8, 2017 Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Global Climate Change, 
Promote Low Carbon Development 
 Table 5.5: Themes of the SILCC Forum, 2013-2017 
The combination of the two storylines won extra political significance for the project. It was 
designated as the flagship project of the newly established EU-China Partnership on 
Urbanisation (ECPU), which aimed at “tackling together the challenges of urbanisation and 
jointly promoting healthy urbanisation development” (Joint Declaration on the EU-China 
Partnership on Urbanisation, 2012). In May 2012, as one of the three Chinese mayor 
representatives, Xu Qin attended the first ECPU Forum held in Brussels. During the Forum, 
mayor Xu gave a presentation on Shenzhen’s efforts toward sustainable urbanization 
highlighting the SILCC as an exemplification of such efforts as well as international cooperation 
(Zhenzhen Special Zone Daily, May 4, 2012). In 2013, mayor Xu attended the annual ECPU 
Forum again and signed an agreement with city of Amsterdam to cooperate on sustainable urban 
development and the SILCC in particular. Later on, a project of China EU Future City (CEFC) 
was proposed in the SILCC Extension Zone as a pilot project of the Partnership and officially 




Due to the presence of high rank officials such as vice-premier Li Keqiang and EU 
Commission leaders, this event and the ECPU in general were considered of great prestige and a 
strong commitment by the central government. As the flagship project, the SILCC became a 
symbol of China’s aspiration to better urbanization and openness to international cooperation in 
related fields (Interviewee 27, personal communication, September 29, 2015). As a result, many 
new international actors were seen in the subsequent project implementation. For example, the 
CEFC would be partly funded by a German investment company Tucher & Schmied Office 
(T&S). 
Domestically, the framework of ECPU drew new central government actors to the SILCC. 
For example, the China Center for Urban Development (CCUD), which was a research institute 
under the NDRC and the secretariat of ECPU, became an open advocate for CEFC and SILCC. 
In addition, Overseas Chinese Town Enterprises Co. (OCT)56 promised to establish a joint 
venture with Longgang to sponsor a project in the SILCC with a total investment of 50 billion 
yuan (Interviewee 26, personal communication, September 14, 2017). These central-level actors 
started actively participating in the annual SILCC Forum and became leading members of the 
discourse coalition surrounding the project (Table 5.6). 
                                                 
56 The OCT is a state-owned-enterprise under the supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council. Since it was founded in 1985 in Shenzhen, the OCT has engaged 
in three major businesses, including tourism and related cultural industry operation, real estate development and 
management, and the manufacturing of electronic products. The OCT’s total assets amounted to over 136 billion 




Organizations Nature 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
Central 
government ◎ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ 
National Development and Reform Commission Climate 
Division 
Central 
government   ◎ ◎    
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
Central 
government ◎        
People's Government of Guangdong Province  
Provincial 
government     ☆ ☆ ☆ 
People's Government of Shenzhen City 
Municipal 
government ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 
Shenzhen Development and Reform Commission 
Municipal 
government ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Shenzhen Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission 
Municipal 
government ☐        
People's Government of Longgang District 
District 
government ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Construction and 
Development Corporation 
State-owned 
enterprise  ☐ ☐ ☐ △  
China Emissions Exchange 
State-owned 
enterprise  △ △ △ △  △ 
Urban Planning and Design Institute of Shenzhen 
State-owned 
enterprise    △       
Shenzhen Energy Group Co., Ltd (SEC) 
State-owned 
enterprise    ☐ △ △  △ 
Shenzhen Energy Environment Engineering Co. Ltd (SEEE) 
State-owned 
enterprise   △ △     
World Alliance for Low Carbon Cities 
Transnational 
NGO ☐ △ △     
The World Bank in China 
Transnational 
NGO       △   
C40 
Transnational 
NGO       △  
Shenzhen Green Low Carbon Development Foundation NGO △ △ ☐ △  △ 
China Low Carbon Action League NGO   △      
Shenzhen International Technology Promotion Center for 
Sustainable Development NGO    △   △  




International Academy of Low Carbon Development (Shenzhen, 
China) 
Academic 
institution △ △ △ △  △ 
Shenzhen Institute of Building Research Co., Ltd. Private  △ ☐ ☐ ☐  △ 
BYD Auto Private   △ △    
Vanke Private     △   
China International Forum on Green Development         △  
Shenzhen International Low Carbon Forum Development Center       △ 
Shenzhen C-TEAM Center for Facilitating Adaptation to Climate 
Change      △ 
              
☆ Counsel; ◎ Host; ☐ Organizer; △ Co-organizer       
Table 5.6: Organization of the SILCC Forum, 2013-2017  
The SILCC was also selected as one of the ten National New Urbanization Models in 2013 
out of 168 candidates across the country. This came out from a competition-like campaign 
co-sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Governance and the People’s Daily Online.57 
Considering the government background of the two sponsors, it can be concluded that the SILCC 
was acknowledged by the central government as a role model of urbanization practices.  
At the provincial level, Guangdong government resumed an active role by supervising and 
advising the SILCC Forum since 2015. The political project of regional integration and 
development, which drew the provincial government to the Ping-Xin-Qing program and the 
                                                 
57 Formerly known as China National School of Administration, the Chinese Academy of Governance was started 
in 1994 in response to the Civil Service System that was restored in the late 1980s. It mainly functions as a training 
center for middle and senior civil servants, senior executives and policy research fellows. It also provides policy 
consultancy to the State Council and other ministries and government agencies. The Chinese Academy of 
Governance was directly under the leadership of the State Council, and a senior official from the State Council holds 
its position of president. People’s Daily Online is the internet portal to People’s Daily, which is the official 
newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party and has a particular focus on the national politics and the working of the 




discourse coalition surrounding regional cooperation, stayed on the provincial government’s 
agenda even after the cessation of this particular program. Under the new storylines of new 
urbanization as well as low-carbon-eco-development, Guangdong found a different strategy to 
pursue this career. As part of the SILCC Forum, it led the Shenzhen Declaration on Green 
Low-Carbon Development in the City Cluster of the Pearl River Delta and urged the three cities 
listed in the Ping-Xin-Qing program as well as other cities to promote low-carbon development 
collaboratively (Interviewee 29, personal communication, December 16, 2015). 
As the storyline of new urbanization emerged and successfully added international fame and 
political commitment to the SILCC, project proponents started reinterpreting the existing 
planning documents to emphasize the urbanization theme. The most prominent example was a 
new concept of ‘rolling-over development’ which was defined as enhancing the value of 
surrounding areas through the construction of the Pilot Zone and constantly improving the 
master plan on basis of outcome of earlier development (Yang & Feng, 2014). Generally, 
‘rolling-over development’ denotes an incremental development process starting from a couple 
of pilot projects in the Pilot Zone. 
The concept was invented by the architecture firm IBR, which contributed to disseminating 
and popularizing the concept to make it a signature feature of the SILCC (Interviewee 5, 
personal communication, June 12, 2015). In the words of a senior manager at IBR,  
Rolling-over development distinguished the SILCC from other Chinese low-carbon cities 




mechanism where the experiences and revenues from developing a land plot is to be 
applied to another. Consequently, this model enables learning and reflection in 
megaprojects with large spatial and temporal scales. It thus presents a revolutionary 
approach to Chinese urbanization as well as low-carbon cities (Interviewee 2, personal 
communication, June 3, 2015). 
The leadership group asked the UPDIS to reorient the spatial plans in correspond with this 
concept. For the UPDIS, ‘rolling-over development’ shared their development strategy 
operationalized in the existing three-phase plan. According to the master planner,  
The major driving concern is land reclamation. No matter what is called, three-phase 
development or ‘rolling-over’ development, the goal is to develop the readiest land 
first……Vacant land owned by the state with yet-to-be-transferred land use rights (LURs) 
is completely at the government’s disposal, so it goes first. Land with existing occupants 
or transferred LURs goes later as development of such land might involve relocation 
which might take a huge amount of time (Interviewee 4, personal communication, June 9, 
2015). 
The rhetorical value of ‘rolling-over development’ was tremendous. By responding to the 
national agenda of new urbanization, the concept rationalized the apparently piecemeal and 
random development order which was essentially decided by the risk of relocation disputes. With 
the development sequence specified in the plan, the land with higher risks of relocation dispute 
were circumvented at first. This strategy was of particular importance, 
Relocation disputes is an extremely sensitive issue in the current political environment. 
Such disputes are generally seen as a stop sign for a project and furthermore a curse on 
officials’ career (Interviewee 4, personal communication, June 9, 2015). 
In this light, the rhetoric of ‘rolling-over development’ not only enhanced the feasibility of 




it in the Pilot Zone. As a result, the Pilot Zone was divided into three parts that were anticipated 
to be completed in sequence by 2015, 2018, and 2020 (Fig. 5.5). Similarly, the order was based 
on feasibility for the government to conduct primary development: vacant land or occupied land 
with complying tenants was assigned a tighter time frame; and a later complete date was given to 
the land parcels that were more likely to involve relocation disputes (Interviewee 4, personal 
communication, June 9, 2017). 
 
Figure 5.5: Pilot Zone three-step development plan (Source: SILCC Industry Introduction and the Pilot Zone 
Profile) 
Alongside ‘rolling-over development’ plans, the storyline of new urbanization was also 
operationalized as building retrofit projects. In the Pilot Zone, especially a substantial proportion 
of the development was to come from building retrofit and renovation (Table 5.7). Also, retrofit 




of the Hakka Residential Community, a hotel transformed from a worker dormitory building, and 
an office building transformed from a factory.  
 Completion 
ear (expected) 
Total floor area to 
be produced (m2) 
Floor area to be produced through 
retrofit & renovation (m2) 
Percentage (%) 
Step I 2015 381,900 82,580 21.62 
Step II 2018 444,920 0 0 
Step III 2020 369,300 23,000 6.22 
Total  1,219,120 105,580 8.66 
Table 5.7: Pilot Zone development size and scale of building retrofit (Source: SILCC Industry Introduction and the 
Pilot Zone Profile) 
As building retrofit would inevitably involve existing property owners and users, the 
selection of buildings for retrofit became tricky. For example, the worker dormitory building and 
factory building that were retrofitted for new uses were identified through a tortuous process 
lasting for months. In the block group, they were only two of a group of existing buildings, 
which were owned by five different villages, including Long’er, Longkou, Hongqi, Masha, and 
Gekeng.58 Each of these buildings was owned by the collective of a single village and managed 
by a Township and Village Enterprise (TVE). However, management style across different TVEs 
had been quite different, resulting in varying degrees of control over the properties (Interviewee 
24, personal communication, August 5, 2015).  
                                                 
58 These five villages were located in Longgang but outside Pingdi. Before the construction of these structures, 
these land parcels were given to these five villages by the government as relocation compensation when their land 




All of the five villages showed an interest in building retrofit when they were contacted by 
the SILCC Office, as the rent offered was as twice as high the average rent for the area of the 
time59 (Interviewee 26, personal communication, August 12, 2015). However, some of them 
were held back by existing tenants. For example,  
The TVE in Masha had a loose style of management and some tenants divided the space 
they rented into smaller units for sub-lease. As a result, the Masha TVE was faced by a 
problem of unidentifiable occupants. This problem largely rejected the feasibility of a 
building retrofit project (Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 2015).  
Besides the existing tenants, building retrofit was also hindered by the difficulty in reaching 
consensus among the villagers who collectively owned the assets. Eventually, two buildings 
owned by the Gekeng village were selected due to its particular decision-making mechanism: 
Gekeng is a Hakka community and heavily influenced by a clan culture. The head of its 
TVE is at the same time the chief of the village and the headman of the clan. He is highly 
respected by the villagers and has absolute authority. His decision is generally supported 
unconditionally. With such a strong figure, the Gekeng TVE has been well managed. 
There has not been any kind of sublet in their buildings (Interviewee 15, personal 
communication, July 9, 2015). 
Strategically, the SILCC project implementers together with the Gekeng TVE picked two 
unfinished buildings from the latter’s portfolio. Designed as a factory building and a workers 
dormitory building, respectively, these two structures were under construction when the SILCC 
was searching for possible building retrofit projects. The absence of tenants exempted the SILCC 
from an unpredictably long relocation process. By the opening of the 2014 SILCC Forum, the 
                                                 




retrofit of these two buildings had been completed. According to an insider, this timing is 
extremely important: 
Considering the political attentions paid to the SILCC, project implementers need to 
show their supervisors at higher levels of the government that they are making progress. 
The annual SILCC Forum provides the best opportunity due to its high visibility and 
presence of high rank officials. Therefore, project implementers have been led by a time 
frame defined by the SILCC Forum. For a period after the completion of the Convention 
and Exhibition Center in 2013, there was no project being carried out, giving project 
implementers great pressures……Building from scratch would have incurred either 
construction of new infrastructures for vacant land or demolition and relocation for 
occupied land. In either case, time would have been highly unpredictable. Retrofitting 
provided a shortcut by avoiding such complicated procedures (Interviewee 5, personal 
communication, June 12, 2015). 
In contrast to the Gekeng properties, building retrofit in the Hakka Residential Community 
was slowed by the difficulties in getting sanction from individual residents. Actually, a large 
proportion of property owners left many years ago and became not reachable. Many buildings 
were currently vacant or occupied by renters who lacked the right to property management. But 
this project was too important to become a total failure: 
It is one of the kick-off projects in the Pilot Zone and a sign of the SILCC’s potential to 
improve the locals’ standard of living. As well, it is located next to the Convention and 
Exhibition Center where the SILCC Forum is held. Due to its great symbolic value and 
visibility, we refurbished the facades of the buildings and placed some new installations 
in the open space facing the Convention and Exhibition Center (Interviewee 5, personal 
communication, June 12, 2015).  
The retrofit of the buildings was not, however, merely a change in uses and floor plans. The 




collection and grey water use, solar water heating, and natural ventilation, made the retrofit 
“green”. The office building and the hotel achieved one-star and three-star level in accordance 
with the national green building standards. The development of Convention and Exhibition 
Center also followed a green building design. As building retrofit became a defining 
characteristic of the SILCC, the idea of a low-carbon city was largely articulated as the 
prevalence of green buildings.  
As regards green building’s increasingly important role, the architectural consulting firm 
IBR started exerting a greater influence with its expertise in green building design. It was 
designated as the general architect of the SILCC and to undertake two other retrofitting projects 
in the Pilot Zone. In addition to architectural consultancy, the IBR became an important partner 
of the leadership group as well as an open advocate for SILCC. For example, it ran the 
Convention and Exhibition Center and acted as an important organizer of the SILCC Forum. For 
the IBR, SILCC was a strategic investment:  
Running the Convention and Exhibition Center alone cost us 12 million yuan in a single 
year of 2014, far exceeding the payment of 4 million yuan. But we have been 
compensated in many other ways. For example, we could use the Convention and 
Exhibition Center as our own reception center. As the concept of low-carbon city has 
obtained increasing political attention, many local governments from other (Chinese) 
cities are interested in building their own low-carbon cities. They have merely a vague 
idea about what a low-carbon city really is. The SILCC provides a showcase and 





As the IBR acquired favorable land leases Zone to locate its new subsidiaries in the 
Extension Zone, it was considered as one of the greatest gainers out of the SILCC: 
They have got an array of contracts in the SILCC ranging from architectural consultancy 
and various technical assistance to facility operation and event planning. More 
importantly, with the help of the municipal government, the IBR got access to some land 
without the open auction process. At the same time, they have built a nation-wide 
reputation in building low-carbon cities thanks to the high visibility of the SILCC. This 
reputation is going to bring them a large number of clients from across the country 
(Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
The same interviewee mentioned the close relationship between the managers of the IBR 
and vice-mayor Tang Jie. Since the ECO-2-ZONE proposal, Tang had been an open project 
advocate and secured the support from the central government. Tang initially included IBR in the 
SILCC project as a technical advisor (Interviewee 2, personal communication, June 3, 2015). 
Later on, the IBR’s influence extended toward strategic decision-making, which was made 
evident by the overarching role of ‘rolling-over development’ concept in the whole project. 
Additionally, the IBR led the establishment of a green building requirement to ensure that all 
of the new development in SILCC would meet the national green building standard.60 This 
requirement was specified at the land parcel level as a minimum green building rating on a plot. 
According to a researcher from IBR,  
                                                 
60 The Chinese national Evaluation Standard for Green Building (GB/T 50378-2006 and later updated to GB/T 
50378-2014) was promulgated and managed by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. The 
Standard offers three certification levels, including one, two, and three stars according to ascending scores gained in 
six areas, including land conservation and outdoor environment, energy conservation and management, water 





We have created a green building control index to guarantee a one-hundred-percent green 
building rate in SILCC. Hopefully, this index will be added to the existing detailed 
development control plan as part of land use requirements……Building sector accounts 
for 30% of Pingdi’s carbon emissions, and the green building requirement could 
contribute to a reduction of 65,600 tons per year, which represents nearly 7% of the total 
carbon emissions of 972,400 tons in 2011 immediately before the beginning of SILCC 
(Interviewee 2, personal communication, June 3, 2015).  
As green building became a priority, the SILCC attracted new players from across sectors. 
In the government, the MOHURD, which was the central agency responsible for formulation and 
implementation of the national green building standard, publicly supported the project and 
co-sponsored the 2013 SILCC Forum. In particular, its Vice-minister Baoxing Qiu, an open 
advocate of green building and eco-city, gave his personal endorsement and appeared on the 
Forum as a keynote speaker. In the private sector, Vanke, a Chinese leading residential real 
estate developer with a track record of green buildings all over the country, showed its interest in 
the SILCC and co-sponsored the 2015 Forum. Additionally, organizations from the social sector, 
such as Shenzhen Green Building Association, also actively engaged in the Forum to promote 
green buildings. Green building manifested both of the ideas including 
low-carbon-eco-development and new urbanization (Interviewee 10, personal communication, 
June 19, 2015). Therefore, professionals and enterprises engaged in the green building sector 
easily found a position in the SILCC, and some of them jointed the discourse coalition and 
project advocates. In this light, green building functioned as an intermediary between the 




Furthermore, green building signaled a shifting understanding of low-carbon transitions 
from a focus on industrial restructuring to a focus on the built environment. More importantly, 
the shifting understanding conceptualized low-carbon transitions as a matter of people’s 
everyday life in addition to production activities. With the accumulating political attention to the 
SILCC, the marriage between the narratives of new urbanization and low-carbon-eco 
development has gone mainstream in the national policy discourse. The reciprocal relationship 
between the two was indicated in a variety of government documents. For example, the National 
Plan on New Urbanization (2014-2020) listed low-carbon development as a core principle to 
new urbanization. In this light, the two originally discrete storylines have merged into a coherent 
discourse surrounding and even beyond the SILCC.  
5.3. Project outcomes and prospect  
The development of Pingdi gained real momentum only after being rebranded as an eco-city, 
an idea that preceded the concept of low-carbon city and was used interchangeably with the latter 
in China’s policy discourse. When the SILCC was officially launched in mid-2012, the 
leadership group announced four-fold goals including (1) experimentation of low-carbon 
development, (2) a pilot project of national response to climate change, (3) development of 
low-carbon industries, and (4) promotion of international cooperation in carbon mitigation 
(Annual Report of Shenzhen International Low Carbon City, 2014). Considering the 




set by individual projects as well as potential for upscaling (Interviewee 33, personal 
communication, May 9, 2017).  
Among the SILCC’s different goals, development of low-carbon industries was given high 
priority, especially in the implementation of the Pilot Zone. While the framing of Pingdi’s 
development shifted from a political project of regional cooperation to an environmental one to 
address climate change, a primary goal of replacing traditional manufacturing industries with 
higher value-added industries never changed (Interviewee 35, personal communication, August 
17, 2017). In the first three years since its establishment, a total of 467 enterprises were removed, 
representing over 40% of the area’s business before SILCC. Between 2012 and 2017, the number 
of nationally certificated high-tech enterprises increased from 9 to 145 (Pingdi sub-district 
government, 2017).  
This change was facilitated by the storyline of low-carbon-eco-development through the 
notion of “low-carbon industry,” which was operationalized in the SILCC industry admission 
guidelines. The guidelines, which were first formulated in 2012 and finalized in 2017, outlined 
six industrial sectors that would lead the development of SILCC. Essentially, the guidelines 
defined what “low-carbon industry’ was and which enterprises had the eligibility or priority to 
locate in the SILCC. Compared to the storyline of regional cooperation, the one of 
low-carbon-eco-development did a better job in justifying the displacement of existing 




As a result, Pingdi quickly transformed from a place dominated by small-scale 
manufacturers to one characterized by a growing group of enterprises above designated size.61 
In particular, enterprises with an annual revenue over 100 million RMB increased from 13 to 43 
between 2012 and 2017 (Longgang sub-district government, 2017). Consequently, Pingdi 
witnessed significant economic growth measured by various indicators (Figure 5.6). In particular, 
fiscal and tax revenues doubled and tripled, respectively, compared to 2010 when the 
Ping-Xin-Qing project was proposed. Thanks to the SILCC implementation, Pingdi became one 
of the fastest growing areas in Longgang (Interviewee 26, personal communication, September 
14, 2017). 
 
Figure 5.6: Economic performance in Pingdi (SILCC), 2007-2016 (Sources: Longgang Statistics Yearbook 
2007-2015; Pingdi Key Economic Indicators 2011-2016; Longgang Communities GDP 2016) 
                                                 
61 Enterprise above designated size is a statistic concept used by National Bureau of Statistics and its local offices 
since 1996. The concept originally referred to enterprises with an annual revenue equal to or over 5 million RMB. 
Since 2011, it has referred to enterprises with an annual revenue equal to or over 20 million RMB (National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2011). The number of enterprises above designated size in Pingdi increased from 94 to 182 between 




Economic growth was seen as evidence of SILCC’s success and an essential part of 
low-carbon development. In its annual working report, the SILCC Office stated that  
Since the implementation of the SILCC project, Pingdi sub-district has not presented a 
slowing economy due to project construction or industrial restructuring. Rather, it has 
achieved steady growth (SILCC Office, 2017).  
The statement revealed a common understanding of carbon reduction as a threat to economic 
growth. The presupposed contradiction between carbon reduction and economic development 
paralleled the conventional environment-economy dichotomy which had long dominated local 
government’s decision-making. In this light, Chinese cities had been reluctant to engage in 
carbon reduction activities (Interviewee 33, personal communication, May 9, 2017). Economic 
growth achieved in SILCC, however, demonstrated the possibility to coordinate ecological 
development with economic development, and the synergy of the two was conceptualized as a 
new pathway of “low-carbon development” (Interviewee 9, June 19, 2015). 
The relationship between environment and economy was epitomized by an indicator of 
“carbon intensity” which was an expression of carbon emissions per unit of GDP. Starting from 
2.21 tons per 10,000 yuan of GDP in 2011, carbon intensity in SILCC decreased by 22% 
between 2011 and 2014 (Li, 2015). Furthermore, a medium-term mitigation was established: 
carbon intensity was to fall below 0.32 tons per 10,000 yuan of GDP by 2025 with an expected 
GDP of over 70 billion yuan (IBR, 2014). The focus on “carbon intensity” was consistent with 




Climate mitigation commitment and efforts were always measured by carbon intensity 
instead of absolute amount of carbon emissions considering the demand for development 
in developing countries like China. Our Low-Carbon City/Province Pilot Program also 
used this indicator. Admittedly, the effectiveness of mitigation measures is sometimes 
outweighed by rapid economic growth, which means the absolute amount of carbon 
emissions increases while carbon intensity decreases. Still, this indicator presses local 
government into climate mitigation practices (Interviewee 33, personal communication, 
May 9, 2017).  
While cities’ concerns over climate change were driven almost exclusively by mitigation 
targets, “low-carbon development” in the SILCC had richer meanings (Interviewee 27, personal 
communication, September 29, 2015). With the emergence of the new urbanization storyline, a 
focus was placed on the improvement of built environment, especially green building retrofit and 
community facilities and amenities. Local roads were expanded and improved through a series of 
reconstruction projects; river restoration projects led to the creation of an eco-park and the 
proposal for a waterfront park system; a new public school and an on-site power generation plant 
were underway (Interviewee 22, personal communication, July 31, 2015; Interviewee 36, 
personal communication, September 12, 2017). In general, the SILCC featured the beautification 
of its physical environment and infrastructure development as well as industrial transformation. 
Being the flagship project of the EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation, the SILCC built up 
an accumulating international profile through awards and appellations such as the Paulson 
Institute’s Prize for Cities of the Future and APEC’s Low Carbon Model Town. Considering the 




Shenzhen as a whole. The function of place promotion was particularly clear when mayor Xu 
Qing addressed the Paulson Institute awards ceremony: 
This honor is not only a recognition and praise of the Shenzhen International 
Low-Carbon City, but also applause to Shenzhen for its endeavor to carry out 
development of good qualities and sustainability (Xu, November 12, 2014). 
Considering its symbolic value, the municipal government designated the SILCC as one of 
Shenzhen’s thirteen “key areas” (Interviewee 27, personal communication, September 29, 2015). 
Consequently, the project entered a favorable position to leverage city-level resources. First, the 
SILCC took advantage of ongoing city-led projects to promote its agenda. Its green 
transportation plan was integrated into and then assisted by city-wide transportation development. 
In particular, it was given high priority in the two planned projects of Metro 3 Line62 east 
extension and outer ring expressway, which were anticipated by 2019 and 2020, respectively. A 
high concentration of seven new stations of Metro 3 Line as well as three interchanges of the 
outer ring expressway were arranged within the SILCC. These arrangements promised more 
convenient access to the city center, thus stimulating the (property) values in the SILCC 
(Interviewee 4, personal communication, June 9, 2015). 
In addition, the SILCC was facilitated through favorable land policies which had an 
experimental or even informal nature. For example, the 2015 land reclamation pilot program 
                                                 
62 The Metro Line 3 was a city subway line put into operation in December 2010 and extended for the first time in 
June 2011 to the CBD of Shenzhen. Before the proposal of new extension to further east side of Longgang, the 




(UPLRC [2015]721) was applied to the Pingxi community to accelerate land reclamation process. 
Also, the Convention and Exhibition Center was registered under the category of temporary 
structures to expedite the administrative approval process to get a building permit. When this 
dissertation was written, the center was still in operation, indicating a duration surpassing the 
general time limits for temporary structures.63 In this regard, the SILCC was treated favorably 
by the municipal government because of its extraordinary political significance, which was in 
turn a result of the attachment to dominant policy discourses of the time. 
With the ever-expanding political commitment, the SILCC further manipulated the city’s 
planning system to streamline the administrative approval process. For example, the SILCC 
Office proposed to draft a single plan to function simultaneously as a conceptual plan, an 
industrial development plan, and a legislative statutory plan in the CEFC program area. Such a 
“multifunctional” plan significantly saved time for plan-making and a statutory plan taking into 
account the concept and development vision of a particular project laid the foundation for an 
easier administrative approval of this project in the future. Unsurprisingly, the first pilot project 
of the CEFC program, Huande City, started within a year from the initial proposal in 2015. 
                                                 
63 Article 49 of the Regulation on City Planning of the Shenzhen Municipality: The term for use of the land for 
temporary construction shall be 2 years, an extension may be applied only once at the end of the term, but the term 
of the extension shall not be more than 1 year. At the end of the term, the land user shall be responsible for 
dismantling and removing all the buildings and structures. If the land is demanded for urban construction during the 
term, the land user shall submit to this demand and remove all the temporary buildings and structures within a 
prescribed deadline. The land user shall have the right to claim compensation no more than 50% of the land use fee 





Rapid progress of the SILCC was translated into political credits of the engaged officials, 
many of whom got quick promotion due to achievements in the project. Under the circumstances, 
the SILCC was seen as a shortcut to official promotion, which had mixed effects on the project 
(Interviewee 24, personal communication, August 5, 2015). On one side, the prospect of 
promotion stimulated the involved officials’ commitment to the SILCC. This was of particular 
importance to the functioning of the SILCC leadership group and the SILCC office, both of 
which had a cross-department composition and depended on individual officials’ dedication. On 
the other side, promotions resulted in frequent change in the personnel, interrupting established 





Chapter 6: Strategic Alliance—Mobilization under the Low-Carbon Agenda 
In the last two chapters, three storylines that featured different development stages of the 
Shenzhen International Low-carbon City (SILCC) were elaborated. The shifting storylines from 
regional cooperation to low-carbon-eco development and new urbanization were embedded in 
the evolving larger socio-political context and brought distinctive actors and resources to the 
project of the SILCC.  
The current and next chapters interrelate and compare the project implementation between 
before and after the introduction of the carbon-reduction discourse to reveal (1) how discourses 
were used by the proponents and promoters of the project to recruit and leverage resources in 
political, financial and institutional terms and how special the discourse of carbon reduction was 
in this respect, (2) how the discourse of carbon reduction was operationalized and articulated, 
and (3) how a distinctive political economy triggered by the carbon agenda reshaped the urban 
context of development practices. The answers to these questions will deepen the understanding 
of the new urban politics of carbon control (While et al., 2010) and its effect on “the state 
entrepreneurialism” in China’s urban development (Wu, 2016).  
To answer these questions, discussion in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are organized around two 
analytical concepts, namely strategic alliance and strategic selectivity. Strategic alliance is a 
concept mostly used in the business and management context to distinguish a more flexible and 




The concept is of particular use for examining urban-scale climate governance as the governance 
has witnessed a diverse collection of actors that is not confined to conventional spheres of 
authority (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013). Local authorities need to engage firms and citizens with 
low-carbon behaviors to achieve meaningful carbon reduction (Rutland & Aylett, 2008). In 
general, the pursuit of low-carbon transitions is “empowering new strategic alliances in urban 
politics” (Jonas et al., 2011, p.2539). Taking a closer look at these alliances is crucial for 
understanding the dynamics underlying those efforts. 
Strategic selectivity is a concept drawn from Jessop’s (1999, 2001, 2002) state theory and 
the strategic-relational approach in particular. This approach views the state as a biased strategic 
site of political action where specific strategies are pursued by specific forces with specific 
identities to advance specific interests over specific spatial and temporal horizons. Forms of state 
interventions reflect the state’s favoring of some forces, some identities, some interests, some 
spatial, and some temporal horizons more than others.  
Based on this presumption, environmental regulation will reflect the ‘strategic selectivity of 
the state’ as governments seek to balance environmental and ecological goals with other forces, 
pressures and demands (Jessop, 2002, p.31). Strategic selectivity is first used as a theoretical lens 
to observe urban-scale carbon control in While et al.’s (2010) study on the eco-state restructuring. 
The concept yields a fruitful discussion on how governments reconcile carbon reduction with 




Taken together, these two concepts highlight the strategic nature of the SILCC and similar 
efforts toward low-carbon cities in China and potentially elsewhere as well. In practice, strategic 
selectivity and strategic alliance are inseparable because 'policy inclinations' never come before 
having certain groups in mind. In other words, strategic alliance is an inherent and integral part 
of strategic selectivity. Also, particular groups will reinforce and further their own interests after 
joining alliances through defining what counts and what does not. Their relationship is thus 
dialectical and one is inextricable from the other.  
The analysis treats strategic alliance and strategic selectivity as two parallel elements to 
show different, but equally essential factors that shape the processes as well as outcomes of the 
SILCC. Both elements are intimately connected to discourses and sensitive to the discursive 
transitions. Strategic alliances and strategic selectivity function as intermediaries between 
discourses and the concrete project of the SILCC. In particular, the former works largely through 
shaping the relationship between the state and other actors, while the latter exerts its influence 
mainly through shaping the relationship between economy and ecology.  
6.1. The leaders and the project’s political status 
To mobilize any large project, alliances have to be formed. One factor in producing these 
alliances involves the selection of ways of 'seeing and knowing' the project (i.e., discourse). 
Alliances and discourse are entangled and inseparable and thus have to 'worked together' for 
a project to be successful. Discourse is a tool, but so is adding and subtracting allies (each of 




The history of building a low-carbon city in Pingdi, Shenzhen can be read as an evolving 
process in which the proponents searched for an effective combination of allies and resources. 
This process was composed of two successive stages characterized by different decision-making 
landscapes dominated by district- and municipal-level governments respectively. The transition 
was closely linked to a shift in the framing and narrative of the project from regional cooperation 
to low-carbon development. As a result, what was changed was not only the name of a 
low-carbon city, but also the collection of interests to which that name appealed. 
If the question of who is leading the decision-making might significantly predict the nature 
and outcome of a government-led project in China’s context, we need to figure out, in the first 
place, why the adoption of a particular name transferred the leading role from Longgang district 
government to its immediately higher level government in the city of Shenzhen. 
In the period leading up to the establishment of a low-carbon city, the local government in 
Longgang promoted the project under the framework of regional cooperation. Its efforts, 
however, turned out to be in vain in the absence of concerted action of the other two cities that 
formed the proposed tripartite alliance. During the process, Longgang found that upper-level 
governments played a critical role in enabling as well as disabling the project. For example, 
under the pressure of the provincial government of Guangdong, these two undecided cities 
promised in official occasions to work with Longgang in spite of their deep concerns over loss of 




ambiguous attitude posed tremendous uncertainties on the project as the authority over required 
approvals resided mostly with city-level agencies.  
These mixed effects led the initiators to recognize that support of higher level government 
would be an indispensable ingredient for the realization of their ambition. In particular, they 
must entice the municipal government as their direct supervising agency to obtain recognition for 
their political achievements as well as administrative approvals necessary for implementing the 
project. 
The municipal government’s hesitation to fully support the Ping-Xin-Qing proposal was 
largely a result of the prevalent inter-urban competition where conflict between cities at the same 
level was paramount (Zhang & Wu, 2006). Pingdi was seen by the municipal government as a 
potential growth pole of Shenzhen, although it was presently one of the least developed areas in 
the city and lagged behind the other two areas in the tripartite alliance in terms of GDP in total 
and by per capita. Its advantages as an integral part of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) could be potentially offset through sharing preferential policies and other resources with 
two adjacent cities to form the alliance. For many city-level government officials, the proposed 
Pin-Xin-Qing plan entailed a risk of dampening the city’s comparative advantages in the region. 
In addition, a more concrete concern at the city level focused on the Gaoqiao industrial park. 
A major conflict between Shenzhen and Longgang was whether to reorient the Gaoqiao 
industrial park, which used to be dominated by traditional manufacturing industries, toward 




increasing fiscal revenues through economic restructuring, Shenzhen would rather see less 
stringent industrial requirements in the outer suburban areas like Pingdi to attract the businesses 
squeezed out from the city center. These businesses usually engaged in traditional industries or 
services and were expelled by the changing land use pattern and increasing rents caused by the 
deindustrialization processes happening in the central urban districts. 
Retaining these businesses in the municipal jurisdiction was crucial for the city’s short-term 
tax and GDP purposes, although they were to be removed or transformed in the end to meet the 
ultimate goal of economic restructuring. Under the circumstances, relocating these businesses to 
the outer suburbs would be an expedient to balance these short- and long-term goals. But more 
flexible criteria for industrial development were needed in these areas to accommodate the 
less-desired businesses. For the city-level officials who questioned the feasibility of the 
Ping-Xin-Qing plan, turning the Gaoqiao industrial park and the Pingdi area into a destination 
exclusively for high-tech industries meant additional risk of losing businesses to other cities in 
the region. 
If the feasibility and capability to pursue a high-tech industrial development was unevenly 
distributed in a city, the opportunity to advance low-carbon transitions might follow a similar 
spatial pattern considering the general correlation between the two processes of industrial 
restructuring and carbon emissions reduction.64 As While and colleagues (2010) argued, a 
                                                 
64 It should be noted that exceptions exist. Many high-tech companies are at the same time have intense carbon 




question of distributional politics is at the heart of territorial carbon regulation. Higher level 
government’ decisions largely define the spatial pattern through allocating varying 
responsibilities for carbon reduction as well as investments and resources for mitigation activities 
to different areas. These decisions “come to reflect judgments about the efficiency of carbon use 
and the effectiveness of local strategy” (While et al., 2010, p.88). In this sense, when municipal 
officials challenged the Ping-Xin-Qing plan arguing that many of the other industrial parks in the 
city had similar plans to develop high-tech industries and were better conditioned than Pingdi to 
do so, they implied a negative judgment about the effectiveness of this specific local strategy.  
To implement the project, the local proponents needed to change this judgment. They 
resorted to many strategies to obtain the municipal government’s support. For example, during 
the official visit of a delegation from the Netherlands to Shenzhen in search of 
government-to-government cooperation on sustainable urban development, the Longgang district 
government commissioned a group of experts from various Dutch as well as domestic academic 
institutions and foundations to draft a new strategic plan for Pingdi. At intervals along the 
preparation of the plan, the district government sent the experts to the municipal government to 
present the progress in the plan drafting.  
These strategies of using expertise and consulting key municipal officials in advance were 
aimed at their individual recognition and support. In spite of the informal nature of these 
                                                                                                                                                             
Also, Xu and Lin (2007) identified a nonlinear relationship between high-tech industries and carbon emissions in 




individuals’ recognition and verbal approvals, the local proponents believed that building an 
informal alliance with key members of the municipal government along the way of plan drafting 
would enhance the chance of an official approval eventually. This belief proved to be reasonable 
as the final ECO-2-ZONE plan was officially approved by the city in a short time frame after the 
completion.  
If we take a closer look, we can recognize that the informal alliance with the municipal 
government at an early stage had a more profound implication on the naming of the SILCC. As 
Longgang was preparing the ECO-2-ZONE plan, the municipal government was preparing a 
city-level mitigation plan to meet the NDRC’s requirement on the candidates under its pilot 
program of National Low-Carbon Cities. The municipal officials being consulted saw an 
inherent linkage between these two plans: many elements of the ECO-2-ZONE plan, such as a 
carbon-trading platform, an environment-friendly waste management system, and a clean energy 
power station, would serve a broader area beyond Pingdi and thus affect the city-scale carbon 
emissions; moreover, the international cooperation marked by the authorship of the 
ECO-2-ZONE would add extra political significance to the city’s mitigation efforts. 
To incorporate this emerging project into the city-level mitigation plan, the municipal 
government rebranded the project as Sino-Dutch (Euro) Low-Carbon City and designated it as 
one of the three pilot low-carbon urban districts in the Shenzhen Medium- and Long-Term 
Low-Carbon Development Plan (2011-2020). Pingdi was also appointed as one of Shenzhen’s 




with key municipal officials enabled the ongoing local project to be connected to a nascent 
political agenda at higher level government. As the project was re-oriented to highlight this 
nascent agenda, it attracted increasing political attentions on a broader scale.  
As the project took on additional political significance, the municipal government replaced 
Longgang to lead the project. The transition was made evident by Vice-Mayor Tang’s sequential 
visits to the NDRC and the Netherlands in search of support and resources for building the 
low-carbon city in Pingdi. As the municipal government took the lead to promote the project and 
as Vice-Mayor Tang became the most outspoken advocate for it, this project assumed a higher 
political status.  
A project’s political status is of tremendous importance in China. This was why the local 
proponents of the Ping-Xin-Qing plan once boasted of their achievement with use of the 
metaphor of “triple strides”, which denoted a process in which district, municipal, and provincial 
governments paid attention to the project in succession. “Triple strides” was essentially a 
description of the ascending political status of the project through attracting the attention of 
higher level government. The proponents publicly accentuated this shifting nature of the project 
in the hope that a higher political status might attract additional support and investment. The 
political status reflects the rank of the strategic alliance assembled around a project and in turn 
reconfigures this alliance through shifting the political calculation of existing and potential allies. 
This also resembles “the processes through which the political spaces of urban climate politics 




With the municipal government’s promotion activities, the project of Sino-Dutch (Euro) 
Low-Carbon City quickly entered the central government’s horizons. In particular, the NDRC 
renamed the project as Shenzhen International Low-Carbon City (SILCC) to further enhance its 
political status, and its officials visited Pingdi to show the department’s support. As the framing 
changed from regional cooperation to carbon reduction, this particular project, which was 
initiated by the local government of an urban district, became a city-led project backed by the 
central government. 
6.2. Expanding alliance under the de-carbonization discourse 
Promoting a local project through attracting the attention of higher level government is the 
conventional wisdom of Chinese local government for development activities, especially when it 
comes to mega-projects. It is, however, interesting to ask what special effect the emergent 
discourse and agenda of carbon reduction might have on the dynamics underlying this political 
strategy for promoting the project.  
Notably, government at different levels was driven by distinct incentives and saw a variety 
of things in the proposed project. For example, Longgang district government aspired to grow 
the local economy and anticipated the economic restructuring and place promotion would boost 
tax and land revenues; the municipal government was driven by the political pressure of 
accomplishing a national pilot project and saw the project in Pingdi as a means to achieve that 
goal and, more importantly, an exemplar of Shenzhen’s shift toward a low-carbon path of 




that the project would demonstrate China’s commitment to addressing climate change to the 
international community.  
The discourse of carbon reduction, and, in particular, the rhetoric of a low-carbon city 
successfully mediated between these fragmented motivations by virtue of its interpretive 
flexibility, which is a result of at least two factors. First, as a comparatively new field of 
governance, no fixed parameters existed to represent carbon reduction either in Pingdi or 
Shenzhen. From carbon intensity to carbon capture and storage, distinct representations were 
referred to in different contexts as the gauge of low-carbon transition. As various activities at 
different scales, from industrial transformation and public transport to on-site power generation 
and individual behavior change, could alleviate carbon emissions in a locality, governments at 
each of the different levels might find a way to connect a low-carbon initiative to its own agenda 
with its primary impact at a particular scale. In other words, the discourse of carbon reduction 
can be manipulated to justify a government apparatus’s policy work in the face of an 
‘institutional void’ in carbon governance where unitary principles for conducting politics have 
yet come into being (Hajer, 2003).  
A second factor contributing to the interpretive flexibility was the fact that carbon emissions 
falling into the ‘local’ category were imprecisely measured. This is not to say that no statistical 
figure expressed the size of carbon emissions in Pingdi. Indeed, an array of carbon 
emission-related statistics were on record, such as carbon emissions per unit of GDP, carbon 




were, however, based on a complicated process of mathematical modeling and calculation and 
were at best an approximation of actual carbon emissions on the ground. Precise measurement of 
carbon emissions in a locality is extremely difficult, if not impossible, considering its high 
requirement for monitoring devices, let alone the unsolved dispute over carbon footprint 
estimation boundaries (Matthews, Hendrickson, & Weber, 2008). As calculation of carbon 
emissions is ambiguous, activities toward carbon reduction are also subject to interpretation.  
Taken together, the above two factors created enormous interpretative flexibility within the 
discourse of carbon reduction. In particular, a low-carbon city becomes a ‘trading zone’ where 
place-making is based on “an ability to cooperate ‘while still disagreeing’” and can be 
accomplished even without shared values and beliefs (Lieto, 2013). This also explained why the 
later storyline of new urbanization could be easily attached to this same project and merged into 
the discourse of carbon reduction. 
As the name of SILCC was established, an increasing number of actors were attracted to this 
project. This can be best seen in the organization of the SILCC Forum. Being the biggest public 
event in Pingdi since 2013, the Forum was highlighted by many prominent attendants, such as 
Vice Minister(s) of the NDRC and the former Vice President of the United States Al Gore. 
Considering the high visibility of the Forum, project proponents used it as a platform to attract 
attention and investment.  
The actors who participated in the organization of this event were de facto promoters and 




government would like to ally. Tracing these actors over time sheds light on the general 
mobilizing power of the de-carbonization discourse as well as the evolving configuration of the 
strategic alliance surrounding the SILCC.  
In particular, the four different titles assigned to these actors, including counsel, host, 
organizer and co-organizer, would indicate their distinctive responsibilities for and varying 
degree of engagement in the project.65 Given the implied relations between the holders of the 
different titles, the question of why an actor assumed a particular title at a particular time is 
enlightening. In addition, comparing actors with different titles or different titles of a single actor 
at different times reveals the complex dynamics and contingency of the alliance. 
Reflecting on the information in Table 5.6, we can develop a few insights into the strategic 
alliance surrounding the SILCC and its relationship with shifting discourses. First and foremost, 
an alliance between the district, the municipal government and the NDRC was formed to provide 
organizational and political foundations for the SILCC. This alliance remained comparatively 
                                                 
65 This arrangement follows the typical mode of organizing big events in Chinese government context. Hosts 
generally play a leading role and are responsible for key decisions. Sometimes they also coordinate between 
different actors through administrative mandate. Counsels are frequently direct or indirect supervisors of hosts and 
characterized by higher administrative ranking within the government system. Counsels serve largely as a symbol of 
the event’s political significance. Neither counsels nor hosts do the work on the ground, which is conducted mainly 
by the organizers. Organizers contribute a majority of investment and labor used to organize an event. Despite being 
accountable to hosts and primarily responsible to put the latter’s decisions into effect, organizers sometimes pursue 
their individual agendas at the same time. As organizers are often responsible to hosts beyond the context of the 
event, they tend to prioritize hosts’ agendas to show their commitment. Co-organizers usually have certain 
connections with organizers and provide assistance in a more flexible way. Co-organizers often use this title to 




stable over time in terms of the roles they played, pointing to the government-led and city-driven 
nature of the project.  
In particular, the development and reform commission (DRC) system, which was a 
vertically directed bureau, predominated in the SILCC decision-making and implementation 
across different levels of government. As the state-level leading agency for climate-related 
affairs, the NDRC and its local offices were on the frontiers of protecting the climate and driving 
the low-carbon transitions. In our case where a low-carbon city was pursued, Shenzhen DRC 
acted on behalf of the municipal government and dominated the decision-making in the SILCC 
leadership group. Similarly, Longgang DRC served as the primary district-level bureau that was 
responsible for the implementation. To a large extent, the introduction of the carbon-reduction 
discourse and, in particular, the framing of a low-carbon city prescribed the DRC system’s 
absolute authority over the project.  
The NDRC’s support had enormous significance for the SILCC. For example, it was the 
NDRC that made the project an “international low-carbon city” and further the single flagship 
project of the EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation. This eminent ‘positioning’ was almost 
impossible without the endorsement by a prominent central government apparatus like the 
NDRC. Considering the massive resources leveraged from this “positioning”, local development 





The discourse of carbon reduction provides a shortcut to this goal of politicization and 
legitimation given the facts that climate change is highly politicized (McCright & Dunlap, 2011) 
and that an implicit moral dimension of reducing emissions surfaces in “a low-carbon polity 
predicated on carbon control” (While et al., 2010, p.82; also Daniels & Endfield, 2009; Purdon, 
2017). The SILCC conceptualized as an attempt to reduce carbon emissions was blessed by 
additional political correctness and ethics compared to the same project simply embodying a 
vision of regional integration. As a result, the project proponents enticed higher level 
government through the higher political value of the de-carbonization discourse. 
Discourse also configures the alliances through creating distinctive interests. As the SILCC 
was joined by the storyline of new urbanization, related agencies quickly found a stake in the 
project. In the heyday of the new urbanization narrative, around mid-2012 when the SILCC was 
designated as the flagship project of the newly-established EU-China Partnership on 
Urbanisation, the MOHURD, as its title showed, had every reason to engage in the project. In 
particular, as the discourses of carbon reduction and new urbanization were primarily 
operationalized as green building design and retrofit, the MOHURD’s interest in the SILCC was 
further deepened considering its authority over national green building policy. For the 
MOHURD, which is the inventor of the national green building standards and the agency in 
charge of the corresponding evaluation and certificate scheme, the SILCC’s one-hundred-percent 




Aside from the department’s support, individual officials played an equally important role in 
expanding the strategic alliance and in promoting the SILCC. For example, the MOHURD’s 
former Vice Minister and present Counsellor of the State Council, Qiu Baoxing, who was also an 
open advocate for green buildings, showed his support for the project through his presence and 
delivering addresses every year at the SILCC Forum. Individuals’ support might come to be 
more consistent than the government agencies they worked for. Even though the MOHURD 
withdrew from the organization of the SILCC Forum after 2013, Mr. Qiu showed his unwavering 
personal support for the project. 
6.3. Contingency and heterogeneity of strategic alliance 
The new interests created by the emerging discourse of new urbanization in combination 
with the established one of carbon reduction expanded the strategic alliance around the SILCC. 
Nevertheless, discourse creates conflicts of interests in addition to interests. These mixed effects 
yield dynamics and instabilities within an established strategic alliance. Actors who are attracted 
by the interests produced by a particular discourse could be at the same time frustrated or 
intimidated by the conflicts behind the same discourse.  
This point was well demonstrated in the dynamics surrounding land development in the 
SILCC. As a prerequisite for any new development, land development had long sat in the center 
of the local government’s considerations even before any specific project was conceived. 
However, it was not until the formulation of the new urbanization agenda that the land issue was 




designers identified a problem solution of fixing the inefficient land use pattern in Pingdi through 
land (re)development and gave it a high priority.  
Till this point, the UPLRC, the city-level agency responsible for planning and land affairs, 
showed some frustration, which was indicated by its retreat from organizing the SILCC Forum. 
As counterintuitive as it might seem, this move was less surprise considering the UPLRC’s 
distinctive, usually more conservative, disposition to ‘land’ compared with other entities in the 
strategic alliance. Indeed, the UPLRC was blamed as an obstacle to the advancement of the 
SILCC due to its hesitation to use favorable land leases to attract desirable business tenants. The 
tensions between the UPLRC and other project proponents went quietly before the ascendency of 
the new urbanization discourse, as land remained an implicit issue back then.  
The establishment of the land development agenda disclosed the undercurrent of conflicting 
interests. To focus on the land problem, the SILCC leadership group put forward an updated land 
use plan, which contradicted both the existing statutory plan and the conventional procedure of 
land use planning. In this context, the authority of the UPLRC as maker, executor, and 
supervisor of the statutory plan and the general planning system was greatly confronted. The new 
urbanization discourse aggravated the tensions between the UPLRC and other allies and further 
turned these previously hidden tensions into open conflicts.  
The UPLRC remained a key actor in the subsequent implementation under the 
interdepartmental arrangement of the SILCC Leadership Group. Key members served the 




structure and their home agency. Their task was generally one of caring for the part of group’s 
decision that fell into the UPLRC’s domain. To put it simply, they were expected to leverage the 
resources within the UPLRC to advance the SILCC. These officials had strong motivations to 
show their capability through carrying out this task, especially in front of the director of the 
Leadership Group who was also Vice Mayor of the city. As a result, many preferential policies 
were provided by the UPLRC to facilitate the project at certain critical moments. For example, 
the agency revised the related existing statutory plans to cater to emergent demands. Furthermore, 
it allowed a project-specific streamlined approval procedure under which construction activities 
could begin before the statutory plan was in effect.  
In contrast to the MOHURD and the UPLRC’s half-way withdrawal, the provincial 
government of Guangdong had been absent in the first and second Forum and then became a 
counsel for the event. Guangdong government used to play a prominent role in supporting the 
Ping-Xin-Qing Plan to promote its then political agenda of regional cooperation. Many 
high-ranking officials, such as provincial Party Secretary and Governor, openly expressed their 
support for the Ping-Xin-Qing plan and urged the three involved cities to work together. 
The shifting framing of the project from regional cooperation to a low-carbon city 
interrupted and complicated the provincial government’s strategic calculations. On one hand, 
Guangdong government had a strong incentive to control carbon emissions within its 
jurisdictions as the central government imposed an obligatory reduction target on every province. 




also in political terms. In this context, any local efforts taken to reduce carbon emissions should 
be welcomed.  
On the other hand, carbon reductions in Pingdi or Shenzhen would not necessarily lead to 
similar results on the province scale. For example, if a locality reduces its emissions through 
getting rid of certain carbon-intensive activities which subsequently relocated to other areas 
within the province, province-level carbon emissions would hardly change. In a worst case, the 
carbon emissions of the province as a whole might even increase if the new locations had much 
less stringent environmental regulations. Such concerns held true for the case of SILCC as it put 
forward a primary strategy of industrial restructuring for carbon reduction. The two contradictory 
lines of calculations largely explained the provincial government’s ambivalent attitude toward 
the SILCC at the beginning.  
With the resurgence of a policy discourse of regional cooperation, the provincial government 
joined in organizing the 2015 SILCC Forum during which a panel of Green Low-carbon 
Development in the Pearl River Delta City Cluster was held. The nine prefecture-level cities in 
Guangdong66 signed the Shenzhen Manifesto, which called for more market-based approaches 
as well as regional cooperation to ecological preservation and environmental protection. While 
the resumed discourse of regional cooperation did not rise to a prominent position as carbon 
reduction and new urbanization, it seemed attractive enough for Guangdong to play a more 
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active role. This trajectory also reflected the power of discourse to constantly reshape the 
strategic alliance. 
Under the provincial government’s influence, a similar tripartite framework was once again 
established between Shenzhen and the cities of Dongguan and Huizhou. This substitute of 
Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation plan was rebranded as united green low-carbon development 
to respond to the latest policy discourse. It is compelling to ask what drove Dongguan and 
Huizhou, whose hesitation and reluctance led to the bankruptcy of the original Ping-Xin-Qing 
plan, to embrace its substitute while higher level government in Guangdong presented similar 
support for the two plans.  
Behind the straightforward answer that “they wanted to learn from us” as given by some 
Shenzhen officials, there was a more fundamental change in the basis of these cities’ strategic 
calculation. For example, Dongguang and Huizhou took into account the economies of scale for 
innovative technologies applied in the SILCC such as new energy and micro-grid. They also 
aspired to take advantage of the low-carbon infrastructures that were being developed for the 
SILCC, such as the low-carbon sanitation provision and the real-time carbon emission 
monitoring system. Additionally, the massive attention being enjoyed by the SILCC, both 
domestically and internationally, seemed to be a good opportunity for place promotion 
considering their geographic adjacency. The framework of a low-carbon city thus introduced a 
new mindset of “carbon interdependencies” (While et al., 2010) and therefore re-conceptualized 




The expansion of the SILCC alliance happened not only in terms of its size, but also its 
diversity. Besides government agencies across various levels, a group of enterprises, non-profit 
groups and academic institutions were found in the organization of the event. Some of them even 
functioned beyond the event and played a critical role in the general implementation of the 
SILCC. For example, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Construction and Development 
Corporation (SSEZCDC), an organizer of the Forum for three successive years before turning 
into a co-organizer, was the single largest investor in the kick-off projects and carried out most 
of the primary land development in the Pilot Zone. In this regard, the SILCC presented many of 
the characters of the ‘multilevel governance’ around local carbon control commitments, such as 
new roles of and dynamism between different levels of government, the participation of the 
private and the third sector, and the involvement of international organizations and transnational 
municipal networks (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; 2013).  
However, the governing nature of the SILCC differed from the multilevel governance of 
climate change as identified in the existing research in two main aspects. First, rather than a 
“complex (and nonhierarchical) scalar associations of multiple levels of governments” (Rice, 
2010, p.931; Bulkeley, 2005), the SILCC’s case revealed an enduring hierarchical relationship 
between different actors. Moreover, it was only through this hierarchy that these actors found a 
mutually understood way to cooperate to promote the project. Second, in contrast to many 
different ways of citizen engagement in multilevel governance, such as programs of individual 




climate action plan making (Rutland & Aylett, 2008), the SILCC presented a more limited 
manner of including Pingdi’s local residents into the development of the SILCC.   
Under the fixed hierarchy, the significance of the central government could be never 
overstated. For example, Shenzhen’s status as a national pilot low-carbon city drove its 
municipal government to prioritize a local project with carbon mitigation potentials, thus making 
the SILCC possible in the first place. Furthermore, the NDRC’s support led to the designation as 
the single flagship project of the EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation, which further enhanced 
the project’s political status and international prestige. In addition, high-ranking officials’ 
attendance to the SILCC Forum attracted more attention to the project as well as the event. 
Finally, the central government also provided financial support through allocation of public 
funds, including special funding for energy conservation and emission reduction, renewable 
energy development, and clean development. Being funded by the central government was an 
important indicator of a project’s political rank. This provision served the SILCC in symbolic as 
well as monetary terms. All these facts revealed the decisive role of the central government and 
the functioning of conventional administrative hierarchy within the nascent field of climate 
governance. 
So far, the SILCC’s case presented paradoxical evidence for a “reconfigured” state in the 
climate governance (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999). On one side, local authorities, such as district 
and municipal governments, were equipping themselves with more environmental consciousness 




Without specified objectives or means of carbon control prescribed by higher level government 
for a particular locality, they experimented with new measures of managing carbon flows within 
their jurisdictions. This largely distinguished the SILCC from the traditional top-down, 
command-and-control mode of environmental management where the central government was 
the largest source of authority and legitimacy.  
On the other side, the development of the SILCC was conditional upon the central 
government’s support. As discussed earlier in this chapter, a package of environmental, 
economic and fiscal policies as well as personal endorsement in the central government produced 
a political environment in which SILCC should and could be carried out. In this context, the 
central government played an enabling role through a mixture of pressures and incentives rather 
than mandatory or coercive mechanisms.  
More importantly, the central government created a political culture where doing ‘carbon’ 
was good in and of itself, and thus taking carbon initiatives constituted a gesture of 
accountability for a subnational government to show their supervisors at higher administrative 
ranks. Such a political culture filled carbon reduction with moral as well as political imperatives, 
thus precipitating local authorities’ endeavors to deal with ‘carbon’ both as a material and a 
rhetoric. In this sense, the nation state is far and away different than a trend of “hollowing out” 
(Jessop, 2013) in China’s climate governance. Indeed, it successfully establishes “an ideological 
state project” of carbon reduction that is subsequently pursued by its subsidiaries across different 




On the other end of the hierarchy, local ordinary people participated in the development of 
the SILCC in a mostly passive manner. Two main mechanisms of involving local residents were 
highlighted in media coverage and related government documents. First, as participants of the 
SILCC Forum, they appeared in many exhibitions and campaign activities, such as a household 
energy saving appliance exhibition, an orientation on personal carbon footprint calculation, and 
organized bike tours to promote bicycle commuting. Second, as shareholders of village 
companies, they received an average dividend that was more than triple that before the start of 
the project. In general, local residents were depicted as passive actors who benefited from 
Pingdi’s new development and took concerted actions as requested at special moments to 
promote the project. 
Limited public participation was not exceptional for a government-led project in urban 
China. But it was noteworthy that the framework of a low-carbon city might deepen this 
development style considering the new emphasis on technocracy. With the shifting narrative 
from regional cooperation to carbon reduction, the project witnessed a broader and deeper 
involvement of academic, professional and research institutions and a group of new players 
doing various ‘scientific’ and ‘technical’ jobs, such as carbon accounting and projection, energy 
planning and green building design. This changing landscape indicated a move toward 
technocratic approach to design and implement the project in addition to the mostly political 




A widely held perspective among these new players as well as some government officials 
was that the public had not yet recognized or even knew about the issues of climate change 
(multiple personal communications). In these experts and professionals’ eyes, the relationship 
between the SILCC and local people was generally one-way—that the project would educate and 
economically benefit the area’s residents—with limited potential for public participation. This 
corresponds to Hajer’s (1995) argument that turning to a “global biosphere” level of analysis 
makes understanding of the environment “a matter of complex scientific extrapolation” exclusive 
to a limited group of people with specialized knowledge and expensive devices and that the 
layman who depend primarily on direct experience are mostly disqualified. 
Actually, local residents played a far more complicated and critical role in (dis)enabling the 
project, especially when they were legal owners of the properties that were reclaimed for the use 
of the SILCC. Negotiation between the project proponents and these local residents over rents or 
relocation compensation was one of the most unpredictable ingredients in implementation. In 
addition, this negotiation allowed the two levels of local government in Longgang and Pingdi to 
retain some influence on the project even though they lost most of the decision-making power to 
the municipal government. As the only authorities that were equipped with enough knowledge 
and capacity to negotiate with local people, these local governments acted as intermediators 





Because of the numerous unpredictability of the negotiations, the relationship between local 
residents and the project was ambiguous. Local residents could be either an obstacle to the 
advancement of the SILCC when they denied what was offered to them in exchange of their 
properties or a catalyst when they reached an agreement quicker than expected. Local residents 
thus took on a dual identity of imaginary foes and allies who needed precaution and co-optation 
at the same time in the eyes of the project proponents. Similarly, in their own eyes, they could be 
either victims or beneficiaries of the development of the SILCC depending on what they would 
get out of it.  
How local residents judged the development and calculated their personal gains and/or loss 
stayed consistent against the shifting discourse. The main consideration lied in property value, 
which was reflected in one-time compensation package, recurring rents, or even the area’s 
average housing price. Increased housing price in Pingdi was esteemed as a positive effect of the 
SILCC as “our properties were worth more” (personal communication). The calculation largely 
conformed to the deeply entrenched development rationing based on economic returns and, in 
particular, property value in Chinese urban context. This calculative basis could be also found in 
the stage of Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation plan as villagers performed speculative 
construction activities in anticipation of additional rents or relocation compensations. While new 
urban politics of carbon control will change state-citizen relations through the making of 




rhetoric in this case failed to add new dimensions to the local residents’ calculations about the 
project or their living in a place facing low-carbon transitions.  
The discourse of carbon reduction also had less mobilization potential toward local ordinary 
people than the other actors in the strategic alliance. Compared with the political credit to be 
earned exclusively through a carbon- and/or climate-related program for the related government 
officials, increased property values could be realized as long as a place became ‘a better place’. 
Among the numerous strategies to achieve this, such as improved infrastructures and amenities 
and more convenient access to public transportation and social services, the carbon-reduction 
discourse was one but only one of the possible strategies. So it was to mobilize local residents 
more effectively only when it better served the goal of ‘a better place’. 
6.4. Place promotion 
As a place-based development program, the SILCC had an inherent mission of place 
promotion. The notion of ‘a better place’ was not only able to entice top level governments’ 
support and attract both domestic and foreign investments, it also influenced local residents’ 
perception and how they would respond. Considering its strategic role in carrying out SILCC, 
place promotion was given great attention by the project proponents.  
The most important way to accomplish this mission included a two-part strategy in relation 
to the strategic alliance. First, an alliance was formed and expanded through continuously 
absorbing renowned entities and individuals. Second, the alliance was publicized to gain more 




enhance the visibility of the alliance, and a more prominent alliance would attract new 
distinguished actors.  
For both parts, international actors were of particular significance. This was not surprise 
considering the project’s designation as the flagship project of the EU-China Partnership on 
Urbanisation. In addition, the starting point of the SILCC was a government-to-government 
cooperation with the Netherlands, and the ECO-2-ZONE plan of Dutch origin served as the 
foundation for most operational plans in the SILCC. Further efforts to entice the international 
community was made evident by a great number of foreign attendants invited to the SILCC 
Forum and the broad media coverage they received. More recently, some nation-themed special 
events, such as 2016 Netherlands Day and 2017 Italy Day, were held during the Forum to 
highlight these international participants.  
The prominence of international players was not unique to the SILCC considering the 
significance of foreign direct investment in China’s urban development since the economic 
reform. But their role started shifting as environmental concerns were increasingly integrated 
into development activities. International actors played a more strategic role than providers of 
financial support and technical assistance under the agenda of climate change. In particular, is 
argued that the recent rapid development of eco-cities in China was characterized by policy 
mobility that “introduces various eco-city imagineering and environmental technologies from 




In the meanwhile, these actors functioned as a window showing China’s commitment to 
tackling climate change to the international community. Under the legally binding global climate 
agreement and the moral overtones of carbon mitigation, climate-related activities have an 
impulse to be seen. In the planning of the SILCC, a ‘showcase’ was explicitly established as a 
major goal of the project. Letting the international community know was also a good way to 
attract the central government’s attention and support, as it was the national governments that 
stood on the frontiers of climate negotiations and faced an urge to demonstrate their 
commitments. 
By re-conceptualizing the spatial scope of urban development’s environmental impact on a 
global scale, the discourse of carbon reduction redefines the legitimacy and accountability of a 
city’s development activities.  `. As While and colleagues (2010, p.76) argue, the emerging 
low-carbon polity predicated on carbon control introduces “a new set of values into state 
regulation”. This explained why the participation of international actors were so important and 
accentuated in the SILCC. These actors together constituted an emblem of Shenzhen’, or even 
China’s, shifting development ideology that corresponded with the new values inserted by the 
global concern over climate change.  
The strategic role of international actors could also be understood from a perspective of 
competitive cities. In an age characterized by many new concerns, such as The Limits to Growth, 
peak oil and climate change, it has been increasingly recognized that cities as strategic sites for 




constraints. A city must develop corresponding skills and capacities to overcome such 
constraints to guarantee a bright and sustainable future. Against this background, the skills and 
capacities to overcome ecological constraints become “a new dimension of cities’ competitive 
positioning” (Hodson & Marvin, 2009, p.207).  
Competitive positioning was of particular importance given the fact that the city of 
Shenzhen was highly dependent upon inward investment to drive economic growth and the 
SILCC was aimed at further stimulating the city’s global competitiveness. The municipal 
government wanted to use this particular project as well as many other ‘green’ characters of 
Shenzhen, such as a good air quality and the prevalence of green buildings, to conduct city 
branding. As Jonas and colleagues (2011) argue, the new urban politics focusing on carbon 
control reshape cities’ place promotion strategies for competing for mobile capital. According to 
some commentators (e.g. Bailey, 2007; Lohmann, 2001, 2008), this reflects a less than 
progressive side of the new low-carbon urban polity. Local authorities’ use an advantage in 
carbon management to stand out in the competition between cities follows the exact growth 
pathways of neoliberal competition state.  
Nevertheless, the two rationales behind the SILCC’s facing outward, including a claim to 
environmental ethics in its development values and a demonstration of its competitive 
advantages, should not be read as standing opposite to each other. Indeed, the persistent mindset 
of competitive cities did not necessarily deter the progressive potential of the carbon-reduction 




development activities. With redefined legitimacy and accountability of local places’ 
development practices under the dominant discourse of carbon reduction, a race-to-the-bottom 
strategy of loosening environmental requirements for inter-city competition can hardly help a 
place to win out. What is desirable for a city is not only inward investment enabled by the 
mobility of capital, but also a good image necessitated by the moral imperative and political 
correctness entailed in carbon reduction. 
To obtain attention, applause, and engagement from the international community, the project 
proponents strategically organized a variety of events at home and abroad. The most important 
one was the annul SILCC Forum and its side events, when international actors from public, 
private and the third sectors were invited to deliver speeches, exhibit products or disseminate 
information. The preparation period for the Forum also provided an exclusive time window to 
suspend existing conflicts between different parties, which were a major obstacle to project 
implementation. With the establishment of a short-term goal of “successfully holding the event”, 
a temporary consensus might be reached to give rise to more effective cooperation. This 
explained why the executers of the SILCC called the Forum as “the most effective precipitant”. 
Many other events effectively involved the international community in the SILCC. For 
example, the project proponents arranged a meeting between Netherlands Consulate-General in 
Guangzhou and vice Mayor of Shenzhen on the Third International Conference on Next 
Generation Infrastructure Systems for Eco-cities, during which the ECO-2-ZONE plan was 




Low Carbon City collaboration document signed between the two countries. In addition, the 
proponents organized two international low-carbon-themed architecture and urban design 
competitions to present the SILCC to a broader professional audience. They also provided a 
venue for international organizations like the World Bank and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organizations to hold meetings and conferences in the SILCC.  
These events served as platforms and channels to disseminate the project to the global 
society. At the same time, they created an opportunity for the strategic alliance to be visible and 
expand toward the international community. Through these events, the discourse of carbon 
reduction and the rhetoric of a low-carbon city was revived and reinforced. As a result, 
‘low-carboness’ and ‘new urbanization’ became people’s first impression of Pingdi as well as the 
SILCC. As the SILCC depended upon a discursive strategy to thrive, it needed to be talked about 
as much as possible. Strategic events made an ideal arena for such talks to take place, as they 
created the sites, specific topics, speakers as well as the audience at one time. Given that 
alliances and discourse are entangled and inseparable and thus have to 'work together' for 
a project to be successful, strategic events provide a mechanism to strengthen these two elements 
both separately and as an integrative system. 
In addition to the self-organized events, the proponents also took advantage of many 
international events, such as the Paris United Nations Climate Change Conference and the New 
York World Cities Summit Mayors Forum, to promote the SILCC overseas. The narrative of a 




concern over climate change was more likely to arouse a broad audience than other objectives of 
the SILCC, such as creating knowledge sector jobs and real estate development. By referring to a 
global agenda of carbon mitigation to contextualize what was going on in Pingdi, the project 
proponents successfully brought the SILCC to a common ground and an expanded reservoir of 
potential members to form its strategic alliance. 
6.5. Institutionalization of strategic alliance 
While strategic events reinforced and expanded the alliance surrounding the SILCC and 
gave rise to increasing short-term concerted efforts, they had far less power in maintaining this 
alliance or good relations between different allies. The strategic alliance needed to be stabilized 
to sustain a facilitating effect on the project. In fact, this was a lesson that the project proponents 
learned as early as the Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation plan stagnated in the absence of an 
agreed cooperative scheme. Therefore, as they carried on the project under a new framework of 
carbon reduction, many efforts were made to institutionalize the strategic alliance within the 
existing government administrative system. 
The first step taken by the project proponents was the establishment of an inter-departmental 
taskforce, the SILCC leadership group, within the municipal government as the decision-making 
body and coordinating platform for the project. The ad hoc leadership group was a sign of the 
priority status of the SILCC. It also signaled that the municipal government had replaced the 
district government of Longgang to lead the SILCC with full commitment. Subsequently, two 




organizational foundation for the project. This institutional arrangement further clarified the 
leading role of the municipal government and its relationship with other allies.  
The institutional arrangement was aimed not only at enhancing the stability of the strategic 
alliance, but also producing a particular, hierarchical relationship within it. In a general 
government-led large project, a hierarchical relationship is a useful tool to ensure smooth 
dynamics between multiple public and quasi-public actors. It stimulates related officials’ 
incentive to signify their political achievement in front of the people they are responsible to.  
A hierarchical relationship between different participants was of particular importance for 
the SILCC as a project themed around climate change. Climate-related affairs composed a 
comparatively nascent field of governance in China that was subject to inter-departmental 
competition, fragmentation and overlap. Moreover, the SILCC and many climate initiatives alike 
had an experimental nature, and there were no established evaluation mechanisms or indicators 
to judge its success. Under these circumstances, a belief that what was done was sure to be ‘seen’ 
and taken into account for their performance evaluation rather than being neglected in the 
complex governing landscape encouraged related officials’ commitment.  
In addition to these organizational structures, a new set of revenue allocation schemes were 
proposed to further incentivize particular allies to invest in the SILCC. For example, according to 
the scheme of ‘city-district co-sponsorship’, a joint venture between city- and district-level local 
government financing vehicles (LGFVs) would be established to invest in the building of the 




proposed a supplementary scheme of ‘enclosed land operation’ to promote the city-level LGFV’s 
incentive to carry out land development. Under this framework, the SSEZCDC was enticed to 
make a large proportion of investment in the Pilot Zone by the aspiration to land revenues or 
even free allocation of land.  
In practice, the revenue allocation schemes turned out to be a better predictor of allies’ 
performance than the organizational arrangements. For example, as Longgang’s LGFV failed to 
make investment in the Pilot Zone due to financial shortage of the time, the ‘city-district 
co-sponsorship” became merely a metaphor of the superior-subordinate relationship between the 
two levels of government. To get land revenues of its own, the district government of Longgang 
even made haste to lease land to some businesses while the SILCC land use plan and industry 
admittance guidelines were still being drafted. Part of these businesses were engaged in 
conventional manufacturing and would apparently unfit for the industry admittance guidelines 
to-be. In this regard, the district government was pursuing its own economic benefits in sacrifice 
of the SILCC’s general goal of de-carbonization and the organizational objective of the 
‘city-district co-sponsorship’. 
Another example of the stronger predictive power of revenue allocation schemes than 
organizational arrangements was the SSEZCDC. As one of the ‘2’ in the ‘1+2+N’ structure, the 
SSEZCDC was one of the most important players and motivated by the scheme of ‘enclosed land 
operation’. It actually operated as the single public investor and land developer in the early phase 




But when the Leadership Group held off fulfilling its promise in the face of increasing political 
risks associated with free land allocation and favorable land leases, the SSEZCDC similarly held 
off making investment and undertaking land development. A decreasing level of commitment of 
the SSEZCDC was also indicated by its shifting role from an organizer to a co-organizer and 
then total disappearance in the SILCC Forum. In spite of the official establishment of the 
‘1+2+N’ structure, the SSEZCDC adjusted the degree of engagement based on its up-to-date 
calculation of the project.  
The institutionalization of strategic alliances did not guarantee full commitment or concerted 
actions. The inner dynamism was a result of expected allocation of costs and benefits as well as 
the power relations between the allies. While this is not unique to a project framed as a 
low-carbon city, the carbon-reduction discourse has profound implications for the cost-benefit 
calculations. In particular, urban activities are increasingly connected to specific accounting of 
carbon emissions and then governed under a logic of carbon control. Under this trend of 
“carbonisation of urban governance”, speculative carbon costs are attached to different forms of 
economic activities and social intervention in strategic calculations (Rice, 2010, p.930, emphasis 
in original; see also While et al., 2010).  
The calculations are further complicated by the varying values of ‘carbon reduction’ to 
different actors as well as uncertainty of the value of ‘carbon’ in and of itself. Taking the SILCC 
as an example, politicians and public officials found a comparatively straightforward formula to 




record. For Pingdi’s manufacturing establishments, especially those engaged in the traditional 
sectors, the discourse was first a threat to their profitability or even existence. Then they 
evaluated its effect and took response with respect to the new industry admittance guidelines and 
the carbon trading scheme set by the newly established Shenzhen Emission Exchange. The 
calculations were, however, more ambiguous for the SSEZCDC. Being a state-owned enterprise, 
the SSEZCDC had a double goal of economic profitability and political achievement, and 
therefore the new agenda of carbon reduction needed to be seen from both economic and 
political perspectives. Mitigation is by no means a purely environmental issue. Indeed, concerns 
about carbon control blur the boundaries between the conventionally conceptualized separate 
economic and environmental spheres of urban politics, resulting in a more tangled foundation of 
strategic calculations (While et al., 2010).  
As the altered calculative basis had inconsistent effects on different actors, the 
carbon-reduction discourse affected the strategic alliance in two contradictory ways. Framing the 
project as a low-carbon city both facilitated the assemblage of alliance by virtue of its mobilizing 
power through interpretive flexibility and, at the same time, placed additional challenges to the 
cooperation between different allies due to their divergent calculations of carbon as a concept 
and materiality. Taken together, the alliance formed around the discourse of carbon reduction 





To sum up, this section examined how a strategic alliance was formed, sustained, and 
reconfigured to promote the project in Pingdi under a shifting discourse from regional 
cooperation to carbon reduction and new urbanization. The discourse of carbon reduction and, in 
particular, the framework of a low-carbon city presented a superior ability to attract central 
government support, maintain local coalitions, and entice international attention and investment. 
As a result, the project was filled with more complicated dynamics and an altered calculative 
basis. The strategic alliance could not, however, ensure effective or coherent actions considering 
the multiple goals pursued by different allies as well as their divergent calculations of ‘carbon 
reduction’. To make the alliance really work, it is necessary to mediate these goals and 
calculations and to connect them with implementation of the project. Again, discourse was of 
particular importance in the processes of negotiating among various imperativeness and 
integrating environmental, political, economic, and social interests into the project. This will be 
the focus of the following section. 
6.6. Summary 
From Ping-Xin-Qing Regional Cooperation Demonstration Area to Shenzhen International 
Low-Carbon City to EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation Demonstration Project, Pingdi’s 
development was characterized by three different but related narratives over time. The shifting 
discourse attracted an ever-expanding strategic alliance, including public agencies across 
different levels of the government, professional institutions, private enterprises, foreign 




organizations. In addition to a full package of political, financial and technological resources, 
these actors, especially those with great prestige and visibility, also equipped the project with 
tremendous symbolic values. 
In spite of some resemblance to the “multilevel governance of climate change” (Bulkeley, 
2005; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; 2013; Rice, 2010), Shenzhen’s case presents a prominently 
hierarchical relationship within the strategic alliance and only through this relationship did 
different actors find a mutually understood way to cooperate. Under the circumstances, who was 
leading the project made a huge different. A turning point in Pingdi’s development resided in the 
replacement of the local district government by the municipal government of Shenzhen to lead 
and promote the project, which happened in parallel with the shifting discourse from regional 
cooperation to carbon reduction. Furthermore, the title of a low-carbon city enticed the central 
government whose attentions and supports substantially enhanced the project’s political status. 
As for the critical role of a project’s political status in recruiting resources, investment and 
preferential policies within China’s developmental context, the carbon-reduction discourse was 
of particular value considering its attractiveness to upper-level governments laden with 
obligatory mitigation targets. 
Discourse also mobilized non-state actors by creating different interests. For example, the 
emphasis on a low-carbon built environment enticed the IBR and Vanke, an architecture firm 
and a national real estate developer respectively, who were considered as advocates for green 




companies such as BYD Auto. Notably, these private actors as well as the involved NGOs were 
part of the hierarchy rather than independent actors outside the sphere of public authority. 
Moreover, a strategic relationship with the government, such as the personal relationships 
between the managers of Shenzhen Green Low Carbon Development Foundation, International 
Academy of Low Carbon Development (Shenzhen, China) as well as the IBR and the SILCC 
leadership group, turned out to be a strong predictor of the non-state actors’ sincere commitment. 
In Hunold and Dryzek’s (2005) terms, as all states are constrained by accumulation and 
legitimation imperatives, environmentalists have a better chance of achieving their goals if 
environmental protection can be understood as part of these imperatives rather than as goals that 
are in tension with these imperatives. 
Nevertheless, even the most established members of the strategic alliance were able to act 
against the general goal of the project. For example, the district government of Longgang, which 
was the founder and early leader of the project, rushed to introduce a group of enterprises into 
Pingdi for immediate rents prior to the enforcement of a more stringent industry admittance 
guidelines under the SILCC program. By contrast, in the face of unfulfilled favorable land leases, 
the SSEZCDC, the official sponsor and developer of the Pilot Zone, purposefully slowed down 
the progress of the project.  
Compared to the power of locating new members of the strategic alliance through innovative 
interests, discourse presented a limited ability to resolve the conflicting interests between an 




strategic alliance formed under an established discourse was volatile and sensitive to new 
discourses that indicated a changing landscape of interests and power distributions. Coherent 
action of the strategic alliance depended on at least three conditions, including established 
organizational structures and effective leadership, explicit instructions for different members to 
calculate their input and output, and a series of strategic events to stimulate and demonstrate their 
contributions.  
These requirements took on new significance under the discourse of carbon reduction, as 
climate change and carbon mitigation represented a still nascent arena of governance where 
many institutionalizing efforts were only experimental. More importantly, the agenda of carbon 
mitigation introduced an altered calculative basis with additional “carbon costs” attached to 
almost all kinds of economic and social activities. The calculations were further complicated by 
the divergent meaning of carbon reduction to different actors and the uncertain value of ‘carbon’ 
in and of itself. To make strategic alliances surrounding the carbon-reduction discourse really 
work, there is always a need for complementary strategies taking environmental, political, 








Chapter 7: Strategic Selectivity—From an Environmental Discourse to an Economic Discourse 
The development of Pingdi since the late 2000s was inspired by a variety of related but 
differentiating objectives such as clustering of high-tech industries, development of the 
infrastructure systems and the built environment, environmental improvement, and place 
promotion. These objectives were driven by a set of more fundamental and implicit goals, 
including economic restructuring and capital accumulation, land concessions from land 
development, and the commitment to addressing climate change. Being a project enabled by and 
requiring the support at all levels of the government, Pingdi’s development was subject to 
conflicting goals as authorities within and across different levels of the government gave distinct 
weights and/or time frames to different objectives, let alone the respective interests of various 
private and civil actors who formed the strategic alliance to push forward the project. 
To a large extent, it was the “low-carbon city” trope and the subsequent discourse 
surrounding carbon mitigation that harmonized these inconsistent goals and legitimized 
conventionally controversial activities such as land reclamation and favorable land leases within 
the political context of China’s urban development. This explained why the project built 
momentum only after the dominant narrative shifted from regional cooperation toward 
low-carbon-eco development. Consequently, it is imperative to ask how the carbon discourse 





I found that the result came through a process of operationalization, which represented “the 
political construction of objects to be governed” within local climate action (Rutland & Aylett, 
2008). Considering the government-led nature of the project, the operationalization reflected the 
state’s strategic selectivity to incorporate particular economic and social agendas into its climate 
action. In the meanwhile, the specific forms in which the notion of a low-carbon city was 
articulated also meant a strategic selectivity of investment and resource allocation as well as 
regulatory power. Now let us take a closer look at the various strategic selectivities achieved 
through the decarbonization discourse and their implications for the project. 
7.1. Conceptualization of low-carbon industry  
Low-carbon industry was the first and most prominent presentation of the notion of a 
low-carbon city. Actually, the phrases of “low-carbon economy” and “low-carbon emerging 
industry” appeared for the first time in the earlier Ping-Xin-Qing regional cooperation plan 
where the concept of low-carbon industry had narrowly drawn boundaries and referred 
specifically to the electronic commerce, new energy and biopharmaceutical sectors. The value of 
low-carbon industry was articulated primarily as “a new growth pole” with no reference to the 
climate or any environmental agenda. In this regard, low-carbon industry was an alternative 
name for strategic industry, which had been a prevalent concept in China’s economic policy 
discourse for years. Low-carbon industry was a calling of the industries wanted, and this label 




With the emergence of the low-carbon-eco-development storyline, the conceptualization of 
low-carbon industry took more environmental factors into account. Indicators relating to climate 
change, such as ratio of GDP to carbon dioxide emissions and energy consumption, were 
established as the goal of the SILCC. In addition, the scope of the industries falling into the 
“low-carbon industry” category was expanded to include the sectors of environmental protection, 
low-carbon services, high-end manufacturing, and aerospace as well as the previously targeted 
new energy and health sectors.  
In spite of the designation of these sectors, it was hard to tell immediately which enterprises 
engaged in the low-carbon industry and thus qualified to locate in the SILCC. As the 
organization responsible for recruiting tenants and signing leases with them, the SSEZCDC had 
to gain the approval of the SILCC leadership group on every single tenant application, which 
involved an opaque and unpredictable review process. To a large extent, it was within the 
leadership group’s discretion whether an enterprise could come to the SILCC.  
The right of defining which business was and which was not low-carbon gave the SILCC 
leadership group and the municipal government the power of including and excluding particular 
enterprises in Pingdi. Furthermore, the leadership group was able to include particular enterprises 
through manipulating the official industry admittance guidelines. For example, the recently 
added item of “3-D printing” in the “low-carbon industry” was to accommodate Weisteck which 
was a manufacturer of 3-D printers and related products. Similarly, the sectors of high-end 




contribution to the environment might be ambiguous. The only reason for their presence in the 
industry admittance guidelines was that the leadership group had identified particular enterprises 
in these sectors. For general enterprises which lacked such endorsement or preference of the 
leadership group, the definition of “low-carbon industry” in the industry admittance guidelines 
might be extraordinarily strict.  
Alongside the shifting industrial composition, there was a subtler but more profound change 
in the government’s management of economic development. Traditionally, the government used 
a mix of administrative and market measures to introduce the desired industries and businesses 
into its jurisdiction. On one hand, government officials proactively engaged in activities of 
investment and business promotion (“zhao shang yin zi”) to identify and attract businesses that 
would bring large amounts of investment, GDP, and jobs. On the other hand, the market auction 
of land leasehold let the bidders with the highest financial abilities to become developers and 
tenants in an area. Although an administrative approval system was in place and notorious for its 
redundancy and bureaucracy, such interventions never challenged capital accumulation as the 
highest priority in urban development. In particular, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
scheme, which was the most important preventative measure to regulate environmental outcomes 
of development, was restrained by weak implementation (Ma & Ortolano, 2000).  
The low-carbon industry requirement reintroduced a focus on the environmental 
considerations in the development of Pingdi. As the shifting industrial composition indicated, the 




More remarkably, the low-carbon industry requirement strengthened the government’s 
regulatory power as it selectively placed the ‘low-carbon’ tag onto particular industries and 
businesses. As While et al. (2010) argue, the state takes a more active and directed role in 
regulating the environmental inputs and outputs of economic and social activities under the new 
low-carbon urban politics.  
In a top-down political system like China, the state’s role is not only more active and 
directed but also more strategic in light of the massive interpretive flexibility of the 
carbon-reduction discourse and the disproportionate discursive power of the state. For example, 
the definition of the scope of low-carbon industry was the municipal government’s strategic 
decision to build a particular business profile and economic structure in Pingdi. There were 
definitely numerous industrial sectors associated with equally low or lower carbon dioxide 
emissions beyond this scope, but the state used its discursive power to establish and justify its 
selection. 
Considering that the selection would result in particular economic and environmental 
outcomes, the state prescribed a particular portfolio of economic and environmental development 
and then a particular economy-environment relationship when it defined what ‘low-carbon’ was. 
In this light, the carbon-reduction discourse reinforced the connections between what have been 
treated as separate economic/extra-economic or economic/environmental spheres of urban 
politics (Jessop, 1997) and created a new source of authority for the state to impose its 




governable aspect of the environment (Rice, 2010), but a trope to make other aspects of 
economic and social life governable.  
7.2. Operationalizing the carbon discourse 
Similar to the designation of low-carbon industry, the state could also selectively place the 
‘low-carbon’ tag onto different entities, technologies, products, and lifestyles. This labeling 
behavior was essentially the operationalization of the discourse of carbon reduction. Notably, a 
wide-ranging operationalization, including but not limited to river restoration and waterfront 
redevelopment, green building design, new waste and energy systems and a carbon-trading 
mechanism, distinguished the storyline of low-carbon-eco development from that of regional 
cooperation.  
The carbon discourse offered a higher capacity to promote Pingdi’s development than the 
previous discourse of regional cooperation partly because of the interpretive flexibility of ‘low 
carbon’ and the openness to diverse operationalization. Previously, designers of the 
Ping-Xin-Qing plan conceptualized ‘regional cooperation’, first and foremost, in terms of 
industrial development almost irrespective of environmental performance or other factors 
associated with the area’s standard of living. Under such a conceptualization, Pingdi would be at 
best envisaged as a flourishing industrial enclave with extraordinary political commitment and 
public recognition.  
The diverse operationalization of the carbon discourse reconfigured Pingdi’s identity as a 




industries was still a top priority. For example, river restoration and waterfront redevelopment 
delineated a thriving public space for recreation and the improved access to public transit 
promised more convenient commutes from and to the city center and thus more job opportunities 
for local residents. Expressing the carbon discourse into different operational terms allowed the 
designers of the SILCC, who were mostly found in the public sector, to identify and address a 
variety of local development issues under a single project. In other words, the process of 
discourse operationalization enabled the low-carbon city project to reflect the state’s strategic 
selectivity of environmental concerns in relation to other goals. 
The way in which the discourse was operationalized had profound implications for the 
outcomes of the SILCC. Different operational forms always meant strikingly different things on 
the ground. Operationalizing carbon reduction as energy-efficient household appliances and as 
improved access to public transit involved very different actors, actions and politics. In particular, 
operationalization of a discourse affected the SILCC in at least three ways. First, as the earlier 
discussion on strategic alliance showed, a particular operational form determined who can and 
should be included in or excluded from the project. The configuration of strategic alliance in turn 
meant particular political status of the project and resources available for implementation.  
Secondly, a particular operationalization implied the criteria by which the project should be 
evaluated. For example, under the low-carbon industry theme, focus was largely on how many 
new nationally certified high-tech enterprises were located in the SILCC. Many indicators 




GDP, were established to monitor the environmental outcomes of the area’s productive activities. 
Similarly, the object of a low-carbon lifestyle introduced a new set of indicators, such as the 
scale of energy-efficient household appliances and household energy consumption, on-site waste 
recycling capacity, and the number of charging stations for electric vehicles. Different indicators 
provided varying principles for organizing and managing the development of the SILCC. The 
project proponents also used the indicators to promote the SILCC in search of political support 
and public recognition. Considering the SILCC’s prominent status among numerous similar 
activities in China, the established indicators in the SILCC shaped how the government 
evaluated these local efforts as well as how the public conceived of low-carbon cities in the 
long-run.  
Thirdly, a particular operational form indicated a specific combination of economic and 
environmental development and therefore a particular economy-environment relationship. The 
decarbonization discourse has penetrated the boundaries between the economic and 
environmental spheres, and the operationalization of this discourse specifies the composition and, 
in particular, to what extent one could be negotiated for the good of the other. The low-carbon 
industry operationalization was illustrative of a consistent priority to remove low-end 
manufacturing industries from the SILCC and Shenzhen’s ultimate goal of economic 
restructuring. The green building operationalization also sustained the local government’s 




sector. These two examples demonstrate how the goal and manner of economic development was 
retained and reshaped under the decarbonization discourse.  
Taken together, operationalization of the concept of a low-carbon city had a reciprocal 
relationship with the state’s strategic selectivity in urban development. On one side, the wide 
operationalization incorporated many different spheres of the urban life into the climate policy, 
creating a new situation where environmental concerns permeated every corner of the society. In 
other words, the decarbonization discourse accelerates the trend of “strategic urbanism” whereby 
addressing climate change is more thoroughly integrated into wider urban agendas (Bulkeley & 
Betsill, 2013). On the other side, the establishment of certain operational forms and the 
ignorance of the alternatives reinforced the state’s strategic selectivity. The state can adjust the 
focus and degree of intervention according to its judgment of the urgency of the climate problem 
in relation to other pressures and demands. In addition, the state’s strategic selectivity gained 
new ground thanks to the universally accepted rightness of carbon mitigation to alleviate the 
global climate crisis. 
7.3. The consistent priorities 
Various operationalizations of the shifting discourse revealed the consistent priority given to 
industrial development and real estate development by the SILCC. This was no surprise 
considering how these activities contributed to the local governments in both short- and 
long-term, on- and off-budget revenues which were a crucial source of institutional capacity for 




government through new regulations such as the restriction on the conversion of farmland to 
urban use and a stricter approval system on Economic and Technological Development Zones 
(ETDZ)67 and industrial parks. Furthermore, the disputes arising from land reclamation and an 
increasing number of public protest against industrial siting have posed extra challenge to new 
industrial and real estate development.  
Pingdi faced a distinct set of problems. For example, its proposal to focus on high-tech 
industries failed to secure the support of the upper-level government in Shenzhen. In addition, 
attracting these industries to Pingdi would be another challenge considering its disadvantageous 
location. Real estate development would be by no means an easier task. The land available for 
new construction was limited as a result of the historical scattered development, and applications 
for rural-to-urban land conversion were extremely difficult in the current policy context. Under 
                                                 
67 The National Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) have been a critical strategy in China’s 
economic reform to encourage foreign direct investment. The first National ETDZs were established in 1984 in 14 
coastal cities. A steady development was seen in the first two decades followed by a rapid expansion since the 
mid-2000. By 2016, there has been a total of 219 National ETDZs across the country with a gross regional product of 
over 8 trillion China yuan (China Development Zones Yearbook, 2016). The failed ETDZs have, however, also 
incurred many negative externalities, such as overinvestment and overproduction in relation to industrial isomorphism, 
limited technological innovation, low-level environmental sustainability, corruption related to land allocation, and 
economic crimes and related social problems (Wei, 2015; Ding & Lichtenberg, 2011; Wong & Tang, 2005). Facing 
these problems, the State Council suspended the approval of national ETDZs in 2003 (No. 30 [2003] of the General 
Office of the State Council) and conducted assessment to revoke the status and the associated preferential policies for 




the circumstances, a new set of strategies and tools was needed to carry out the desired 
development. 
As the case unfolded, the project proponents resorted to an environmental discourse, and 
more specifically a rhetoric of a low-carbon city, to remove the obstacles to the planned 
industrial and real estate development. Ironically, development of these types were considered as 
the primary causes of environmental degradation in urban China and made the strongest case for 
low-carbon cities in the first place. So it is necessary to ask how these intuitively contradictory 
elements came together. 
In general, the SILCC incorporated these elements through conceptualizing an 
economy-environment relationship that was mutually beneficial. The idea was largely a result of 
the international collaboration with the Dutch actors. Actually, a reciprocal 
economy-environment relationship, the principal assumption underlying the ecological 
modernization thought, had dominated the environmental governance in advanced industrialized 
society for decades (Hajer, 1995; Mol, 1996). When it was first introduced by the Dutch 
consulting team in the ECO-2-ZONE plan, it opened up new possibilities for the local 
government in Pingdi to conceive its economic development.  
Based on the assumption that economic and ecological development were closely related 
and each reinforced the other, the ECO-2-ZONE plan proposed to utilize the natural and green 
qualities of the region to enhance its economic value. As the project was subsequently branded as 




reduction of carbon emissions. This move gave the discourse new urgency because of the 
pressing climate agenda. A connection was therefore built up between economic development 
and carbon mitigation. The next question was how the project proponents used this connection to 
promote their main goals of industrial transformation and property development. 
The first goal entailed replacing low-end manufacturing industries with high-tech industries 
and related service sectors. This consistent goal, however, was judged differently over time by 
the municipal government when different discourses dominated the project. For example, the 
phase-out of traditional manufacturing industries was seen as a threat of losing businesses to 
neighboring cities under the framework of regional cooperation; and, under the new framework 
of a low-carbon city, it was seen instead as an approach to city-level carbon mitigation in both 
technical and political terms. This change was a milestone in the SILCC’s development as how 
the municipal government perceived the local initiative predicted the political and financial 
resources to be allocated to the project, which largely determined its vitality. 
The favorable reading of the phase-out of low-end manufacturing came partly from the 
changed landscape of players in the project. In particular, the involvement of the Dutch 
consulting team in the ECO-2-ZONE plan and the government-to-government cooperation 
proposed by the Dutch government promised the municipal government considerable political 
credits. On the other part, the favorable reading was also related to Pingdi’s efforts to carbonize 
its development, which meant identifying specific development activities in relation to 




In particular, a wide range of development activities, such as the construction of a bike lane 
system and a Metro station, installation of solar powered street lights, spatial rearrangements of 
open space and urban forests as well as the establishment of low-carbon industries, were 
rearticulated in carbon terms in supplementary technical documents. This ‘carbon translation’ 
effectively blurred the boundaries between economic development and environmental 
improvement and provided new rationales for the development activities it aimed to conduct. As 
Bulkely and Betsill (2013) point out, addressing climate change has gradually turned into a more 
mainstream economic issue as well as a more strategic concern within urban authorities. 
Compared to the previous framework of regional cooperation that was characterized by an 
exclusive focus on economic growth, the framework of carbon mitigation provided a more 
concrete roadmap to economic development as well as to environmental improvement. Moreover, 
the carbon-reduction discourse gave Pingdi the privilege to block polluting businesses from its 
jurisdictions. Given the fact that these businesses were frequently engaged with traditional 
manufacturing and subject to low added values, economic growth and environmental 
improvement could be achieved at the same time through the industry filtering under the name of 
carbon mitigation.  
The second goal was stimulating real estate development and increasing extra-budgetary 
revenues through land leasing. The local government’s incentive for land development could not 
be overstated. In the regional cooperation plan, the lack of constructive land was described as the 




emergence and mainstreaming of the discourse of new urbanization. In contrast to the regional 
cooperation plan which proposed territorial annexation to supplement Pingdi’s limited land stock, 
the new plans moved the focus back to Pingdi and identified a new solution of redevelopment. 
In fact, it was the combination of the carbon-reduction and new urbanization frameworks 
that enabled large-scale real estate development. Specifically, the development was justified by 
the two agendas of redevelopment and green buildings. Under the new urbanization discourse, a 
new environmental problem of inefficient land uses was identified. Changing the existing land 
use pattern, which was most likely to happen through redevelopment, became an approach to 
environmental improvement that deserved support. In this sense, the establishment of the 
redevelopment agenda gave much legitimacy to the activities of land reclamation.  
This legitimacy was of tremendous significance for the SILCC as land reclamation was 
controversial in China’s political context and usually required additional rationales to carry out. 
As the case unfolded, only after land reclamation could land assemblage and the planned 
large-scale real estate development take place. In While et al.’s terms (2010, p.85), “discourses 
of climate change can be mobilized politically to justify social and technical fixes for states and 
capital that environmentalists might find unacceptable.”  
As land reclamation was justified under the redevelopment proposal, a particular form of 
master plan was drafted under the new rhetoric of ‘rolling-over development’ to diminish the 
land disputes that would have risen from the redevelopment processes. Specifically, the 




sub-areas rationalized a particular order of succession to (re)develop different blocks. This 
arrangement allowed land development to start with the parcels with minimum foreseeable 
disputes. As a result, the SILCC increased its constructive land stock by over 1.2 million square 
meters in the first two years.68 
To further accelerate the process, the SILCC organized several pilot projects around the 
practice of building retrofit which saved time and diminished possible conflicts over relocation 
compensation. The building retrofit followed an energy saving design to contribute to the 
SILCC’s target of one-hundred-percent certified green buildings. The green retrofit interrelated 
the three agendas of redevelopment, green buildings and carbon control and became a signature 
feature of the project. Even though a green building design had become a common element often 
found in China’s low-carbon cities, green retrofit was relatively rare as most of these low-carbon 
cities were “started from scratch.” This character therefore distinguished the SILCC from general 
low-carbon cities in the country, which explained the political attentions and international 
awards it received. 
The green retrofit rhetoric was also where the two discourses of carbon reduction and new 
urbanization converged. The combination of these two discourses further elaborated the 
economy-environment relationship as the ideological foundation of the SILCC. Besides 
interpreting the environment element as the global climate and carbon emissions, the new 
                                                 





discourses articulated the environment as land use patterns as well as the built environment. The 
expanded economy-environment relationship justified the the consistent priority given to 
property development activities.  
7.4. The weak carbonization 
A persuasive demonstration of a reciprocal economy-relationship was strengthened by 
numbers. With the shifting discourse from regional cooperation to carbon mitigation and new 
urbanization, numeric figures were frequently referred to in the ECO-2-ZONE plan and the 
operational plans. Compared with the previous plan of regional cooperation, these new plans 
were consistently characterized by a quantitative expression of the SILCC’s development 
rationales and goals. In particular, many carbon-themed indicators, such as carbon intensity, 
carbon sink, carbon footprint and carbon market, were established to quantify various economic 
and social activities. These efforts exemplified the emerging trend of “carbonization of urban 
governance”, where a linkage was built between the production of GHG emissions and specific 
urban activities (Rice, 2010, p.930; emphasis in original).  
The real achievement of this carbonization of urban governance would, however, depend on 
effective carbon inventories and monitoring. The SILCC master plan included a proposal for an 
on-site monitoring system and the task of designing and building the system was commissioned 
to the IBR, which was also responsible for all the green building designs as well as the operation 
of the Convention and Exhibition Center. The monitoring system turned out to have low priority. 




located, was completed in less than three months and opened in 2013 spring, the system was put 
in use only temporarily during the Forum till the mid-2016. Apparently, its symbolic value 
played a more important role than the practical value in the SILCC. 
Compared to the general speed of the project, the delayed implementation of a particular part 
of the project usually meant something special and deserved more attentions. In addition to the 
monitoring system, another part of the project, namely the industry admittance guidelines, went 
through a longer-than-usual preparation. The criteria were first proposed in 2012 and still 
underway by the late-2017. Theoretically, the criteria should have regulated the economic as 
well as environmental performance of incoming enterprises. In particular, the limits on carbon 
emissions and energy consumption should have been a major consideration in the admission 
decisions to achieve the ‘low-carbon’ character of the SILCC. 
Under the circumstances, the notion of low-carbon industries became the only official 
principle for industrial transformation. As discussed before, the notion was operationalized only 
as six vaguely defined sectors and the result of this vagueness was mixed. On one hand, a group 
of manufacturing enterprises became new tenants of the SILCC, although the business they 
engaged with failed to match any of the six categories under the ‘low-carbon industries’. The 
absence of established industry admittance guidelines allowed the district government in 
Longgang to lease land to these enterprises. In this case, the long-term goal of low-carbon 




On the other hand, as the SILCC leadership group defined low-carbon industry on a case 
base, it was entirely within the state’s discretion whether a particular enterprise would come, stay 
or leave. Therefore, the admission processes became more strategically selective to place the 
most prestigious enterprises such as the Fortune Global 500 companies like Panasonic and 
Philips and nationally certified high-tech enterprises like Royole and STCS in the area. In 
addition, the state could promote emerging industries by reconfiguring the ‘low-carbon 
industries”. A good example was the changing enumeration of high-end manufacturing, which 
was one of the six designated low-carbon industrial sectors. Manufacturing of artificial 
intelligence (AI) devices and appliances were recently added to the list as the AI sector 
witnessed rapid development with the central government’s support. Ironically, the absence of 
strict industry admittance guidelines and the vaguely defined low-carbon industries helped to 
achieve the state’s industrial transformation agenda as it constantly evolved.  
With the delay of emissions monitoring and target setting, the urgency of carbon mitigation 
was alleviated. The SILCC, therefore, obtained a great chance to go after a variety of agendas 
ranging from place promotion to real estate development. Rather than “a harder edge to state 
environmental regulation” through non-negotiable emissions target setting (While et al., 2010), 
the belated emissions monitoring system and the industry admittance guidelines represented the 
weak carbonization of urban governance, where the relationship between GHG emissions 
production and specific urban activities was built but at the same time obscured by incomplete 




The weak carbonization served the state’s strategic selectivity via increased legitimacy, 
which came from the apparently scientific nature of the measurement technologies. These 
technologies, however, were subject to incompletion and manipulation. Some commenters see a 
low-carbon polity as offsetting the ambiguity of sustainable development via non-negotiable 
target setting in contrast to the flexible interpretation of sustainability principles (While et al., 
2010; Slocum 2004). The SILCC case made it clear that this potential was subject to the weak 
carbonization and contingent upon the state’s changing strategic selectivity. 
7.5. The carbon exceptionalism 
The soft management of the carbon flow in the SILCC was also justified by the experimental 
nature of the project. Being a nascent practice in China’s urban development, a low-carbon city 
left abounding space for activities that had not previously been explicitly outlined. Accounting 
for urban affairs in carbon terms was just one of these activities and thus free from fixed norms. 
Activities that were more or less abnormal for a conventional urban context were further upheld 
by the rhetoric of new urbanization, which called for changes and reform rather than consistency 
and conformity. Moreover, the rhetoric of institutional innovation enabled the SILCC to 
institutionalize these informal activities and turned them into additional political significance. 
Under the circumstances, the SILCC witnessed some deviation from the regular 
development routine under Shenzhen’s planning laws. One recent example was the manipulation 
of the statutory plan requirement in carrying out the China EU Future City (CEFC) program, 




absence of an existing statutory plan, the conceptual/industrial development/detailed 
development control plan of the CEFC was designated as the substitution of a statutory plan for 
government review and approval purposes. Theoretically, there should be four plans under these 
titles. In particular, the detailed development control plan should be based on the statutory plan, 
and these two official plans should subsequently guide the project-specific conceptual plan and 
industrial development plan. The 4-in-1 plan essentially streamlined the planning and approval 
of the CEFC, thus facilitating the implementation of the SILCC. 
The CEFC program was but one example of the favorable treatment enjoyed by the SILCC. 
Since the emergence of the new urbanization discourse, especially after the designation as the 
flagship project of the EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation, the project took on a new identity. 
The accumulative political significance and symbolic values created by the carbon-reduction and 
new urbanization discourses assigned an exceptional status to the SILCC. This exceptional status 
allowed the 4-in-1 plan, which violated the general rules for planning administrative approval, 
and other informal proceedings alike. The government-led nature of the SILCC, admittedly, 
precipitated the approval of the 4-in-1 plan, because the author of the plan was a district-level 
branch of the city planning agency that was responsible for reviewing and approving it. 
Nevertheless, government agencies must present adequate rationale to start the informal 
proceedings. 
The title of a low-carbon city provided much of the rationale. The earlier discussion on 




the legitimacy and accountability of a city’s development activities, thus giving rise to new 
actors and new relationships between different actors. Accordingly, the redefined legitimacy and 
accountability should be reflected in new institutions and principles, which might contradict 
established norms. In other words, urban activities aimed at reducing carbon emissions are 
special and the ways in which they take place might be exceptional.  
This sense of carbon exceptionalism, where the contribution to carbon mitigation exempts 
particular urban activities from rigorous enforcement of related regulations, allowed the project 
to bypass normal due diligence. Many obligatory review processes, such as the planning 
approval and building permit allocation for new development and renewal activities, business 
registration of new enterprises and business loan authorization, were altered or streamlined. As a 
result, the implementation of the SILCC was expedited by a customized and simplified approval 
and administration scheme. The carbon exceptionalism hereby demonstrates the privilege of a 
carbon-themed project to challenge the established rules and principles that govern urban 
development in a particular context.  
In this regard, development projects of this kind can potentially be disembedded from its 
situated urban context and the prevalent development culture. The consequence of the carbon 
exceptionalism is not, however, necessarily related to non-growth, de-growth, low consumption 
or alternative growth strategies (North 2009) as seen in radical approaches such as the UK’s 
Transition Town movement (see Hopkins 2008) or the low impact developments outlined in 




deregulation and its outcomes are more likely to reflect and serve the state’s priorities. When the 
state placed a high priority on economic growth as the case in the SILCC, the carbon 
exceptionalism worked to break down certain regulatory barriers for such growth.  
The economic growth that was witnessed in Pingdi through the SILCC presented some new 
characters than the traditional new towns emerging from China’s urbanization processes. For 
example, the growth entailed shrinking environmental costs in terms of energy consumption and 
carbon emissions per unit of GDP. In addition, a more just distribution of the growth was 
achieved through transforming indigenous residents who collectively owned the land into 
shareholders of some new enterprises. As the increased income for local residents drove a 
consistent increase in the area’s total retail sales of consumer goods, the SILCC largely 
prevented the problematic phenomena of “ghost cities” that prevailed in China’s “phantom 
urbanization” (Sorace & Hurst, 2016).  
The pro-growth nature of the carbon exceptionalism in the SILCC and potentially other 
China’s low-carbon cities does not necessarily maintain the exact growth pathways in China’s 
urban history. The “new urban politics” reconfigured by the environmental discourse of carbon 
reduction provides alternative mindset and tools for development (Jonas et al., 2011), which 
might lead to dramatically different outcomes economically, environmentally and socially. Some 
commentators draw attention to this progressive potential of the politics of carbon control to 
“open up alternative socio-economic possibilities for localities and regions locked into the 




“the state entrepreneurialism” in China’s urban development represents a very distinct 
socio-economic system (Wu, 2016), the capability of the carbon exceptionalism to challenge the 
conventional growth pathways is still possible. 
This progressive potential indicates a dialectical relationship between the carbon 
exceptionalism and the strategic selectivity of the state. Carbon exceptionalism is conditional 
upon the state’s giving up regulatory power, and the decision as to what extent and in which field 
the regulatory power is retracted is inherently selective. Exemption from a land use review and 
exemption from an environmental impact assessment would be far different for the 
implementation and outcomes of the SILCC, and the choice made for this project reflected the 
local state’s more tolerance for an imperfect land use pattern that might have resulted from the 
former than for disastrous environmental outcomes from the latter. Allocating different priorities 
to different agendas is the essence of the state’s strategic selectivity. In this sense, a particular 
form of the carbon exceptionalism reflects the state’s strategic selectivity in a special temporal 
and spatial context and then works toward the realization of this selectivity. 
In the meanwhile, strategic selectivity is subject to change under various external and 
internal dynamism, and the concern about carbon emissions is a critical source of these 
dynamism. For example, when the then Premier Wen Jiabao made a 2020 carbon intensity 
commitment on the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit, carbon management became a top 




carbon mitigation and it was under one of these programs, the Low-Carbon City Pilot Program, 
that Shenzhen was incentivized to carry out the SILCC.  
Moreover, the top-down allocation of obligatory emissions mitigation target reshaped the 
previous GDP-oriented performance evaluation criteria for local governments, posing increasing 
imperativeness to carbon control relative to economic growth (Qi et al., 2013). The new 
dynamism under the “carbon control regime” forces public agencies across different levels of 
government to reflect and redefine their priorities, a process through which the state’s strategic 
selectivity is fundamentally reshaped (Jonas et al., 2011). 
In addition, carbon exceptionalism has influenced the state’s arrangement for different 
priorities via “institutional voids” (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). Despite being formed ad hoc to 
streamline the process of low-carbon transitions, the purposeful institutional vacuum provides 
opportunities for governance innovations that have an extended impact. For instance, under the 
streamlined planning review process, the land uses in the SILCC were more a result of the 
negotiation between the authorities responsible for the project and the villagers who collectively 
owned the land than a mandatory government command. This situation induced the development 
of many community-owned enterprises, which subsequently formed joint ventures with the 
government and private enterprises to carry out real estate development. Such community 
development was initially not a priority on the SILCC’s agenda. However, when the government 




and co-opt than a group of individual villagers, community-owned enterprises were encouraged 
and their interests seriously considered.  
The discussion of the carbon exceptionalism further expands our understanding of the 
relationship between policy discourse and the strategic selectivity of the state. As discussed 
earlier, the state can harness discourse to justify and promote its consistent priorities and goals. 
In particular, the carbon-reduction discourse has a compounding effect on the state’s strategic 
selectivity. While it extends intervention in environmental affairs through a process of 
operationalization where a new set of carbon-related indicators and standards are established; 
non-environmental agendas can be also facilitated through the combination of additional 
legitimacy and the weak carbonization. This largely explained why the SILCC was able to 
encompass a wide range of divergent agendas in a single project. 
More importantly, a new policy discourse can also pose challenges to the preexisting 
institutional structures and social organization. To achieve its goals, the state needs to provide 
innovative institutional arrangements and to empower new social groups, and these behaviors 
might open up alternative socio-economic possibilities. This is why the growth-oriented nature 
of the carbon exceptionalism did not stem the progressive potential of the carbon-reduction 
discourse to yield the development of community capacity as well as a more just distribution of 
the growth. The state reconceptualizes its priorities, consciously or even unconsciously, under an 
emerging policy discourse. As a result, the strategic selectivity of the state will be constantly 





Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 discussed the role of discourse in building a low-carbon city in 
Shenzhen, China. It shows that a shifting discourse shaped the nature, process and outcomes of 
this effort through two channels, namely strategic alliance (ad hoc or casual cooperation 
between different entities and actors) and strategic selectivity (tools and tactics designed to 
prioritize specific activities in accordance with the state’s priorities of a particular time). In 
practice, strategic alliance and strategic selectivity could be results of both purposeful design and 
unexpected occurrences. As a result, they might obstruct as well as facilitate the making of the 
low-carbon city. Also, as the products of a particular discourse of a specific time, strategic 
alliance and strategic selectivity are fluid with their effects contingent and accumulative. 
The extraordinary mobilizing power of the carbon-reduction discourse mostly came from its 
interpretive flexibility, which was in turn a result of unsettled indicators to represent the 
significance of carbon emissions for local well-being as well as the currently incomplete 
inventory of local carbon dioxide emissions. The interpretive flexibility also accounted for the 
versatility of the carbon-reduction discourse to promote both environmental and 
non-environmental agendas as components of the state’s strategic selectivity. As the 
development project proceeded, it was driven by a variety of goals, such as regional integration, 
clustering of high-tech industries and the service sector, infrastructure development, 
environmental beautification and competitiveness of the place. To put it simply, the title of a 




More remarkably, it was the discourse surrounding carbon mitigation that enabled the 
project proponents within the government to exercise favorable land leases and large-scale land 
reclamation, both of which had came to be considered highly controversial and politically 
sensitive in China’s developmental context. These activities effectively attracted new actors who 
were aspired by the lucrative land development with their investment to the SILCC. This 
explains why the project built momentum after being framed as a low-carbon city, as only with 
large financial resources can a mega-project like the one in Pingdi be carried out.  
In many ways, the label “low-carbon city” served as a rhetoric tool to justify the local state’s 
strategic selectivity and to accumulate political, financial and institutional resources to realize 
this selectivity. Not surprisingly, high priority was placed on economic growth through capital 
accumulation. In particular, the two primary goals that gave rise to the project and constantly 
steered the implementation under the shifting discourse, including the phase-out of low-end 
manufacturing industries and land speculation, were substantially achieved through the rhetoric 
of a low-carbon city and the general discourse of de-carbonization.  
The discourse played a facilitating role via three spheres associated with the ideological, 
operational and institutional worlds. In the ideological sphere, the discourse of carbon reduction 
broke down the conventional wisdom about the trade-off between environmental and economic 
objectives and conceptualized a concerted and reciprocal economy-environment relationship. 
The ecological modernization thought behind this conceptualization, which had long dominated 




first introduced by the Dutch consulting team in their ECO-2-ZONE plan and provided the 
project proponents new ideas to conceive and interpret their project. Subsequently, a direct link 
was built between development practice and environmental protection in general and carbon 
mitigation in particular. 
In the operational sphere, a new set of indicators were established to evaluate development 
activities in the SILCC both qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, industrial 
development would be controlled by both the descriptive industry admittance guidelines and the 
amount of energy consumption and carbon emissions per unit of output. By these means, the 
leadership group could precisely predict the area’s industrial composition and development 
trajectory. Aside from these indicators, the project also introduced a process of strategic 
operationalization where a discourse was articulated as particular objects so that the legitimacy 
and urgency underneath the discourse was attached to the related actions. For example, green 
retrofit as an operational form of the new urbanization and the carbon-reduction discourses 
justified large-scale redevelopment activities and land reclamation. Through strategic 
operationalization, the leadership group successfully incorporated many non-environmental as 
well as environmental agendas into the SILCC in accordance with the state’s strategic selectivity. 
In the institutional sphere, a strategy of weak carbonization in combination with a sense of 
carbon exceptionalism provided the SILCC a great chance to stay away from non-negotiable 
emissions target setting and to streamline the due diligence processes as regularly required for 




carbon reduction were not only possible but precipitated in the deliberate ‘institutional voids’. 
Here we see a soft management of carbon emissions as “a matter of fact” and a hard exploitation 
of them as “a matter of concern” (Latour, 2004).  
While the carbon-reduction discourse promoted the state’s strategic selectivity that 
consistently placed a focus on economic growth, the progressive potential of this emerging 
discourse should not be overlooked. The SILCC witnessed the development of community 
organizations and a more just distribution of the outcomes of the growth. New social groups 
were empowered as well as institutional arrangement reconfigured to reflect the new urgency of 
carbon mitigation. In addition, the state reset its priorities in the development of the SILCC, 
purposefully or even by accident to manifest the distinctiveness of this low-carbon city in 
contrast to traditional new towns, a character that sustained the extraordinary resources allocated 
to the SILCC. In trying to be different, or even unprecedented, the low-carbon city reshaped the 
state’s strategic selectivity that incorporated a new carbon rationing. The new regime 
characterized by the discourse of carbon reduction would therefore provide alternative 
socio-economic possibilities for cities locked into the narrow growth pathways of urban 
entrepreneurialism. 
7.7. Linking to the previous chapter 
While the analysis in the above two chapters treated strategic alliance and strategic 
selectivity as two separate arenas where the discourse exerted its influence, there is a dialectical 




First, strategic alliance is an expression of the negotiable elements of the strategic selectivity. 
The state’s strategic selectivity evolves under the complex domestic dynamics and international 
influence. To entice an increasing number of actors, the leaders of the SILCC defined various 
new priorities in the urban development, such as public transport, electric vehicle facilities, green 
buildings and distributed energy resources. Each of these emerging priorities implied a particular 
configuration of environmental and non-environmental goals. Taken together, they reshaped the 
strategic selectivity of the state as governments sought to rebalance environmental and ecological 
goals with other forces, pressures and demands within the wider society. 
Not all elements of the state’s strategic selectivity are negotiable. For example, the focus on 
capital accumulation through real estate speculation was rarely, if ever, compromised. Indeed, 
inconsistent plans for land development and uncertain distribution of related revenues accounted 
for a large part of the instability of and the incoherent actions within the alliance. The conflicting 
interests in land also turned the so-called “1+2+N” organizational structure into a battlefield of 
power struggles between different entities, especially between different levels and sections of the 
government.  
The strategic selectivity is never a static attribute of the state or homogeneous across 
different spaces of the state. The real functioning of a strategic alliance to accomplish a 
government-led project is contingent upon a mutually understanding and acceptance of the 
ambitions of different members. Here the discourse of de-carbonization shows its magic. In the 




metropolitan development and regional development within the district-, city- and province-level 
governments, respectively. By reshaping the ways of 'seeing and knowing' the project, the 
carbon-reduction discourse mediated between diverging agendas and priorities of different allies. 
As a result, the strategic alliance as a collective presented an increasing willingness to negotiate 
and compromise.  
Second, the dominant strategic selectivity of a time is an expression of the power relations 
within and surrounding the strategic alliance. In spite of the increased likelihood of negotiation, 
the power relations within the strategic alliance was more resistant to change. The power 
relations reflected the inherent administrative hierarchy in China’s top-down system. While local 
authorities experimented with the idea of a low-carbon city in accordance with their existing 
agendas, it was only through the legitimacy, resources and the political status of a project 
designated by higher level government that these local initiatives were possible to flourish. In 
addition, it was only through a clear accountability system prescribed by the conventional 
administrative hierarchy that different members of the strategic alliance could cooperate in a 
smooth manner.  
The hierarchical relationship between different participants and stakeholders distinguishes 
China’s low-carbon cities and other local climate initiatives from the typical “multilevel 
governance” of climate change (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013). Considering the pivotal role of the 
central government, the viability of a low-carbon city is closely related to how they respond to 




low-carbon city need to mediate their objectives with those of higher levels of government. In 
this light, the emerging low-carbon cities is a state discursive project to facilitate the 
“eco-restructuring” whereby various local agents as well as a constellation of non-state actors 
seek innovative and contextual methods of realizing the state’s strategic selectivity (While et al., 
2010).  
Furthermore, the dialectical relationship between the strategic alliance and strategic 
selectivity in the SILCC revealed the complexity and contingency of this discursive project. 
Rather than a normative program with predefined goals and standards, a low-carbon city 
involves a continuous and contested process in which, depending on the imperativeness of both 
environmental and non-environmental agendas in a particular context, the state actively searches 





Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This study was organized around three questions: (1) How has the idea of low-carbon cities 
in China been implemented? (2) What has been the role of the state in this process? (3) How 
have the efforts toward low-carbon cities altered urban development institutions? It focused on 
how the framework of a low-carbon city helped to form a strategic alliance across different 
sectors to promote a local development project in Longgang, Shenzhen and how the state’s 
strategic selectivity was achieved through this project. The dominance of decarbonization 
discourse in urban governance introduced a new set of tools and norms into development 
activities and created new possibilities to reshape the state-society as well as the 
environment-economy relations.  
The purpose of the case analysis was to better understand how the discourse of carbon 
reduction in general and the framework of a low-carbon city in particular affected the goals, 
processes, and outcomes of a development initiative. In addition, it discussed how this emerging 
environmental discourse reconfigured the socio-political landscape of the growth-driven 
planning practice in Chinese cities. The dynamics observed in the case revealed the combined 
effect of an enduring top-down administrative system, a persistent planning ideology centered on 
growth, and a looming crisis of financial as well as ideological foundations for mega-projects.  
The following sections start with a summary of the findings that respond to the three 




world. Particular attention is directed to two sub-fields in urban policymaking: urban 
sustainability and urban entrepreneurialism. Finally, I contextualize these findings within a 
broader set of research interests and outline some of the limitations of this study. As well, some 
directions are offered for future research in related fields.  
8.1 Main findings  
The discursive nature of China’s low-carbon cities 
Regarding the first question about the implementation of the idea of “low-carbon cities” in 
China, I argue that the implementation in the SILCC featured a discursive project which has 
roots in the Chinese “campaign-style” enforcement of environmental law (Liu, Lo, Zhan, & 
Wang, 2015). While some commentators claim that state mitigation strategies, especially in 
terms of non-negotiable target setting and carbon emissions accounting and monitoring, mark a 
new stage of environmental governance characterized by “a harder edge on regulation” (While et 
al., 2010; Slocum, 2004; North, 2009), the current study reveals a “softer” side of carbon control. 
In the SILCC’s case, carbon was largely used as a conceptual resource to legitimize a series of 
development activities, leverage the capacity within the state across different levels of 
government, and entice a broad range of actors with intellectual, financial, technological and 
political inputs.  
The mobilizing power of the discourse of carbon reduction came from the interpretive 
flexibility through which a low-carbon city was articulated across a variety of objects such as 




energy-saving household appliances, and a waste incineration plant. These constructed objects, 
in aggregate, aroused a wide range of interests. In other words, positioning the project under the 
framework of a low-carbon city made it attractive to a broader audience both inside and outside 
the state. In addition, the discourse of carbon reduction created an opportunity for potential allies 
to communicate their ambitions when they tried to impose different agendas on the project. The 
indeterminacy of the discourse allowed the project to proceed even in the absence of a consensus 
about what a low-carbon city should be or how it should be built.  
Facilitating development under the framework of a low-carbon city was dependent upon and 
reinforced a strategy of weak carbonization. Rather than what is observed in “the carbonisation 
of urban governance” (Rice, 2010, emphasis in original), weak carbonization represented a 
situation under which a direct connection between carbon emissions production and specific 
development activities was established but, in the meanwhile, obscured by partial measurement 
and biased conceptualization of causes and consequences of carbon emissions. As a result, an 
overwhelming majority of attention and resources were directed to particular areas of economic 
and social life prioritized by the leaders in building low-carbon cities, or the local government in 
the case of SILCC and most of its domestic counterparts. The project of low-carbon cities in 
China provided the local government with an opportunity to redistribute its capacity and 
authority across different aspects of urban life in the face of increasing pressures and demands of 




Radical changes seemed to take a longer time to happen. While the framing of development 
activities shifted from regional cooperation to low-carbon development and to new urbanization, 
the project was driven by the consistent goal of phasing-out traditional manufacturing industries 
and increasing land revenues. In this sense, the SILCC presented a set of values and strategies 
normally found in China’s refueled new town development since the 2000s, which was primarily 
motivated by the desire for growth (Wu, 2015). In addition, carbon management was decoupled 
from the goal of climate protection. For many designers and implementers in the project, setting 
and reaching a mitigation target was the greatest goal a low-carbon city could achieve, but the 
issue of climate change was too big and too distant. 
The enabling role of the nation-state 
Regarding the second question about the role of the state, I argue that the support from the 
central government was essential for the SILCC to gain real momentum. In this respect, SILCC 
resembled many Chinese eco-cities such as the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City and Shanghai 
Dongtan Eco-City (China Society for Urban Studies, 2010). 
Ostensibly, Chinese low-carbon cities are a product of the local government’s 
developmental ambitions. Taking the SILCC as an example, the district government initially 
proposed the project and later advanced the project under the leadership of an ad hoc 
inter-departmental taskforce established within the municipal government. But on the other side, 
the SILCC was well illustrative of the significance of a project’s political status, which was 




ways, the SILCC grew out from an upstream process in which the project proponents searched 
for an effective combination of allies and resources at higher level governments. 
In particular, the central government played a crucial role in facilitating the project. Among 
other things, this role included renaming the project as an ‘international’ low-carbon city and 
designating it as the single flagship project of the newly established EU-China Partnership on 
Urbanisation. These designations turned out to be great sources of political commitment, 
preferential policies, financial investments, public attention, and international influence. As a 
result, the SILCC was distinguished from general low-carbon cities by the broad involvement of 
many foreign governments and institutions as well as domestic players across different sectors. 
This demonstrated that the nation-state acted as the most important nodes in the increasingly 
networked form of global climate governance (Barry & Eckersley, 2005). 
The rise of sub-national actors in climate governance has initiated an ongoing restructuring 
of the state in relation to environmental initiatives, thus calling for “a more dynamic account of 
the state” (Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012, p.743). Rather than “hollowing out”, the nation-state 
plays a pivotal role in the multilevel urban climate governance with its conventionally 
recognized legal and financial power, coordination and steering capacity, and the ability to shape 
social norms. As well, the enabling function of the nation-state in low-carbon initiatives, which 
was highlighted by the SILCC’s case, also related to the discursive nature of such initiatives and 
the overwhelming discursive power held by the nation-state. For example, the central 




as well as carbon reduction, both of which composed major sources of the SILCC’s political 
significance and legitimacy. In addition to standing at the intersection between domestic, 
international, and global pressures (Barry & Eckersley, 2005), the nation-state also acts as the 
intermediator between local authorities and the public by establishing a particular dominant 
discourse.  
On a broader scale, the nation-state defined the spatiality of low-carbon transitions through 
allocating varied responsibility for carbon reduction as well as investment and resources related 
to environmental initiatives. As the SILCC’s case showed, the opportunity to pursue low-carbon 
transitions was unevenly distributed in spatial terms. The municipal government defined whether 
an urban district was ready to turn its traditional industrial site into one exclusively for high-tech 
industries. Similarly, the national government defined the spatial pattern within the borders 
through strategically selecting particular locations for building low-carbon cities, developing 
sites for new low-carbon infrastructures like regional rail transit, and establishing urban 
institutional innovations as model experiments. In this light, the national government predefined 
the eligibility a particular locality to engage in low-carbon initiatives, largely shaped a locality’s 
capability to carry out such initiatives, and designated which initiatives would be potentially 
scaled up. 
Last but not least, horizontal collaboration and coordination across organizational and 
departmental boundaries in the Chinese context is extremely hard to achieve unless emphatically 




challenge in the nascent field of climate governance because of the comprehensiveness of the 
problem it aims to address as well as its experimental approach. Actually, the SILCC gained real 
momentum only after top leaders of the NDRC, which was the primary government apparatus in 
China responsible for climate policy making, and the then Vice-Premier gave their support for 
the project.  
All of these factors point to the rise of “the enabling state” in the transition toward a 
low-carbon pathway of development (Blowers, 1997). With the establishment of a discursive 
state project of carbon reduction, the national state plays an enabling role through a mixture of 
pressures and incentives. It also selectively suspends the regulatory power and purposeful creates 
institutional voids under the carbon exceptionalism to facilitate the low-carbon experiments it 
prioritizes. As well, it creates a political culture where ‘carbon’ is valued.  
The prospect of a paradigm shift 
Regarding my third question, using the notion of low-carbon cities as a rhetorical tool to 
promote urban development does not necessarily mean that its effects occurred merely in the 
discursive sphere. Indeed, the emerging discourse of carbon reduction has brought about many 
profound changes to the development landscape in world cities. For example, serving local needs 
and improving economic, environmental, and social soundness of a locality no longer suffice to 
justify urban development activities. Weight also needs to be given to protecting people from 




Correspondingly, a notion of the shared responsibility of saving the global climate has become 
an integral part of local authorities’ developmental mindset and accountability.  
With the shifting foundation for legitimating development activities, especially 
mega-projects, Chinese low-carbon cities presented new characteristics compared with the 
traditional new town development. Despite a consistently disproportionate focus on capital 
investment approaches than operating ones, low-carbon cities have witnessed a switch away 
from investments in fossil-fuel-based infrastructure and towards alternatives that reduce carbon 
output such as public transit facilities, on-site power, green buildings, and urban forests. In 
addition, the strategy of attracting inward investment has evolved into one of filtering and 
selectively attracting businesses. As well, new place promotion strategies have been devised to 
attract new, less carbon-intensive economic activities. All this evidence points to a new logic of 
competitive cities: the ingredients of a successful city include not only anchoring and exploiting 
mobile capital but also a good image through mitigation efforts. In this regard, “a new dimension 
of the competitive positioning of cities” related to overcoming ecological constraints has political, 
ideological, and moral bases in addition to the environmental ones (Hudson & Marvin, 2009, 
p.124). 
More notably, the new “carbon calculus” of urban governance (While, 2011) has peculiar 
effects in the Chinese political context. Under the upward accountability system, the most 
important political logic that drives local mitigation efforts is not one based on a calculation of 




but one that is centered on recognition of political achievement. Low-carbon initiatives become a 
useful expedient for showcasing local politicians’ achievements for purpose of promotion. For a 
subnational government, taking the initiative in cutting down carbon emissions constitutes a 
gesture of accountability to show their supervisors at higher administrative ranks.  
To some extent, a political culture has been created where dealing with ‘carbon’ was good in 
and of itself. Such a culture encouraged local authorities to engage in various carbon-themed 
activities, among which low-carbon cities are one popular genre of high visibility. The political 
imperative of low-carbon cities is also reinforced by a new set of administrative indicators such 
as carbon intensity, carbon sink, energy efficiency, percentage of energy coming from non-fossil 
fuels, and ridership of the public transportation system as well as the obligatory and cascading 
mitigation target. By these means, the carbon rhetoric penetrates the administrative sphere of the 
state and reshapes the ways in which the performance of government and politicians will be 
assessed.  
8.2. Policy implications 
The findings of this study are of particular relevance to two arenas of urban policymaking. 
First, this study demonstrates that sustainability policymaking and climate planning should pay 
close attention to the discursive nature of low-carbon initiatives, which disqualifies the 
technocratic methods as the exclusive or primary approach to the climate problem. Second, the 
study reveals a shifting foundation for development legitimacy and an altered conceptualization 




the city as a “growth machine” is exposed to new formulas for calculating the cost and benefit of 
development practice (Molotch, 1976). A key question that should be asked is how to take 
advantage of the discursive nature of low-carbon initiatives and the enabling role of the state to 
realize the progressive potential of the decarbonization discourse. 
Urban sustainability policy 
Sustainability policy has long been subject to an “implementation deficit” which is, in a 
large part, attributed to the vagueness and ambiguity of sustainable development (Weale, 1992). 
Similarly, there is a growing gap “between the rhetoric of a need for an urgent response and the 
realities of governing climate change on the ground” (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013, p.140). The 
weak implementation of sustainability and climate policy is a planning failure if planning is 
about transferring knowledge into action (Friedmann, 1987). 
While many commentators see the emerging agenda of carbon reduction as a solution to the 
implementation problem by virtue of its clear and instrumental goals, this study proves that 
low-carbon initiatives are intrinsically discursive and even more prone to poor implementation 
considering the problematic accounts and measurement of carbon emissions. The discursive 
character is a double-edged sword for low-carbon initiatives. On one side, the multifarious 
articulations and operationalizations of the low-carbon notion call into question an established 
evaluation system for the related activities and programs without effective evaluation fail to 
ensure desired and predictable outcomes. Also, the carbon rhetoric can be manipulated by a 




experts and professionals in climate science, and privileged international organizations, to 
achieve their own goals. On the other side, the interpretive flexibility of the decarbonization 
discourse leaves space to incorporate a wide array of issues and concerns in the efforts towards 
carbon reduction. In a word, the discursive character can make low-carbon initiatives both 
exclusive and inclusive.   
From this perspective, the technocratic approaches and expert culture that dominate the 
current climate policymaking calls for reflection. The realization of the progressive potential of 
the decarbonization discourse calls for alternative forms of knowledge through additional 
discursive approaches to policymaking. Moreover, at least in China, the prospect of “subpolitics” 
and a deliberative democracy are minimal considering the pivotal role of the state in enabling 
and scaling up low-carbon initiatives, although the success stories of grassroots initiatives such 
as the Transition Town Movement inspire people’s imagination for citizen-led low-carbon 
transitions (Beck, 1992).  
In the face of a dilemma between a coercive state and an enabling state, the boundaries 
between bottom-up and top-down approaches to climate action have been blurred. In the 
SILCC’s case, a low-carbon city initiative by the local government simultaneously leveraged the 
capacity within the state and at the community level. The analysis of the strategic alliance further 
demonstrated “an ability to cooperate ‘while still disagreeing’” among actors with different 
calculating logics thanks to the interpretive flexibility of the decarbonization discourse (Lieto, 




discursive approaches to policymaking. Rather, to produce real action on the ground, such 
approaches can be employed heuristically to discover more “boundary objects” that could align 
different interest groups and converge different dynamics (Star & Griesemer, 1989). 
The discursive character of low-carbon initiatives also requires policymakers and planners to 
see carbon as an uncertainty. The SILCC’s case shows that a low-carbon city is not made once 
and for all in the sense that the building processes would in the end deliver a finish product. 
Instead, a low-carbon city and low-carbon initiatives alike present an unfolding process filled 
with power struggles, negotiations, spontaneous tactics, and sometimes accidental incidents. 
Furthermore, many arenas that were definitively divided in conventional policy processes, 
including program design, plan drafting, site selection, program implementation, and evaluation 
of outcomes, are intertwined in the advancement of a low-carbon initiative, thus giving rise to a 
perpetually emerging landscape for these efforts. As such, the traditional linear procedure and 
instrumental view in planning and policymaking is less useful for the carbon-centered 
sustainability policy.  
Urban entrepreneurialism 
This study highlights the blurring boundaries between environmental protection and 
economic development under the framework of a low-carbon city. Actually, the whole project of 
the SILCC was based on a conceptualization of the economy-environment relationship that sees 
the two as mutually beneficial and reciprocal. Such a relationship also constitutes a starting point 




as cap-and-trade mechanisms and carbon tax. As responding to climate change has increasingly 
become “a more mainstream economic issue”, carbon reduction strategies have also been 
integrated into the entrepreneurial urban governance (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013, p.141).  
While concern about an extended “market environmentalism” in carbon policymaking and 
the consequent neoliberal lock-in is worth scrutiny (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008), it is equally 
noteworthy that the priority given to carbon, as both materiality and rhetoric, challenges 
conventional urban entrepreneurialism in fundamental ways. Aside from a new set of indicators 
which redefine the effectiveness and efficiency of economic activities, the decarbonization 
discourse re-conceptualizes the accountability and legitimacy of urban development practice, 
which used to be preoccupied by the tasks of attracting increasingly mobile capital and making a 
place more competitive in global economic terms. Taken together, these changes outline a 
progressive potential of the carbon-laden urban governance.  
In particular, the case analysis reveals new calculation on competitive positioning under the 
framework of a low-carbon city. The inclusion of environmental performance stood in striking 
contrast to the race-to-the-bottom strategy of loosening environmental requirements for inter-city 
competition, which has prevailed in Chinese reform era as economic growth was privileged over 
environmental protection. In addition, inter-city relations in the same region started shifting as 
municipal governments made strategic calculations with an eye towards “carbon 
interdependencies” (While et al., 2010). These reconfigured relations opened up new possibilities 




economic purposes. This new situation calls for policymakers to reflect on key presumptions of 
competitive cities, such as competing for what, with whom, and against whom.  
While this study focuses on a case in the Asian developmental state’s context, the ascending 
discourse of decarbonization actually has broader implications for the neoliberal competition 
state. The state’s leading role in promoting economic growth is compounded by its enabling role 
in low-carbon transitions. The analysis of the strategic selectivity illustrates how the consistent 
goal of economic development is reinterpreted and achieved under the decarbonization trope. 
The same analysis also points out that the state’s selectivity is contingent upon and evolving 
through the influence of “the different ‘faces’ of the state” (Carlsson & Sandström, 2008, p.49). 
Being a form of state intervention, planning as well as policymaking must take into account the 
multifaceted character of the state and employ a holistic approach to addressing the intertwined 
problems of climate change and development.   
8.3. Significance and limitations 
The study is situated at the intersection of the literatures on environmental sustainability 
(climate) policy, local development politics, and environmental discourse. Before 
contextualizing the results of the study within these broad research interests, I would like to look 
back upon the three knowledge gaps identified during the course of literature review, including 
(1) the assumption about the quantifiable nature of ‘carbon’ in carbon management, (2) an 




regime of carbon control, and (3) dominance of the prevailing modes of competitive sub-national 
governance in western nations.  
With the goal of problematizing these assumptions and bringing politics back into the notion 
of ‘low carbon’, this study makes three contributions to our existing empirical and theoretical 
understanding of what is termed ‘decarbonization’. First, it investigates the rhetorical side of the 
decarbonization project and how the discourse of carbon reduction exerts its influence through 
ideological, political as well as economic spheres. Second, it argues that low-carbon transitions 
demand a qualitative shift in the state’s role in urban development. And, third, using a Chinese 
example, it directs attention to an Asian developmental state’s context where the 
economy-environment dichotomy is historically sharp. For these regions, the decision on 
reconfiguring the relations between economic growth and carbon reduction is a more 
complicated one in the light of an implicit but vital dimension of legitimacy of the state authority. 
Still, the study demonstrates some progressive potential of the decarbonization discourse to 
redefine the responsibility, legitimacy, and accountability of the development practice, thus 
giving rise to alternative state-society as well as economy-environment relations. 
Aside from these contributions, the study is limited by four main factors. First, the 
single-case research design largely restrains the generalizability of the findings. The SILCC is a 
special case in terms of the economic, political and cultural environment of the Shenzhen 
municipality, which is distinguished from its counterparts in China by a set of features. These 




(1) As one of the sixteen municipalities directly under the central government, or vice 
provincial-level city (副省级城市), and one of the five municipalities separately listed 
on the state plan (计划单列市), Shenzhen has a particularly close relationship with the 
central government. In particular, Shenzhen shares its tax revenues with the central 
government rather than its immediately higher level of administration, the provincial 
government of Guangdong. This arrangement, which is not found in most of Chinese 
cities, makes it easier for Shenzhen to solicit support and allies from the central 
government. In this light, the resource input of the central government in the current case 
might be in part due to an exceptional central-local relationship. Low-carbon programs 
led by local government with varied political profiles may not equally leverage the 
strategically enabling role of the central government found in this study.  
(2) Open policies for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which intend mainly for promoting 
foreign direct investments (FDI), have introduced intense interactions with the 
international community. The engagement with the global economy is made evident by a 
great contribution of FDI to GDP and a superior presence of foreign companies, 
especially those listed in Fortune 500, and immigrant workers (Shenzhen Statistics 
Yearbook, multiple years). Shenzhen is given a “global city” status in accordance with 
various evaluation metrics such as A.T. Kearney Global Cities Index and Globalization 
and World Cities Research Network. The connection with foreign actors and resources 
provides Shenzhen with opportunities of engaging international cooperation, which 
proves to be a key factor for the success of a low-carbon city in China. The availability 
of such opportunities are not, however, evenly distributed across different places.  
(3) Shenzhen has a more liberal environment in terms of an active social sector. By 2018, 




municipality of Shanghai among all Chinese cities.69 The potential of NGOs in driving 
climate action is globally observed but has particularly profound implications for China. 
A reason is that activities of environmental NGOs are seen by the Chinese government 
as less threatening to its legitimacy and authority than NGOs with political and social 
agendas. This gives environmental NGOs a less retrained space to act under the overall 
authoritarian environment. The case of SILCC witnessed the involvement of a handful of 
NGOs with particular industrial as well as environmental focuses. Many of these NGOs 
were located or had offices in Shenzhen. The proximity to social organizations may not 
be found in other places. 
(4) A process of deindustrialization has started unfolding in Shenzhen. This is a result of the 
development of the tertiary sector, whose presence expanded from 50% to over 58% of 
the local GDP between 2008 and 2017 (Shenzhen Statistics Yearbook, multiple years). 
As Shenzhen evolves into a city based on service and R&D sectors, it simultaneously 
shifts away from heavily-polluted industries and related production activities. This 
process also helps to curb carbon emissions on a city scale, thus working for local 
projects with carbon reduction purposes. Nevertheless, a dominating tertiary sector is not 
consistently identified across different cities in the country. For those industrializing 
cities, low-carbon initiatives of sub-municipal scales might encounter more technical 
difficulties. 
In addition, a warm, monsoon-influenced, humid sub-tropical climate makes it easier for 
Shenzhen to present a low-carbon lifestyle or take on particular carbon-reduction strategies. For 
example, the absent winter heating season helps to avoid huge amount of energy consumption 
and GHG emissions, considering the country’s dominant energy source from coal. As well, the 
                                                 




additional costs of achieving the National Green Building Standard are far less in a warm place 
than in a cold one (MOHURD & Peking University, 2012). While the green building 
requirement is a popular strategy in Chinese low-carbon cities, the burden caused by it might be 
moderate for the SILCC compared with its counterparts in the North. As above, to what extent 
the SILCC represents the overall project of low-carbon cities in China is still not clear. 
The second limitation of this study is related to the time frame. The case was in the early 
implementation stage when the study was carried out and most of the efforts concentrated in a 
one–square-kilometer area which was designated as the Pilot Zone. According to the plan, it will 
take decades before the completion of the project which covers a total area of 53km2. Future 
development of the SILCC is uncertain due to the lack of a legislative land use plan in many 
areas within the boundaries of the SILCC. Even though a legislative land use plan for the Pilot 
Zone was in effect, its implementation since 2012 went through a series of significant changes in 
land use compared with what was initially proposed. In this light, the findings in this study are 
tentative.  
Thirdly, the validity of this study is threatened by data collection through interviews. The 
snowball sampling strategy might result in interview participants with similar beliefs and 
propositions on the same topics. In this study, all the interviewees held a supportive or neutral 
attitude toward the SILCC project. The unheard voices of opponents and critics, such as the 




findings to the bright side of the project. Keeping this potential bias in mind is of particular 
importance for reading this particular study.  
Lastly, the study might be exposed to a set of problems associated with the method of 
discourse analysis. For example, the selection of a topic for research reflects a researcher’s 
interests and preoccupations, and the scope of the material to study, and the discourses proposed, 
are inherently subjective in terms of selection. Also, Foucauldian discourse analysis is subject to 
a limited capacity to directly generate normative advice that the policy community sometimes 
seeks, a result that partly arises from Foucault’s deliberate avoidance of defining “what should 
be done”. To offset these weaknesses inherent in the discourse analysis method, this study makes 
this subjectivity transparent by specifying the researcher’s positions in advance of the research 
process. As such, the audience can come to their own judgment about the results. 
8.4. Directions for future research 
In the empirical field, the findings presented here would benefit greatly from comparison 
with other cases. In particular, there is a need for comparison with other low-carbon cities in less 
supportive political environments and across a broader geographical scope. Within the case there 
are a number of issues that remain unexplored. For example, how does the economic 
restructuring through the low-carbon industry requirement affect existing businesses? Are they 
transformed and upgraded on site or removed and relocated? How is the environmental 
performance of the same businesses changed after these processes? These questions shed light on 




society-wide low-carbon transitions via these efforts. As well, as the SILCC was still in its early 
implementation stage, it would provide the opportunities to follow the actual development for a 
more complete understanding of low-carbon initiatives.  
Theoretically, the understanding of low-carbon initiatives would be further deepen through 
building connection with the works of environmental justice. The study shows that opportunity 
and capability to pursue low-carbon transitions is unevenly distributed across different places 
and higher level governments’ decisions play an important role in shaping this spatial pattern. In 
the Western neoliberal context, this distributional issue is also identified and it is found that 
already economically successful places are best equipped to retrofit their economic, social and 
physical infrastructures for such transitions (While et al., 2010). In this regard, low-carbon 
initiatives would become new sources of injustice and inequality.  
This topic is of particular importance to China studies, where justice is not a prominent 
concept in either planning literature or environmental policy research. In particular, theoretical 
discussion on this issue has been limited. An alternative concept of fairness is, however, only a 
recent framework used in urban studies, partly due to the national policy goal of “harmonious 
society” appearing in the mid-2000s and the institutionalization of public participation in 
government decision-making around the same time. 
The existing discussions have mainly focused on empirical cases and case-specific 
interpretation of “fairness”. Little theoretical generalization has been developed except for two 




development fruits and property ownership. It is commonly recognized that property owners 
benefit from development projects more than renters. In many senses, this conclusion is 
indicated by the case in this dissertation, as property owners were readiest to benefit from the 
development of a low-carbon. So property ownership provides a promising perspective to 
interrogate the equality impacts of the decarbonization discourse.  
The other exception is urban-rural disparity due to the household registration system. To a 
large extent, this type of injustice overlaps with injustice relating to property ownership under 
the dual-track urban-rural land administration. The lack of justice discussion is because the 
concept of justice, or even fairness, is contested and constantly evolving, and regional diversity 
and rapid change happening in China’s society renders generalization particularly difficult. Also, 
as the government places top priority on economic growth, development quality issues such as 
fairness comes to a secondary place in development studies. 
The environmental justice theory would provide a fruitful analytical framework to better 
understand the implications of low-carbon transitions for different social groups as well as 
different localities. In contrast to the micro-level case studies of justice/fairness issue in urban 
planning domain, there is a small group of scholars studying macro-level environmental justice. 
This line of discussion has been limited to distributional justice only, and conclusions about 





As the Western studies on environmental justice have moved beyond the distributional 
paradigm into the topic of procedural equity and questions of recognition, difference, and 
political participation (Young, 1990; Fraser, 1997, 1998; Dryzek & Scholsberg, 1998), it would 
be of particular usefulness to interrogate the discursive nature of low-carbon programs and the 
technocratic approaches and expert culture that dominate the current practice. As well, the 
particular attention to policy making procedures under this new interest of environmental justice 
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
1. Anonymous. Associate Professor of Urban Planning, Tsinghua University. April 6, 2015. 
2. Anonymous. Senior Manager, Shenzhen Institute of Building Research Co., Ltd. June 3, 2015. 
3. Anonymous. Associate Architect, Shenzhen Institute of Building Research Co., Ltd. June 5, 
2015. 
4. Anonymous. Senior Planner, Urban Planning and Design Institute of Shenzhen. June 9, 2015. 
5. Anonymous. Associate Director, Shenzhen Center for Public Art. June 12, 2015. 
6. Anonymous. Regional Director, C40 China. June 16, 2015. 
7. Anonymous. Professor of Economy, Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School. 
June 18, 2015. 
8. Anonymous. Deputy Director, Office of Public Relations, People’s Government of Xinxu 
Township. June 18, 2015. 
9. Anonymous. President, Shenzhen Green Low Carbon Development Foundation. June 19, 2015. 
10. Anonymous. Vice President, Shenzhen Green Building Association. June 19, 2015. 
11. Anonymous. Professor of Public Administration, Longgang District Party School. June 23, 2015. 
12. Anonymous. Officer, Longgang Economy Promotion Bureau. June 24, 2015. 
13. Anonymous. Committee Member, Qingxi Township Committee of the Communist Party of China. 
July 1, 2015. 
14. Anonymous. Office Director, People’s Government of Dongguan Municipality. July 7, 2015. 
15. Anonymous. Local resident, Gekeng community. July 9, 2015. 
16. Anonymous. Chair, Office of Carbon-Trading, Development and Reform Commission of 
Shenzhen Municipality. July 14, 2015. 
17. Anonymous. Deputy Chair, Office of Urban Development, Development and Reform 
Commission of Shenzhen Municipality. July 15, 2015. 




19. Anonymous. Deputy Secretary-General, Longgang District Committee of the Communist Party 
of China. July 22, 2015. 
20. Anonymous. Representative, Public Relations, Shenzhen Grandsun Electronics Company Ltd. 
July 28, 2015. 
21. Anonymous. City Planner, Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission of Shenzhen 
Municipality. July 29, 2015. 
22. Anonymous. Representative, Public Relations, Shennan Circuits Company Ltd. July 31, 2015. 
23. Anonymous. Program Associate, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Construction and 
Development Corporation. August 4, 2015. 
24. Anonymous. Project Manager, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Construction and Development 
Corporation. August 5, 2015. 
25. Anonymous. Reporter, ShenzhenHome.com. August 11, 2015. 
26. Anonymous. Director, SILCC Office, People’s Government of Longgang District. August 12, 
2015; September 14, 2017. 
27. Anonymous. Vice mayor, People’s Government of Shenzhen Municipality. September 29, 2015. 
28. Anonymous. Chair, Department of Public Relations, Shenzhen Weistek Co., Ltd. December 3, 
2015. 
29. Anonymous. Deputy Secretary-General, Guangdong Province Committee of the Communist 
Party of China. December 16, 2015. 
30. Anonymous. Deputy Director, Space Technology Center South. January 7, 2016. 
31. Anonymous. Deputy Secretary-General, Huizhou Municipality Committee of the Communist 
Party of China. June 17, 2016. 
32. Anonymous. Officer, Longgang District Land Requisition Center. July 19, 2016. 
33. Anonymous. Deputy Chair, Climate Change Division, National Development and Reform 




34. Anonymous. Former Minister, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of People’s 
Republic of China. May 18, 2017. 
35. Anonymous. Researcher, Delft University of Technology. August 17, 2017. 
36. Anonymous. Project Manager, Shenzhen Energy Group Co., Ltd. September 12, 2017. 
37. Anonymous. Local resident, Gaoqiao community. September 18, 2017. 
38. Anonymous. Local resident, Pingxi community. September 21, 2017. 
39. Anonymous. Officer, Shenzhen Municipality State-Owned Assets Supervision and 





Appendix B: Interview Questionnaire 
Q1: Which agency are you working for? What is your title within this agency? Please introduce 
generally the nature and functions of your agency.  
 
Q2: Under what circumstances did you and your agency start to engage in this project? What are 
the initial incentives that drove your agency to participate in this project? Have these incentives 
changed over time? 
 
Q3: What are your agency’s main tasks for this project? How have you performed these tasks? 
How have you made decisions during the process? 
 
Q4: What are the main difficulties and challenges that encounter you during the process of 
performing your tasks? How have you overcome them? In your opinion, why are these 
difficulties and challenges in place? 
 
Q5: What are the other agencies that you work with/beside for the project? How do you 
cooperate with each other? How do you deal with conflicts that rise between you and any of 
them? Who has the final say? 
 
Q6: According to your knowledge, how is the project going? Are there any problems that 
obstruct the implementation of the project? 
 
Q7: Who are the key actors in the implementation of the project? What is the relationship 
between these actors? Who has the greatest power to influence the project? 
 
Q8: How do you perceive this project? What characteristics distinguish this project from other 
similar projects in the country? 
 
Q9: How do you understand the concept of a low-carbon community? What does “low-carbon” 
mean?  
 
Q10: What do you think is the goal of the project? To date, to what extent has this goal been 
achieved? By what criteria is the achievement evaluated? 
 
Q11: How does the project impact different groups of on-site people, such as local residents, 
business, and public officials, etc.? 
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Translations 
 
Q1：您在哪个单位工作？您的职位是什么？请简单介绍一下您所在单位的性质和职能？ 
 
Q2：您所在单位和您本人是在什么样的机缘下参与到该项目中来的？最初参加是为了什么？
随着时间推移， 参与的动机是否发生了变化？ 
 
Q3：您所在单位在这个项目中承担的主要工作有哪些？你们是怎样开展这些工作的？在这
一过程中，你们怎样做决定？ 
 
Q4：在你们的工作中遇到了哪些困难和挑战？当遇到这些问题时，你们如何应对？在您看
来，为什么会出现这些问题？ 
 
Q5：在这个项目中，和您打过交道的还有哪些单位？您所在单位和这些单位怎么合作？当
出现分歧时，你们如何解除？谁掌握最终的话语权？ 
 
Q6：据您所知，目前该项目进展的情况如何？是否出现了阻碍项目实施的因素？ 
 
Q7：该项目实施的关键人员和部门有哪些？他们之间的关系是什么样的？在影响项目走向
方面，谁的权力最大？ 
 
Q8：您对这个项目怎么看？您认为和国内其他类似项目相比，这个项目有哪些特别之处？ 
 
Q9：您是如何理解低碳社区这一概念的？低碳意味着什么？ 
 
Q10：您认为实施这个项目的目的是什么？目前为止，该目标实现了多少？可以用那些指
标进行评估？ 
 
Q11：这个项目对当地的各种人群，例如当地居民、驻地企业、当地政府官员等产生了哪
些影响？ 
 
 
